What if the defining political struggle of our time isn't left versus right, but national sovereignty versus global financial power? In a revealing interview with Michelle Makori, political strategist Susan Kokinda argues that Donald Trump is challenging an entrenched financial order through manufacturing, investment and economic independence. From central banks and gold-backed currencies to America's debt crisis and a possible new Bretton Woods system, the discussion raises a vital question for New Zealand: who really controls our economic future?
INR Report: Based on an interview conducted by Michelle Makori, President and Editor-in-Chief of Miles Franklin Media, with Susan Kokinda, Coalitions Vice Chair of the Michigan Republican Party and co-founder of Promethean Action, for The Real Story with Michelle Makori, published by Miles Franklin Media — Trump vs. the Globalists: Is a New Financial Order Taking Shape? HERE on 1 November 2026.
Two Competing Systems
The political debate surrounding Donald Trump is usually presented as a contest between Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and progressives, or nationalism and globalisation. Susan Kokinda believes that description misses a much more fundamental conflict. In her interview with Michelle Makori, she argues that the United States is confronting two competing models of economic organisation, each with profoundly different consequences for national independence, industrial development and the prosperity of ordinary citizens.
Kokinda calls the first model the American System, drawing on the economic thinking of Alexander Hamilton, Abraham Lincoln and William McKinley. Its defining characteristics, as she describes them, are national banking, protective tariffs, infrastructure development, technological progress and investment in productive industries. In this framework, economic policy should strengthen a country's ability to manufacture goods, develop resources, employ its citizens and improve living standards through increasing productivity.
The competing model, which Kokinda calls the British imperial system, is presented as one in which financial power, international institutions and large corporate interests exert influence over national economic decisions. She argues that this system has evolved far beyond the formal British Empire and now operates through international finance, central banking, global trade arrangements and influential policy institutions.
This is Kokinda's historical and political interpretation, not an established finding that these diverse institutions operate under a single command structure. Nevertheless, her distinction between productive economic development and the accumulation of financial power raises questions extending well beyond American politics.
At its heart is a question that every independent country must confront: should economic policy primarily serve the development of a nation's productive capacity, or should national governments adapt their policies to the requirements of international financial markets?
The Meaning of Sovereignty
For Kokinda, sovereignty means considerably more than possessing a flag, a parliament and internationally recognised borders. It includes the practical ability to determine how a nation's resources are developed, how its industries are financed and how economic policy is directed towards the welfare of its population.
A country may be legally independent while remaining heavily dependent on imported energy, overseas technology, foreign investment and international borrowing. It may possess substantial natural resources but lack the domestic capacity to process them. It may export raw materials while importing the manufactured products derived from those same resources.
Such arrangements are not necessarily evidence of exploitation. International trade and investment can increase prosperity, improve access to technology and allow smaller economies to specialise in industries where they are competitive.
But dependence also creates vulnerabilities.
When essential goods, financial services or energy supplies are concentrated in external markets, disruptions beyond a nation's control can quickly affect households, businesses and public finances.
Kokinda's argument is that genuine economic sovereignty requires a productive foundation strong enough to support meaningful national choice.
That distinction deserves consideration in New Zealand, where debates about sovereignty often focus on constitutional arrangements while giving comparatively little attention to the economic structures that determine what governments can realistically achieve.
The Financial Architecture
One of the interview's most provocative themes concerns the institutions that influence international finance.
Kokinda identifies the City of London, the Bank of England, central banking systems, the World Economic Forum, Chatham House and the Council on Foreign Relations as important elements of what she regards as a continuing international establishment.
She argues that the influence of this establishment is not necessarily exercised through direct instructions to individual governments. Instead, it operates through financial incentives, institutional relationships, accepted economic assumptions and the development of policy frameworks that become difficult to challenge.
In Kokinda's interpretation, the most effective form of influence occurs when political leaders and citizens come to regard particular economic arrangements as inevitable.
Makori presses her guest on an important distinction. Britain is no longer the dominant industrial or military power it once was, while much of the world's financial activity is centred in the United States and other major economies. Why, then, does Kokinda continue to describe the system as British?
Her answer is that she is referring to a historical model of financial organisation rather than the contemporary British state alone.
The claim requires qualification. Central banks, international organisations and financial institutions differ substantially in their legal structures, mandates, ownership and accountability. Their participation in an interconnected financial system does not establish that they pursue one coordinated political objective.
However, the concentration of financial influence and the relationship between international capital and domestic policymaking are legitimate subjects for scrutiny.
The question is not simply whether international institutions exist, but how their decisions affect the choices available to elected governments.
Wealth or Production?
Perhaps the most accessible part of Kokinda's argument concerns the difference between creating wealth and transferring existing wealth.
She uses the history of Detroit to illustrate her position.
During the height of American industrial expansion, Detroit became synonymous with automobile manufacturing, skilled employment and the growth of a substantial working and middle class.
Kokinda recalls an economy in which industrial employment could provide sufficient income for a family to purchase a home, raise children and anticipate a better future.
She contrasts that experience with the economic decline associated with factory closures, industrial restructuring and the movement of production to lower-cost locations.
Her argument is that financial wealth alone does not guarantee national prosperity.
An economy can possess sophisticated financial markets while struggling to provide stable employment, affordable housing or opportunities for productive investment.
Kokinda also challenges the assumption that wealth automatically makes someone an oligarch. She distinguishes entrepreneurs who develop industries and employ workers from systems of power that, in her view, preserve advantages for a narrow group at the expense of broader economic development.
The distinction is debatable, but it identifies an important economic question: does the financial system channel savings and investment into activities that expand productive capacity, or does it disproportionately reward speculation and short-term financial returns?
For New Zealand, this question is especially relevant to the allocation of capital between residential property, existing financial assets, manufacturing, infrastructure and emerging industries.
Trump's Industrial Gamble
Kokinda interprets Trump's economic programme as an attempt to revive the American System.
She points to tariffs, tax incentives and government-supported financing as three elements of an industrial strategy intended to encourage businesses to establish or expand production within the United States.
Tariffs can increase the cost of imported goods, potentially making domestic production more competitive. Tax incentives can improve the financial attractiveness of constructing factories and investing in machinery. Government lending and guarantees can help finance projects that commercial lenders might regard as too risky or insufficiently profitable in the short term.
Kokinda argues that these measures are intended to operate together rather than independently.
She also highlights the role of public financing institutions, including the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Capital, in supporting industrial and strategically important projects.
Her broader argument is that governments should not merely wait for financial markets to determine which industries develop. They should actively create conditions that encourage investment in strategically important productive capacity.
The interview includes Kokinda's claims about manufacturing job growth, factory announcements and industrial investment during Trump's administration. These figures are presented as evidence of a recovery, but they have not been independently verified for this report.
There are also economic trade-offs. Tariffs can raise prices for consumers and businesses, provoke retaliation and protect industries that may not become internationally competitive. Public investment programmes can encourage development but may also expose taxpayers to losses.
The central issue is whether the long-term benefits of increased productive capacity outweigh those costs.
Who Controls the Credit?
One of the most significant aspects of the interview is its discussion of credit.
Kokinda argues that industrial development depends not only on the willingness of entrepreneurs to invest, but also on whether financing is available on terms appropriate to long-term productive activity.
A factory, processing plant or major infrastructure project may require years of investment before generating substantial returns.
By contrast, many financial transactions can generate profits over much shorter periods.
Kokinda believes that modern financial arrangements have increasingly favoured the latter.
Her proposed alternative draws on Hamilton's conception of national credit, under which public financial institutions and government policy help direct capital towards projects considered important for national development.
This does not necessarily require government ownership of industry. It can involve loans, guarantees, tax arrangements and partnerships intended to mobilise private investment.
The distinction matters because the availability of credit helps determine what a country can build.
A nation with abundant resources and skilled workers may still struggle to develop strategic industries if investment capital is unavailable, excessively expensive or directed towards other assets.
For New Zealand, the question is whether the financial system provides sufficient long-term support for productive businesses, regional infrastructure, technological innovation and domestic processing industries.
The Dollar Dilemma
The interview then moves from industrial policy to the foundations of the international monetary system.
Makori raises the Triffin dilemma, named after economist Robert Triffin, which concerns tensions arising when a national currency also serves as the world's principal reserve currency.
The United States benefits from international demand for dollars and dollar-denominated financial assets. However, supplying liquidity to the global economy can create tensions between domestic economic objectives and the requirements of the international monetary system.
Kokinda connects these problems to the decision in August 1971 to end the dollar's direct convertibility into gold for foreign monetary authorities.
That decision helped bring an end to the original Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates.
Since then, the world has operated primarily through fiat currencies and exchange rates determined by varying combinations of market forces and government intervention.
Kokinda argues that this transformation contributed to an international financial environment increasingly detached from tangible productive activity.
She associates the modern system with currency speculation, financial derivatives and the expansion of dollar-denominated credit outside the United States.
That interpretation should not be confused with a settled conclusion that fiat currencies or financial derivatives are inherently destructive. Modern monetary arrangements have also provided flexibility in responding to economic shocks, financing investment and managing liquidity.
Nevertheless, the relationship between currency stability, financial speculation and productive economic development remains a major subject of international debate.
Could Gold Return?
A particularly intriguing section concerns economist Judy Shelton and her advocacy of monetary arrangements involving gold.
Makori discusses Shelton's proposals for long-term US Treasury securities linked to gold and asks whether her advisory role signals a wider reconsideration of the international monetary system.
Kokinda believes the Trump administration is examining the vulnerabilities of the existing financial architecture and may be considering alternatives that connect monetary stability more closely to productive economic activity.
She also refers to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and the possibility of a new Bretton Woods-style agreement.
The original Bretton Woods conference in 1944 established an international monetary framework intended to support financial stability and post-war reconstruction. The system linked participating currencies to the US dollar, which was convertible into gold under specified arrangements.
A modern equivalent would require substantial international negotiation and agreement over exchange rates, reserve assets, capital flows and monetary responsibilities.
The interview does not establish that the United States has adopted a gold-backed currency policy or formally committed to a new Bretton Woods agreement.
Rather, Kokinda interprets the involvement and statements of certain economic advisers as signs that alternative arrangements are being considered.
The distinction is important.
A gold-linked monetary system might be intended to strengthen confidence in currency value, but it could also restrict monetary flexibility and introduce new economic risks.
Whether any proposed system would improve stability depends on its design, governance and ability to respond to financial crises.
Debt and the Real Economy
The United States' substantial public debt is another central concern.
Kokinda argues that economic growth, rather than austerity alone, should be the principal means of improving the country's long-term fiscal position.
Her reasoning is straightforward: an economy that expands productive capacity can generate additional income, employment and tax revenue, potentially improving the government's ability to service existing obligations.
She contrasts that approach with policies focused primarily on expenditure reductions.
Makori challenges the practical record, observing that attempts to reduce government spending have not necessarily delivered the promised savings.
The exchange exposes an important limitation in the argument.
Economic growth can improve debt sustainability, but it does not automatically resolve persistent deficits. Borrowing costs, taxation, expenditure commitments and the rate of economic expansion all matter.
Likewise, public investment can support future growth while increasing borrowing requirements in the short term.
The question is whether debt finances activities that generate sufficient long-term economic value.
For New Zealand, this distinction is directly relevant to debates over infrastructure spending, public investment, government borrowing and the productive return achieved from major projects.
The Politics of Globalisation
The interview moves beyond economics into the political institutions and ideological movements Kokinda believes have shaped the international order.
She discusses Chatham House, the World Economic Forum, influential political figures, cultural institutions and the historical relationship between British and American power.
Kokinda argues that globalisation has been promoted not merely as an economic arrangement but as a set of assumptions about how societies should be governed.
Her analysis extends to education, political philosophy, cultural movements and the influence of international policy networks.
These are among the interview's most contentious claims.
Participation in international forums, support for free trade or advocacy of international cooperation does not, by itself, demonstrate an intention to undermine national sovereignty.
Nor does the existence of relationships among political leaders, businesses and think tanks establish a unified conspiracy.
Nevertheless, there is a legitimate distinction between international cooperation undertaken by sovereign governments and arrangements that reduce democratic control over important decisions.
The practical test is whether governments retain meaningful authority, whether commitments are transparent and whether citizens can hold decision-makers accountable.
An International Power Struggle
Kokinda also places economic sovereignty within a wider geopolitical framework involving China, Iran and the future balance of international power.
She discusses Trump's approach to China as part of an attempt to strengthen American productive capacity and reduce strategic dependencies.
Her interpretation suggests that economic competition is increasingly inseparable from questions of national security.
Access to energy, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, transport infrastructure and financial systems can all influence a country's ability to act independently.
The interview also examines American pressure on Iran and the risks of disrupting an already fragile international financial system.
Kokinda argues that economic sanctions and financial restrictions must be managed carefully because sudden disruptions can have consequences extending beyond their immediate targets.
These observations reinforce a broader theme: modern national sovereignty is exercised within an international network of economic relationships.
Even the largest economies cannot simply detach themselves from global trade, finance and supply chains without substantial consequences.
The challenge is therefore not necessarily to eliminate interdependence, but to manage it without surrendering essential national capabilities.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
For New Zealand, the interview raises questions that deserve serious examination.
Our country is politically independent, but its economy operates within international financial, trading and monetary arrangements over which it exercises limited influence.
The New Zealand dollar is a floating currency whose value responds to domestic conditions, international interest rates, commodity prices and global investor sentiment.
Our banking system is closely integrated with international capital markets, while major parts of the domestic banking sector are owned by Australian banking groups.
International investment provides valuable access to capital, but reliance on overseas funding can also expose borrowers and businesses to changing global financial conditions.
New Zealand is similarly dependent on international supply chains for fuel, machinery, vehicles, technology and many manufactured products.
These arrangements bring benefits, but they also create vulnerabilities when supply chains are disrupted or international prices rise.
Kokinda's emphasis on productive capacity invites a question: has New Zealand devoted sufficient attention to the industries and infrastructure required to sustain genuine economic independence?
What Do We Produce?
New Zealand has considerable strengths in agriculture, food production, specialised manufacturing, technology and renewable electricity generation.
Yet important parts of the economy remain dependent on exporting commodities and importing higher-value manufactured goods.
There are opportunities to expand domestic processing, improve productivity, strengthen regional manufacturing and develop technologies suited to New Zealand's particular resources and capabilities.
The question is not whether New Zealand should abandon international trade. As a small economy, access to overseas markets is essential to its prosperity.
Rather, it is whether we are making the most of the productive opportunities available within our own borders.
A stronger manufacturing base could create skilled employment, support regional communities and reduce dependence on selected imported products.
Investment in infrastructure, research, workforce training and energy resilience could similarly improve the country's capacity to withstand international shocks.
Such policies would need to be judged on their economic merits, environmental consequences and long-term affordability.
But the underlying principle is worth examining: an independent nation should understand which capabilities are essential to its future and whether it possesses the means to sustain them.
Who Benefits From Our Capital?
Another question concerns the allocation of investment.
New Zealand has experienced extended periods in which residential property has attracted substantial household and institutional capital.
Property investment can provide accommodation, support construction and generate legitimate returns.
However, an economy also needs investment in businesses that create new products, improve technology, increase exports and raise productivity.
When capital flows disproportionately into existing assets, the resulting increases in asset values do not necessarily produce equivalent gains in national productive capacity.
Kokinda's argument about credit and manufacturing therefore has a clear local application.
Could New Zealand do more to ensure that promising manufacturers, exporters, infrastructure providers and emerging technology businesses can access patient, long-term capital?
What role should commercial banks, public institutions, private investors and government policy play in achieving that objective?
These questions do not have simple answers, but they are fundamental to the country's long-term prosperity.
Sovereignty Requires Choices
Economic sovereignty should not be confused with complete self-sufficiency.
No modern economy can efficiently produce everything it needs, and attempts to do so can impose substantial costs on consumers and businesses.
International cooperation can strengthen national security, expand markets and improve access to investment and technology.
But cooperation should not prevent a country from examining the consequences of its commitments.
New Zealand's elected representatives must remain accountable for decisions affecting public finances, essential infrastructure, natural resources and national development.
Where international agreements or financial arrangements constrain domestic policy, those constraints should be understood and openly debated.
Where strategic dependencies create risks, those risks should be identified and addressed.
And where opportunities exist to strengthen productive capacity, they deserve serious consideration rather than automatic dismissal.
The sovereignty question is therefore not simply whether New Zealand participates in the international system.
It is whether New Zealand participates from a position of sufficient economic strength, democratic accountability and informed choice.
Knowledge Is Power
The interview concludes with a discussion of individual sovereignty.
Makori asks what ordinary people can do to preserve their independence in an uncertain financial and political environment.
Kokinda responds that genuine sovereignty begins with understanding how economic and political systems operate.
Her argument is that independence cannot be achieved merely by declaring oneself independent. Citizens must understand the institutions, incentives and decisions that shape their opportunities.
That is perhaps the most valuable message of the entire conversation.
People do not need to accept every aspect of Kokinda's historical interpretation to recognise the importance of understanding money, credit, industry, international trade and the relationship between governments and financial institutions.
Nor must they agree with Trump's economic programme to ask whether their own country is building sufficient productive capacity to support future generations.
For New Zealand, these questions are particularly relevant as households confront living costs, businesses struggle with investment and productivity, and policymakers debate the country's economic direction.
The Sovereignty Test
The fundamental issue raised by Michelle Makori and Susan Kokinda is not whether international cooperation should exist.
It is whether sovereign nations retain the practical capacity to shape their own futures.
A country that cannot finance essential development, maintain strategic infrastructure or support productive industries may discover that its formal independence provides less freedom of action than its citizens assume.
Conversely, a country that invests wisely in productive capacity, maintains credible institutions and manages international relationships carefully can strengthen both its prosperity and its independence.
Kokinda presents the current struggle as a confrontation between two competing economic systems.
Whether that interpretation accurately describes the motives of the institutions and political figures she identifies remains open to debate.
But the underlying questions are real.
Who determines where capital flows? Who benefits from economic growth? Who controls essential infrastructure? What does a country actually produce? And how much freedom do elected governments possess to pursue the interests of their own citizens?
For New Zealand, these are not abstract questions about Washington, London or the international financial establishment.
They are questions about our own economic future.
A sovereign nation must be more than politically independent. It must possess the knowledge, productive strength and institutional capacity to make independence meaningful.
That is the challenge this interview places before us.
Watch the Full Interview (above)
Trump vs. the Globalists: Is a New Financial Order Taking Shape?
Michelle Makori interviews Susan Kokinda for The Real Story, published by Miles Franklin Media on 1 November 2026.
Sources
- Miles Franklin Media — Trump vs. the Globalists: Is a New Financial Order Taking Shape? — Primary interview, 1 November 2026.
- Promethean Action — Organisation co-founded by Susan Kokinda; background on her political and economic arguments.
- US Department of the Treasury — Official information on American fiscal and financial policy.
- International Monetary Fund — International monetary arrangements, economic surveillance and financial stability.
- Reserve Bank of New Zealand — New Zealand monetary policy and financial-system information.
- New Zealand Treasury — Government fiscal policy and economic analysis.
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment — New Zealand industry, trade and economic development.