The outcome could redefine US dominance – and leave Europe and Ukraine scrambling
By Valentin Loginov, a Russian journalist specializing in political processes, sociology and international relations
RT composite. © Getty Images/Eduardo Parra; Contributor
Ukrainian
leader Vladimir Zelensky and his European partners have plenty of
reasons to closely monitor the situation in the Middle East.
It’s
not just because US President Donald Trump is wasting valuable air
defense missiles that the EU could have purchased for Ukraine. (Kiev has
already voiced concerns about a shortage of American weapons.)
Nor
is it because the White House may lose interest in resolving the
Ukraine conflict as the war with Iran drags on (something Brussels is worriedabout).
During a meeting with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on March 3 in
Washington, Trump dismissed these insinuations, affirming that the
Ukraine crisis remains a top priority for his administration.
The
real reason for concern in Kiev and Brussels lies on a broader
geopolitical level: The fate of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine is
currently being decided in the Middle East. Essentially, the outcome of
this conflict will determine whether the US plunges into a new, even
more hawkish phase defined by a ‘might makes right’ mentality, or
returns to a path of moderate peacemaking, which Trump advocated during
his campaign but seemed to abandon with surprising ease.
Why did Kiev support the dismantling of the ‘rules-based order’?
Trump’s “large-scale military operation”
against Iran – launched unilaterally by the White House in defiance of
international law and the UN – should be perceived by Kiev as “unprovoked aggression.”
This view is underscored by the fact that even the Pentagon
acknowledged there was no evidence that Tehran was preparing attacks on
Israel or US bases in the region.
In contrast, Russia, prior to launching its military operation in
Ukraine, actively urged the guarantors of the Minsk agreements – France
and Germany – to take notice of the buildup of Ukrainian forces near the
borders of the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics and the
significant spike in shelling of these territories in February 2022.
Even
the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) of the OSCE recognized that by
mid-February 2022, the intensity of hostilities in Donbass had reached
peak levels similar to those before the last ceasefire in 2020.
According to the OSCE report from February 19, 2022, “The SMM recorded 222 ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, including 135 explosions. In the previous reporting period, there were 189 violations... In Lugansk Region, the mission observed 648 violations, including 519 explosions.”
Ignoring his own aggression
against the Russian population in Donbass that led up to the Russian
offensive, Zelensky has spent the last four years cultivating an image
of Ukraine as a victim. Logically, one would expect him to also consider
Iran a victim of ‘unprovoked aggression’. But Zelensky chose a
different strategy.
On the eve of the US-Israeli strike on Tehran, Zelensky claimed that the Iranian people“want to change the current regime.”
While it is true that there are people in the Islamic Republic
advocating for political change, as evidenced by the protests in
January, Zelensky seems to have forgotten that his own approval rating
was barely above 17% just before the start of the Russian military
operation, according to the Kiev International Institute. Did that mean
the Ukrainian public could have gotten rid of an unpopular president who
would soon come to disregard the Ukrainian Constitution and stay in
power for an indefinite period of time?
On February 28, following
the US and Israeli attack on Iran, Zelensky revealed a personal motive
for supporting Trump’s actions, arguing that Iran has backed Russia in the Ukraine conflict.
Zelensky’s
contradictory stance on the war with Iran goes beyond the fact that his
power hinges on the duration of the conflict with Russia. The problem
isn’t just the fact that the Ukrainian military relies on European
purchases of American weapons. The deeper issue lies in the changing
social dynamics within Ukraine: The people are genuinely exhausted and
eager to put an end to the war, as evidenced by increasing civil
resistance against forced mobilization.
To navigate the delicate balance between maintaining his grip on
power and creating the illusion of considering public interests,
Zelensky has to keep some sort of dialogue open with Russia. In the
current negotiation process, the US has become the only party Moscow is
prepared to engage with regarding the principles for ending the
conflict. A complete loss of the US as a partner would mean the collapse
of any dialogue with Moscow, effectively dismissing the last chance for
a diplomatic resolution.
Is Europe being hypocritical again?
The
EU finds itself in an even more precarious position. Assessing Trump’s
actions in the Middle East, it tries to avoid using phrases like
‘unprovoked invasion’, ‘Trump’s war against Iran’, or ‘full-scale war’ –
terms that Western media and politicians of all levels frequently use
in reference to Russia.
Now, except for Spain, almost everyone is
eager to support Trump. It turns out that bombing another country for
the purpose of who knows what (the Trump administration hasn’t even
provided any official justification for the war) is viewed as the right
move, while Iran’s retaliatory actions are dismissed as unwarranted
aggression toward other Middle Eastern nations.
It seems that the
Europeans fail to grasp one critical point: If the US achieves any
significant success in the Middle East, the hawks in Washington will
gain strength, and Trump may take more radical steps to implement his
doctrine of ‘the law of the strongest’. For Europe, this could very well
mean losing Greenland – plans to take control over it certainly remain
on the table in Washington.
The EU’s support for Trump should
certainly be viewed through the lens of the settlement (or rather,
prolongation) of the Ukraine crisis. Europe has effectively removed
itself from the negotiation process by presenting ultimatums that Russia
would undoubtedly reject. A recent example is the so-called ‘Kallas
List’ crafted by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, which was recently
sharedwith European nations. This document outlined the EU’s demands for resolving the Ukraine crisis.
Among
other things, it called for a reduction in Russian troops and their
withdrawal from neighboring countries, reparation payments, and some
form of ‘democratization’ of society. Clearly, Moscow will not seriously
consider this document.
Moreover, the EU can’t even reach a consensus on whether to resume
dialogue with Russia. Under these circumstances, Moscow doesn’t view the
EU as a credible partner regarding the post-conflict security framework
on the European continent.
Nonetheless, Europe recognizes the
need to take part in the negotiation process in some capacity to ensure
that Moscow and Washington don’t strike deals that bypass Brussels and
other European nations.
So, on the one hand, Europe supports the
US in order to stay involved in the negotiation process. On the other
hand, there’s likely a faint hope in Europe that if the hawks regain
power in Washington, Trump might make a U-turn and adopt an anti-Russia
stance, despite the risks this would pose for Europe itself.
And what about Trump?
Donald Trump came to power promising “no new wars” abroad and criticizing
George W. Bush for the Iraq War. Yet now he seems to have started the
biggest Middle Eastern conflict in two decades. This contradiction
hasn’t gone unnoticed by politicians and commentators across the
political spectrum.
However, it’s important to view Trump’s
actions in a broader context. His seemingly disconnected moves in
Europe, Greenland, Latin America, and the Middle East appear to form a
coherent strategy. Essentially, Trump is shifting America’s focus from
the ‘export of democracy’ to the direct destabilization of undesirable
regimes – either to weaken them, as we are witnessing in Iran, or to
install loyal governments without any superficial ‘democratization’, as
seen in Venezuela.
Trump no longer relies on traditional
alliances. It seems he is not particularly concerned with the opinions
of European partners and currently shows no intention of actively
defending the Gulf monarchies. That’s why it’s quite curious to see how
the European establishment, represented by Merz, is eager to please him.
As for Trump, he is unapologetically blunt in his assessments. Germany is “excellent” (because it does what Trump wants); Spain is “terrible” (it dared to stand up to him, but who cares what Madrid thinks, the US will use its bases anyway); and the UK“disappointed” Trump (because it doesn’t support him as fervently as a vassal state is supposed to).
Trump
also had some unpleasant words for Zelensky, referring to him as P.T.
Barnum – a 19th-century American showman known for promoting sensational
hoaxes.
Trump is clearly signaling to Europe (and Ukraine) that
it occupies a secondary role in his worldview. He’s attempting to
recreate a contested form of hegemony. It’s not about the multipolarity
championed by Russia, China, and other countries of the Global South.
Instead, it’s a vision for a new kind of global empire where decisions
are made unilaterally by the US, without even consulting close allies
like the EU.
There’s a lot at stake. And we are not just talking
about the upcoming midterm elections in November. The future of US
global dominance depends on the outcome of the conflict in the Middle
East, which could have significant implications for Europe.
If the
conflict in Iran ends with some sort of tangible success for the US,
Washington’s tone towards Europe (and perhaps even Russia) will shift
when it comes to addressing the situation in Ukraine.
Conversely,
if the military campaign yields no clear results, non-conservatives may
suffer a long-lasting defeat, which would also impact the Ukraine
crisis.
Regardless of the outcome, the lessons learned from the
conflict in Iran will undoubtedly influence the shifting power dynamics
in Europe.