Modern "legal" rules of engagement create more civilian suffering, death and destruction
Dr. Robert W. Malone
What has changed in modern warfare is not just technology. It is constraint.
The rules governing armed conflict, shaped in large part by the Geneva Conventions,
place real limits on how force can be applied. These limits are not
theoretical. They operate in real time, at the level of the individual
soldier, the pilot, the commander, making a targeting decision. They
shape what can be done, when it can be done, and often whether it can be
done at all.
You cannot strike unless you can distinguish
the combatant from the civilian. You cannot proceed if the anticipated
civilian harm is judged disproportionate to the military objective. You
are expected to accept a degree of tactical risk to reduce risk to
noncombatants, ergo civilians.
In practice, this translates into
hesitation, verification, legal review, and delay. It means fewer
overwhelming blows and fewer moments where force is applied in a way
that collapses the opponent’s system all at once.
Historically,
wars were often ended by a concentration of force. Infrastructure was
destroyed, supply lines were severed, and the enemy’s ability to sustain
itself, both militarily and socially, was broken. That pathway has
narrowed, and if the Geneva conventions are followed, it results in
“forever wars.” The result is not necessarily defeat but something
subtler and more corrosive. It is the erosion of the ability to end a
conflict quickly and decisively. In the end, the countries at war may
actually face more death and destruction, not less, as wars stretch out
endlessly.
What replaces unrestricted warfare is incrementalism.
Ground is taken, secured, and then contested again. Progress is measured
in small gains that must be constantly defended. The same roads, the
same towns, the same ground are fought over repeatedly. Control becomes
temporary, conditional, and reversible. The United Nations keeps watch
to ensure that the more powerful nations don’t overstep their authority.
God forbid an unequal display of war power were to emerge. It is all
about equity.
Into that environment steps the irregular fighter.
Not a uniformed army standing in formation, but a fluid presence
embedded within the civilian population. There are no fixed front lines
and no clear boundary between the battlefield and daily life. Weapons
are concealed, identities shift, and engagement happens on their terms. A
shot, an explosion, and then a disappearance back into the fabric of
the town or village.
Asymmetric warfare is a type of war between
nations whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ
significantly. Before the recent amendments to the Geneva Conventions,
such wars would have been finished rather quickly. Waging successful
asymmetric warfare is how the United States gained independence from the
most powerful war machine of the era, Great Britain.
Guerrilla
tactics or warfare focus on avoiding head-on confrontations with enemy
armies, typically because of reliance on inferior arms or forces, and
instead engage in limited skirmishes to exhaust adversaries, wear down
their political will, and force them to withdraw. Organized guerrilla
groups often depend on support from either the local population or
foreign backers who sympathize with their efforts.
This is not
incidental. It is strategic. These tactics exploit the very protections
that constrain conventional forces. If you cannot clearly distinguish a
combatant, you cannot lawfully engage, because of the Geneva Convention
constraints. If engagement risks civilian harm, you hesitate or accept
consequences that extend far beyond the battlefield. The civilian
environment becomes a form of cover, not only in the physical sense but
also in the legal and political senses.
What follows is a
different kind of war. Not one defined by decisive battles, but by
persistence. Small-unit engagements, ambushes, improvised explosives,
and raids that achieve limited objectives and then dissolve the
warfighter unit. Territory is cleared and then contested again. Control
is never absolute. It is negotiated, temporary, and constantly
challenged.
The Geneva system, particularly the 1949 Conventions
and the 1977 Additional Protocols, did not create guerrilla warfare. But
they did change the incentives that shape it. Once a legal regime
strongly protects civilians, hospitals, detainees, infrastructure, and
prisoners, a state army that follows those rules has fewer brutal
options available. It cannot level entire districts, execute captives,
or treat every military-age male as a target without consequence.
An
insurgent or irregular force operates under a different logic. It can
blend in with civilians, use civilian infrastructure, and force the
stronger army into a dilemma. Hold fire, or strike and incur political
and legal costs. The humanitarian logic of the law is clear and, in many
ways, necessary. But the military side effect is less often
acknowledged. Some conflicts become longer, more indecisive, and more
politically exhausting.
Afghanistan provides the clearest recent
example. The Taliban did not present itself as a conventional army to be
destroyed. It was integrated into the population, spread its forces,
and relied on time, religious beliefs, and propaganda as strategic
advantages. The war became one of containment rather than conclusion.
Corruption, weak governance, and external sanctuary all played critical
roles, but the operational environment mattered as well. The allied
coalition could not apply the kind of overwhelming force that
historically ends rural insurgencies quickly. The result was a long war
that ended not with a decisive victory, but with exhaustion and
collapse.
Iraq followed a similar trajectory, though in a more
fragmented form. The initial invasion was rapid and decisive. What
followed was not. The insurgency regenerated faster than it could be
eliminated because it did not exist as a fixed target. Urban warfare,
sectarian fragmentation, and civilian entanglement made large-scale
decisive action increasingly costly. The conflict stretched, shifted,
and persisted, even after formal victory was declared against ISIS.
The
Geneva framework is ill-suited to the modern battlefield. It narrows
the pathways to decisive victory and expands the conditions under which
conflict can persist.
It is in this context that the current
debates should be understood. There is a growing tendency to claim that
President Donald Trump is committing war crimes in the current Iranian
conflict. I disagree with this logic. What has changed is something more
consequential. The way the Geneva Conventions are being interpreted,
the way they are being applied, and most importantly, the willingness to
subordinate them to the outcome. The Trump administration is
exercising military power decisively and granting greater operational
latitude to battlefield commanders to achieve military objectives more
rapidly and definitively.
Over the many decades since the decisive
Allied victory in WWII, American warfighting has drifted into a
constrained model built on the assumption that if you fought carefully
enough, precisely enough, and with sufficient regard for civilian
infrastructure, you could achieve both moral legitimacy and strategic
success. The protracted and ultimately failed US military adventures in
Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan should have challenged that assumption.
What these military and diplomatic failures demonstrated instead is that
when one side follows the rules rigidly, and the other side exploits
them, the result is not a cleaner war. It is a longer and ultimately
more destructive war. The United Nations, by reinforcing those norms,
contributes to that dynamic. Despite its charter, in the many decades
since its creation, the UN has completely failed to prevent war. What
it has achieved is the prolongation of armed conflict and civilian
suffering by facilitating asymmetric, guerrilla warfare. And this
should surprise precisely no-one. By its very structure, the UN is
biased towards less militarily and economically powerful nation-states.
By promoting policies that favor “equity”, the UN advances the
interests of less developed (often socially primitive, socialist, or
communist) nation-states.
The core principle of the Geneva
framework is distinction. Separate the civilian from the combatant, the
hospital from the barracks, the water system from the weapons depot.
That principle works when both sides operate as states with defined
militaries, clear lines of demarcation, and a mutual commitment to
international rules of engagement. It begins to break down during
asymmetric warfare, when the adversary embeds itself within civilian
systems or builds its strategy around proxies, militias, and urban
cover. That is no longer an exception. Under the influence of the Geneva
Conventions, asymmetric warfare has become the dominant model.
What
has changed in recent strategy is not the abandonment of rules, but
their reprioritization. Instead of treating them as the governing
objective, they are treated as one constraint among many, and not always
the top priority. That is a fundamental shift in posture.
You can
see it in the willingness to target systems that were once considered
politically or legally untouchable in the post WWII era of warfare.
Energy infrastructure, transport networks, economic chokepoints, and
other foundational systems are increasingly viewed through a different
lens. If they sustain the state, they sustain the war. And if they
sustain the war, they become part of the battlefield.
This
reflects a rejection of the incremental model that has defined much of
the last sixty years. Limited strikes, calibrated responses, and
carefully managed escalation were intended to prevent wider conflict. In
practice, they often prolonged or prevented conflict resolution,
paradoxically increasing civilian suffering.
The emerging approach
is more direct. Apply pressure across systems. Escalate earlier. Force a
choice. Continue on the current path and absorb systemic damage, or
step back. It is coercion, not containment. A battle strategy focused
on efficiently winning once a decision to move from diplomacy to armed
conflict has been made.
Critics are not wrong to be concerned.
Once a major power begins to reinterpret these boundaries, others will
follow. The distinction principle weakens, the core Geneva Conventions
position that one must always distinguish between combatants and
civilians, and only intentionally target clearly defined combatants and
military objectives. Reciprocity takes hold. Protections erode at the
margins.
But the counterargument is just as clear. A system that
cannot produce decisive outcomes does not prevent suffering. It
stretches it out. It rewards the side most willing to operate in the
gray space and to hide within civilian systems. It turns war into a slow
bleed rather than a sharp shock.
That is the tension at the
center of modern conflict. Current international law was built for a
different kind of war. What we face now is hybrid, decentralized, and
embedded. The rules did not disappear. The battlefield changed around
them.
Under President Trump, the Geneva Conventions have been
reframed. Because wars fought by attorneys, rather than skilled armed
forces focused on rapid, decisive resolution of conflict, will never
provide a clean outcome. War is war; to end such a conflict cleanly and
surgically, war fighters (and battlefield commanders) must be given
permission to act decisively.