The odds of Poland cutting Ukraine off, including from the aid that it receives from the West, are unrealistic despite the radical change in popular Polish perceptions of Ukrainians as a result of the unprecedented Ukrainian troll attacks against them over the Volhynia Genocide dispute.
By Andrew Korybko
The social media front of the Ukrainian conflict was dominated last week by Ukrainian troll attacks against Poles after President Karol Nawrocki said that he would revoke the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest honor, from Vladimir Zelensky for glorifying the Volhynia Genocide’s culprits.
The controversy followed Zelensky’s decision to rebury the repatriated remains of former OUN leader Andrey Melnik with honors and rename an elite military unit after the UPA. According to the article, both groups were responsible for the genocide of more than 100,000 Poles during World War II.
Growing Anger In Poland
According to Korybko, patriotic Poles were outraged by the developments, with many viewing subsequent online attacks by Ukrainians against Poland, Polish history, and Polish national identity as adding fuel to the fire.
The author notes that some Ukrainians even defended the Volhynia massacres as an “anti-imperialist” action.
Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry responded by stating that Zelensky had no intention of offending Poles and argued that “only Moscow benefits from disputes between Ukrainians and Poles.”
According to Korybko, this argument has been widely echoed on social media, where Poles who criticize modern Ukraine’s glorification of OUN-UPA figures are frequently labelled as “Russia’s useful idiots.”
Historical Truth Versus Political Pressure
The article argues that Nawrocki’s comments emboldened many Poles to openly discuss issues that had previously been considered politically sensitive.
Korybko writes that many Poles have long felt pressured into self-censorship over criticism of Ukraine’s historical narratives due to fears of being accused of supporting Russia.
With Nawrocki publicly taking a stand, the author contends that many Poles now feel more comfortable expressing concerns about historical revisionism and wartime atrocities.
Relations Were Already Under Strain
The article argues that Polish attitudes toward Ukrainians had already begun shifting before the latest dispute.
Factors cited include refugee-related tensions, criminal incidents, displays of OUN-UPA symbols in Poland, and ongoing disagreements over historical memory.
Korybko notes that Nawrocki previously submitted legislation aimed at banning Banderist symbols, although the measure did not advance through parliament.
According to the article, many Poles were surprised by the scale and intensity of the online backlash directed at Poland following Nawrocki’s comments.
A Fundamental Change In Public Perception
Korybko argues that a significant shift in Polish public opinion has now taken place.
He writes that people-to-people relations between large segments of Polish and Ukrainian society have fundamentally changed as a result of recent events.
According to the author, many Poles who previously viewed Ukrainians as close allies or “brothers and sisters” no longer hold that view following the dispute.
Does Russia Benefit?
The central argument of the article is that Russia and President Vladimir Putin do not materially benefit from the controversy.
Korybko argues that no major political force in Poland is advocating a complete end to support for Ukraine or a shutdown of the aid transit routes that pass through Poland.
He notes that Poland continues to play a critical role in facilitating Western support for Ukraine, handling approximately 90% of aid shipments according to figures cited in the article.
Even if public pressure leads Poland to demand concessions regarding historical disputes, Korybko argues that Poland is unlikely to completely cut off support.
Future Political Consequences
While the author does not believe the dispute will significantly affect the course of the conflict itself, he argues that it could reshape domestic politics within Poland.
The article suggests that support may grow for parties advocating the remigration of Ukrainian refugees and for political movements focused on protecting Polish national interests in future economic competition with Ukraine.
Korybko also references comments by Zelensky adviser Mikhail Podolyak, who stated in 2023 that Ukraine and Poland would eventually become economic competitors after the conflict.
According to the article, many Poles now view that competition as inevitable and believe Poland should prepare accordingly.
A Deepening Divide
The article concludes that the current deterioration in Polish-Ukrainian relations is the result of decisions made in Kiev rather than any action taken by Moscow.
Korybko argues that repairing the damage to people-to-people relations could take years, even if future governments in Ukraine adopt a different approach to historical memory and national identity.
Source: Andrew Korybko Substack
Author: Andrew Korybko