Retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor says the Ukraine conflict may be entering a more dangerous phase, with Russia increasingly convinced that neither Ukraine nor its European supporters can reverse the military balance. He argues Moscow's willingness to wait for diplomacy is fading, while warning that direct NATO involvement could dramatically escalate the conflict.
INR Report: Based on an August 18, 2026 interview with retired US Army Colonel Douglas Macgregor, published by Gnan Review on YouTube on August 21, 2026. The interview has attracted more than 58,000 views.
Macgregor is a decorated US combat veteran, author and former adviser to the US Secretary of Defense.
Russia May Be Preparing for a More Decisive Phase
The central argument of Macgregor's interview is that Russia's calculation of the war is changing.
For much of the conflict, Moscow pursued what Macgregor characterises as a slow and methodical military campaign. He believes Russian frustration with that approach is growing and points to President Vladimir Putin's reported calls for accelerated operations and greater offensive action.
Macgregor also discusses speculation about the future of Russia's military leadership, suggesting that any change at the top of the General Staff could reveal whether Moscow intends to move away from its more deliberate strategy. He specifically raises speculation surrounding General Sergei Surovikin, while acknowledging that he does not know who might ultimately be appointed.
His broader assessment is considerably more important: Russia, he argues, now has the troops, equipment and reserves necessary to contemplate more decisive operations.
Macgregor claims Russia is training approximately 150,000 reserves and says he has been told that at least 20,000 North Korean troops are currently in theatre. These figures are claims made during the interview and should not be treated as independently verified figures.
The NATO Question
The danger, in Macgregor's assessment, is no longer simply what happens between Russia and Ukraine.
It is what happens if NATO becomes directly involved.
Macgregor believes Russia has deliberately retained substantial forces and equipment in reserve partly because Moscow cannot completely exclude the possibility of NATO intervention. He says Russian planners have continued watching Poland, Lithuania, Moldova and other potential approaches to the conflict.
At the same time, he argues that Moscow's fear of European intervention is diminishing.
Poland is critical to that calculation. Macgregor describes the country as potentially possessing one of NATO's strongest armies, but argues that without Polish participation there is no practical foundation for a major European ground intervention in Ukraine.
His conclusion is stark: the more confident Moscow becomes that NATO will not directly intervene, the greater the likelihood of a substantially more decisive Russian offensive.
That remains Macgregor's assessment, rather than an established NATO or Russian policy position.
Why Odessa Matters
Macgregor places particular emphasis on Odessa.
He argues that the Black Sea city is strategically more important to Russia than Kharkov because of its logistical position, its historical connections with Russia and its importance to whatever remains of Ukraine's access to maritime trade.
In Macgregor's assessment, taking Odessa would fundamentally alter Ukraine's strategic position. But he also acknowledges the considerable military requirements involved: Russian forces would need to move air and missile defences forward while establishing the logistics required to sustain operations over considerably greater distances.
This is one area where the interview moves beyond describing current events and into forecasting. Whether Russia actually intends to seize Odessa cannot be established from Macgregor's comments alone.
Diplomacy Without Trust
Perhaps the most significant part of the interview concerns diplomacy.
Macgregor believes Moscow no longer regards negotiations with Washington and European governments as a reliable pathway to ending the war.
His assessment of the likely Russian position is essentially: negotiate if necessary, but continue military operations regardless.
He argues that Russian policymakers may interpret renewed Western interest in negotiations not as a genuine peace initiative but as evidence that Ukraine and its supporters are becoming weaker. In his view, Moscow could therefore regard negotiations as something that can occur simultaneously with intensified military pressure.
That represents a potentially dangerous change.
If one side views negotiations as an opportunity to stop a war while the other views them merely as tactical manoeuvring, diplomacy becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.
What Would Russia Now Accept?
Macgregor argues that the settlement Russia might have accepted earlier in the conflict is no longer available.
He says Moscow once appeared prepared to accept a neutral Ukraine and arrangements that left significant Russian-speaking territories within Ukraine. After years of warfare and enormous casualties, he believes Russian demands have hardened considerably.
His assessment is that Moscow now wants a post-war Ukraine incapable of functioning as a military platform against Russia.
That does not necessarily mean, he argues, that Russia wants to occupy the whole country. Administering hostile territory would impose enormous political, economic and military costs. Instead, he believes Moscow's objective would be to impose a political and security structure preventing whatever remains of Ukraine from becoming a forward NATO military position.
Again, this is Macgregor's interpretation of Russian objectives, not a confirmed statement of Moscow's eventual settlement terms.
Western Military Capacity Under Pressure
Macgregor also connects Ukraine with a much larger question: whether the United States and its allies still possess the military capacity to sustain several major geopolitical confrontations simultaneously.
He argues that American forces are already stretched across Europe, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and therefore questions whether Washington could realistically undertake a direct military confrontation with Russia over Ukraine.
In his assessment, that constraint is increasingly understood in Moscow.
That calculation could itself increase the danger.
Deterrence depends partly upon each side believing the other might act. If Russian leaders become convinced NATO will not intervene, they may feel increasingly free to expand military operations. Conversely, if NATO believes Russia is miscalculating Western resolve, pressure could grow for a demonstration intended to restore deterrence.
That is precisely the environment in which miscalculation becomes dangerous.
The Economic War Behind the Military War
The interview moves beyond the battlefield into energy, sovereign debt and the changing international financial system.
Macgregor points to rising diesel costs in parts of Europe and expresses deep concern about US government debt and Treasury yields. He also argues that the wars surrounding Russia and Iran cannot be separated entirely from the struggle over energy markets, the dollar and accelerating moves by some countries away from dollar-denominated trade.
His economic predictions are strongly expressed opinions rather than established outcomes. But the underlying issue is important: prolonged conflict between major energy producers and Western economies can affect fuel prices, shipping, inflation, government borrowing and international trade well beyond the countries actually fighting.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Yes, although primarily through economic and strategic transmission rather than any direct military role.
New Zealand is geographically distant from Ukraine, but it remains exposed to international energy markets, shipping costs, exchange-rate movements and global inflation. A serious escalation involving Russia and NATO could therefore reach New Zealand households through fuel, freight and imported goods long before it presented any direct security threat.
There is also a foreign-policy question.
As a Western-aligned country that has supported Ukraine, New Zealand has an interest in understanding whether the assumptions underpinning Western policy remain valid. If the battlefield balance, European military capacity or prospects for a negotiated settlement have materially changed, Wellington should be assessing those developments from evidence rather than simply inheriting the strategic assumptions of larger partners.
Macgregor's interview does not prove that Russia is about to launch a decisive offensive, that Ukraine is approaching collapse, or that NATO is incapable of intervening. Much of what he discusses involves his own analysis, unnamed sources and predictions about decisions that have not yet been made.
But his central warning deserves attention.
If Moscow increasingly believes that time is on its side, that Ukraine's military position is deteriorating, that Europe cannot intervene effectively and that negotiations with the West cannot be trusted, then the incentives that previously encouraged Russia to proceed cautiously may be weakening.
The question may therefore be changing from whether Russia can continue the war to what Russia believes it can now achieve before anyone is capable of stopping it.
Source: Gnan Review, Douglas Macgregor: Russia Is Done Waiting - Ukraine & NATO Face a New Reality
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.