Russia’s increasingly deliberate use of “Britain” rather than “Great Britain” may sound like diplomatic trolling, but Russian academic Alexander Bobrov argues it reflects something deeper: Moscow’s deteriorating view of London as relations between the two nuclear powers approach what he describes as a dangerous low. His RT opinion also extends the argument beyond Ukraine, portraying Britain as a country that retains considerable international influence through its relationships with the United States, Commonwealth and Commonwealth realms — including New Zealand.
INR Report: Based on an opinion by Alexander Bobrov, PhD in History and head of diplomatic studies at the Institute for Strategic Research and Forecasts at RUDN University, published by RT HERE.
Relations between Russia and Britain have deteriorated to the point where even the country's name has become part of the political contest.
In his RT opinion, Alexander Bobrov notes that Russian officials and state media have increasingly referred simply to “Britain”, rather than “Great Britain” or the “United Kingdom”.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly addressed the choice earlier this year, arguing that Britain was unusual in describing itself as “great”. Bobrov acknowledges, however, that the word historically has a geographical rather than self-congratulatory origin, distinguishing Great Britain from Brittany in France.
The terminology is therefore less important than the message Moscow intends it to convey.
Bobrov interprets it as evidence of a broader shift in Russian attitudes towards Britain at a time when diplomatic relations are already severely strained.
Relations ‘On the Brink of Collapse’
Bobrov points to the completion of Russian Ambassador Andrei Kelin's diplomatic posting in Britain and reports concerning the absence of an immediate successor.
He says speculation has consequently emerged about whether Moscow could downgrade diplomatic relations with London.
Such a step would be substantially more serious than rhetorical sparring over Britain's name. Diplomatic representation could potentially be reduced from ambassadorial level to a chargé d'affaires, signalling a formal deterioration in relations.
Bobrov goes further, warning that a complete breakdown in diplomatic relations between two nuclear-armed permanent members of the UN Security Council would carry obvious international risks.
That assessment represents the author's interpretation of the present trajectory rather than confirmation that either government has decided to sever relations.
Nevertheless, the deterioration itself is difficult to dismiss.
A Rivalry Much Older Than Ukraine
Bobrov argues that today's hostility cannot be understood solely through the war in Ukraine.
He reaches back through centuries of Anglo-Russian relations, invoking former British prime minister Lord Palmerston's famous doctrine that nations have no permanent allies or enemies, only permanent interests.
From the Crimean War and the 19th-century “Great Game” in Central Asia to British involvement in Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution and Winston Churchill's 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech, Bobrov portrays Britain as a persistent geopolitical competitor of Russia.
This is explicitly a Russian interpretation of history, and several historical episodes he invokes remain subjects of considerable debate over motive, context and responsibility.
Its significance is nevertheless useful in understanding Moscow's contemporary worldview.
From that perspective, British support for Ukraine is not regarded as a response beginning in February 2022, but as the latest manifestation of a much older contest for strategic influence.
Ukraine at the Centre of Today's Confrontation
Bobrov portrays London as one of the principal Western governments seeking to prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine and maintain pressure on Moscow.
He cites Britain's military support for Kiev, its role in the “Coalition of the Willing” and its broader efforts to strengthen European military capabilities.
He also repeats the disputed Russian narrative surrounding then-prime minister Boris Johnson's April 2022 visit to Kiev, presenting Britain as having helped prevent an early settlement between Russia and Ukraine.
That interpretation requires qualification.
Johnson's role in the breakdown of the 2022 negotiations remains contested, and Bobrov's assertion should be understood as part of his argument rather than established fact that Britain unilaterally prevented a peace agreement.
His broader thesis, however, is that London sees Russia as a strategic adversary and is preparing for a prolonged confrontation rather than an early restoration of normal relations.
Britain: Weaker Than an Empire, But Still Influential
The more interesting part of Bobrov's argument concerns Britain's position in the contemporary international system.
The British Empire has disappeared and Britain's relative economic and military dominance has declined dramatically from its 19th-century peak. Yet Bobrov rejects the assumption that this makes Britain strategically insignificant.
Instead, he argues that London has adapted.
Britain maintains extensive diplomatic, intelligence, financial and military relationships, retains a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, possesses nuclear weapons and remains deeply embedded in Western security structures.
Bobrov argues that Britain's influence is particularly evident in its relationship with Washington.
Rather than simply functioning as America's subordinate “junior partner”, he contends that London can influence US policy and attempts to keep Washington aligned with broader transatlantic strategic objectives.
His interpretation of current US-British relations is again an argument rather than an independently demonstrated conclusion, but it forms an important part of his thesis: Britain's power should not be measured solely by the size of the territory it directly governs.
The Commonwealth Enters the Argument
This is where Bobrov's commentary becomes particularly relevant to New Zealand.
He argues that Britain's post-imperial influence also survives through the Commonwealth of Nations and draws particular attention to the Commonwealth realms — sovereign countries including Canada, Australia and New Zealand that retain King Charles III as head of state.
Bobrov presents this constitutional connection as part of Britain's continuing global infrastructure of influence.
That proposition needs an important distinction.
New Zealand is an independent sovereign state. The King is separately King of New Zealand under New Zealand's constitutional arrangements, and the Governor-General exercises constitutional functions in New Zealand rather than serving as an instrument through which the British government directs New Zealand policy.
Membership of the Commonwealth likewise does not give London authority over New Zealand's foreign policy.
Nevertheless, Bobrov's broader observation raises a legitimate question about the less formal networks connecting Britain with countries such as New Zealand.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Yes — although not necessarily in the way Bobrov frames it.
New Zealand's connection with Britain today is not one of constitutional subordination to the British government. Wellington makes its own foreign-policy decisions and has its own sovereign constitutional arrangements.
But New Zealand remains closely connected to Britain through history, defence, intelligence, diplomacy and institutional relationships.
Most significantly, New Zealand and Britain are both members of the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, alongside Australia, Canada and the United States. New Zealand has also maintained political and military support for Ukraine and participates in a wider Western strategic architecture in which Britain remains an important player.
That makes deteriorating relations between London and Moscow relevant here.
If the confrontation between Russia and Britain moves beyond diplomatic hostility towards increasingly direct military, intelligence or economic confrontation, New Zealand could face difficult questions about how closely it aligns itself with its traditional security partners.
Bobrov's article should not be read as neutral analysis. It is an opinion written from a distinctly Russian geopolitical perspective and published by RT. Claims about Britain's motives, its role in Ukraine and its influence over other Western countries therefore require scrutiny rather than automatic acceptance.
But the New Zealand question it indirectly raises deserves examination.
New Zealand is geographically remote from Europe, yet its intelligence partnerships, constitutional history and security relationships connect it to countries increasingly involved in geopolitical confrontation.
The relevant question for New Zealand is therefore not whether Britain is still “Great”.
It is how independently New Zealand determines its own national interest when the strategic interests of its oldest partners collide with those of another nuclear power.
Source: Alexander Bobrov, RT, 2 September 2026 — Moscow has stopped calling Britain ‘Great.’ Here’s why. Original image caption and credit preserved.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.