BRICS has grown into one of the most significant non-Western groupings in international affairs, but expansion alone will not determine whether it succeeds. Russian foreign-policy analyst Timofey Bordachev argues its real challenge is more fundamental: developing a coherent idea of international order capable of binding very different countries together — and persuading others that there is a credible alternative to institutions historically shaped by Western power.
INR Report: Based on an analysis by Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club, published by RT HERE. The article was originally published by Russia in Global Affairs and subsequently translated and edited by RT.
BRICS may be expanding geographically, economically and politically, but Bordachev argues that size is not ultimately what will determine its place in the emerging international order.
His starting point is the relative decline of Western dominance and the question increasingly confronting countries outside the traditional US-European sphere: if the existing international system no longer adequately represents their interests, what should replace it?
Bordachev's answer is not another empire or a rival military alliance.
Instead, he sees BRICS as potentially providing a peaceful mechanism through which major non-Western powers can cooperate to reshape the rules governing international relations.
But there is a problem.
Russia, China, India, Brazil and the wider collection of countries associated with BRICS differ enormously in their political systems, cultures, economic interests and strategic priorities.
If opposition to Western dominance is the only thing holding them together, Bordachev suggests, that may not be enough.
Who Gets to Write the Rules?
At the centre of Bordachev's argument is a deceptively simple proposition: international power is not merely the ability to make rules.
Real power comes when enough other countries accept and implement those rules.
The post-Second World War international architecture was heavily influenced by the United States and its Western allies. That influence extended beyond military strength into finance, trade, international institutions, diplomatic norms and the rules governing economic interaction.
Bordachev rejects the idea that such rules are politically neutral. In his view, international systems inevitably reflect the interests of the countries powerful enough to design them.
That leads to the question now confronting BRICS.
Can countries dissatisfied with Western dominance develop rules and institutions that others voluntarily regard as legitimate?
For Bordachev, that is far more important than simply adding additional countries to the organisation.
What Holds Countries Together?
History suggests that international cooperation tends to be strengthened by two things: geography and shared values.
Western countries demonstrate the second particularly well.
Europe, North America and countries such as Australia and New Zealand may be separated by enormous distances, yet their institutions have been shaped by overlapping histories, languages, political traditions and security interests.
Bordachev specifically points to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership — Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and United States — as evidence that geography alone does not determine whether international cooperation works.
Those countries are scattered across the planet.
What binds them is something else: shared institutional history, political culture and strategic relationships.
That, Bordachev argues, is precisely the lesson BRICS must learn.
BRICS Is Not the ‘Anti-West’
The most significant potential strength of BRICS may also be its greatest weakness.
Unlike NATO or the European Union, BRICS does not require its members to conform to a common political model.
Its members can have very different relationships with Washington, Beijing, Moscow and Brussels while still participating in the grouping.
India is perhaps the clearest illustration.
New Delhi maintains major strategic relationships with Western countries while simultaneously cooperating with Russia and China through BRICS and other institutions.
That flexibility makes BRICS attractive to countries seeking greater strategic independence.
But it also raises the central problem identified by Bordachev: what exactly does BRICS stand for beyond reducing Western dominance?
An international grouping capable of criticising an existing system is one thing.
Building a functioning alternative is considerably harder.
The First Major Non-Western Experiment
Bordachev argues that BRICS is historically significant because it represents one of the first major attempts in centuries to construct an international political project largely outside Western intellectual and institutional leadership.
The grouping initially brought together Brazil, Russia, India and China, with South Africa subsequently joining and later expansion substantially increasing its reach.
Its importance, in Bordachev's view, does not come simply from population or territory.
It comes from the fact that major powers including China, India and Russia can sit together and discuss international governance without Western participation being necessary.
That represents a substantial change from the geopolitical environment that followed the Second World War and particularly the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
BRICS therefore reflects something larger than the organisation itself: the emergence of a more multipolar international system.
Expansion Alone Isn't Enough
This is where Bordachev offers what is perhaps his most important warning.
BRICS can continue admitting countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East, giving the organisation enormous geographical reach.
But filling the map does not automatically produce political cohesion.
A larger BRICS could actually make agreement more difficult because every additional country brings its own economic priorities, security concerns and foreign-policy relationships.
Bordachev therefore argues that the organisation's next phase must be intellectual rather than simply geographical.
BRICS needs to articulate what a different international system would actually look like.
Would smaller countries have greater influence?
Would economic sanctions be restricted?
Would international trade increasingly bypass the US dollar?
Would international financial institutions operate differently?
How would sovereignty, territorial disputes and military intervention be handled?
And perhaps most importantly: would a BRICS-influenced international system genuinely apply its principles equally when the interests of its most powerful members were involved?
Bordachev's source article does not provide detailed institutional answers to those questions. Rather, his central contention is that developing such a coherent vision is now the task confronting BRICS policymakers and intellectuals.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Potentially, very significantly.
New Zealand remains deeply connected to the Western institutional system Bordachev describes. It is a Five Eyes member, has longstanding defence and diplomatic relationships with Australia, Britain and the United States, and operates within an international economic architecture largely developed under Western leadership.
But New Zealand's economic geography looks different from its strategic history.
Asia has become crucial to New Zealand's trade and economic future, meaning Wellington increasingly operates in a world where its traditional strategic partners and some of its most important economic relationships do not always occupy the same geopolitical camp.
That makes the evolution of BRICS relevant even if New Zealand never contemplates membership.
If BRICS develops stronger financial institutions, alternative settlement systems, expanded trade arrangements or greater influence over the rules governing international commerce, smaller trading nations will eventually have to decide how they engage with those systems.
The question does not necessarily have to be framed as West versus BRICS.
For a country such as New Zealand, a more important issue may be whether an increasingly multipolar world creates opportunities to pursue a genuinely independent foreign and trade policy — maintaining longstanding Western relationships while engaging emerging institutions where doing so serves New Zealand's national interest.
Bordachev ultimately identifies the same challenge for BRICS that confronts any emerging political order.
Replacing dominance is comparatively easy to promise.
Creating rules that countries willingly follow — particularly when those rules sometimes constrain the powerful countries that designed them — is much harder.
If BRICS can achieve that, it could become considerably more than an economic grouping.
If it cannot, adding more countries to the map may simply create a larger organisation without creating a stronger one.
Source: Timofey Bordachev, RT, 2 September 2026 — Here’s what BRICS need to succeed. Originally published by Russia in Global Affairs, translated and edited by RT. Original image credit: Alexei Danichev / Photohost Agency / Anadolu via Getty Images.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.