CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s unusually discreet visit to Moscow has generated speculation about Ukraine, Iran and intelligence negotiations. But columnist Rachel Marsden advances a different argument: that the timing also benefits Baltic governments seeking billions from Brussels and ultimately the American defence companies supplying much of their military hardware.
INR Report: Based on commentary by Rachel Marsden for RT HERE
The secrecy surrounding CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s recent trip to Moscow has created a vacuum quickly filled by competing explanations.
Was Washington seeking Russian cooperation over Iran? Was Ratcliffe exploring another route towards negotiations over Ukraine? Was a prisoner or intelligence exchange under discussion?
Rachel Marsden argues in an RT opinion column that the most interesting feature may not be any of those possibilities, but the unusual discretion surrounding the visit itself.
Her argument is explicitly speculative. No evidence presented in the article establishes that Ratcliffe travelled to Moscow to stimulate European defence spending or promote US arms sales. Instead, Marsden points to the timing of the visit and asks who could benefit politically and commercially from renewed warnings about Russia.
An Unusually Quiet Mission
Marsden contrasts the secrecy with the Trump administration’s tendency to discuss foreign policy publicly and sometimes in considerable detail.
Donald Trump reportedly characterised Ratcliffe’s journey as “semi-routine”, offering little explanation of its purpose.
For Marsden, that creates the central question: if the mission was sufficiently important for the CIA director to travel personally to Moscow, why was Washington saying so little about it?
She then turns from the possible content of the discussions to the political environment surrounding them.
Baltic Governments Want More From Brussels
The visit coincided, Marsden notes, with European Union negotiations over its next seven-year budget and efforts by eastern European governments to secure greater funding for defence and infrastructure.
Latvia features prominently in her argument.
Marsden says Riga is seeking €7 billion while portraying itself as part of Europe's frontline against the possibility of future Russian aggression. Lithuania, she writes, is similarly pressing Brussels for greater financial support based on the costs associated with defending the EU and NATO's eastern flank.
The security concerns of Baltic governments are real policy positions. Marsden's interpretation of their funding demands, however, is deliberately sceptical: she argues that portraying Russia as an imminent threat provides a powerful argument for extracting considerably more defence money from Brussels.
Latvia Has Paid an Economic Price
Marsden also connects the security debate with the economic consequences of the collapse in Latvia-Russia trade.
Citing Latvia's foreign affairs ministry, she says bilateral trade fell from just over €2 billion annually around the beginning of the Ukraine conflict to €193 million last year — a reduction approaching 90 percent.
She also points to sharply higher Latvian gas prices, arguing that the country's economic environment has deteriorated as Europe has progressively separated itself from Russian energy and trade.
In Marsden's analysis, large European defence allocations could therefore serve two purposes: strengthening the Baltic states militarily while injecting substantial public money into economies facing pressure from the broader geopolitical confrontation.
But Where Does the Defence Money Go?
This is where Marsden develops the central argument of the column.
If Brussels allocates billions more to Latvia and Lithuania for defence, those governments will need to purchase military equipment. And a significant supplier of that equipment is the United States.
Marsden cites Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms-transfer data in arguing that America is the largest supplier of major conventional weapons to both Latvia and Lithuania.
That creates an important distinction.
European taxpayers may finance increased defence expenditure through Brussels, while a portion of that money ultimately flows across the Atlantic through purchases from American defence manufacturers.
The commercial beneficiary of greater European concern about Russia may therefore extend well beyond the Baltic states themselves.
A Warning to Moscow and a Message to Europe?
Western media reports cited by Marsden suggested Ratcliffe travelled to Moscow partly to warn Russia against attacking NATO countries.
If accurate, such a warning has an obvious diplomatic interpretation: Washington communicating directly to Moscow that NATO territory represents a red line.
Marsden offers another interpretation of its political effect.
A high-level CIA mission based around the possibility of Russia attacking NATO reinforces precisely the security argument being advanced by eastern European governments seeking more money for defence.
That does not establish that the trip was designed for that purpose.
But Marsden argues that its effect is nevertheless convenient: Baltic governments can point to Washington's concern about a potential Russian threat when asking Brussels to finance additional military capabilities.
From European Taxpayers to American Arms Manufacturers
The broader issue raised by the article is therefore less about what Ratcliffe actually discussed behind closed doors and more about the economics of Europe's security architecture.
European governments have committed themselves to substantially greater defence preparedness as relations with Russia have deteriorated. Eastern European NATO members, because of their geography, have particularly strong incentives to seek additional military investment.
But where the weapons are manufactured determines where much of that expenditure ultimately lands.
If European governments significantly increase defence budgets while remaining heavily dependent on American military equipment, increased European security expenditure can simultaneously become an industrial stimulus for the United States.
Marsden's contention is that this financial relationship deserves scrutiny alongside the conventional geopolitical explanations for Washington's behaviour.
Correlation Is Not Proof of Motive
There is an important limitation to the argument.
The article demonstrates a convergence of interests, not evidence of coordination.
Ratcliffe's Moscow trip, Baltic requests for European funding and American arms sales can all occur simultaneously without one having been deliberately orchestrated to produce the others.
Nor does the existence of an American commercial benefit invalidate Baltic security concerns. Latvia and Lithuania border Russia and have adopted defence policies based on their governments' assessment of that strategic environment.
The stronger conclusion supported by Marsden's argument is therefore narrower: increased perceptions of a Russian threat create political pressure for higher European defence expenditure, and American weapons manufacturers are positioned to capture part of that spending.
Whether Ratcliffe's Moscow visit was intended to reinforce that dynamic remains speculation.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Indirectly, but importantly.
New Zealand is geographically distant from the Baltic security confrontation, yet it faces the same fundamental questions whenever defence spending rises: what threat assessment justifies the expenditure, who supplies the equipment, and how much of the money remains within the domestic economy?
Marsden's argument also illustrates why defence policy cannot be assessed purely through military capability. Large procurement decisions simultaneously involve foreign policy, industrial interests, alliance relationships and taxpayer commitments.
For New Zealand, the useful lesson is not that every security warning conceals a commercial motive. It is that security claims and commercial outcomes should be examined separately.
When governments argue that a deteriorating international environment requires billions more in military expenditure, taxpayers are entitled to ask not only what capability is being purchased and why — but also who ultimately receives the money.
Source: Rachel Marsden, RT, “Who really benefits from the CIA chief’s Moscow trip?”, 4 September 2026.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.
Rachel Marsden is a media professional with over two decades of expertise in international politics. Her extensive career includes multilingual hosting, presenting, producing, and debating across TV, radio, and digital platforms. She has been an internationally syndicated columnist since 2011, contributing to over 100 major newspaper outlets globally. Her media background is complemented by over 20 years of business experience as the CEO of Rachel Marsden Global Corporation, an international political and business risk consulting firm. Rachel has also taught in the Masters of Journalism and international affairs program at Sciences Po in Paris, France.
Rachel's website can be found at rachelmarsden.com