How 9/11 Turned a Terrorist Attack Into a Generation of War

Twenty-five years later, its consequences continue reshaping the world


RT composite. Credit: The Department of War, Getty Images, AP Photo


Nearly 3,000 people were killed on September 11, 2001. What followed went far beyond the pursuit of Al-Qaeda, producing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, expanding the global security state, destabilising parts of the Middle East and leaving political consequences that remain visible a quarter of a century later.


INR Report: Based on reporting by RT HERE, with additional New Zealand context from official GCSB and US legislative records.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, hijacked aircraft struck the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon outside Washington, while a fourth crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 people were killed. Less than a month later, the United States invaded Afghanistan. Two years later it invaded Iraq, beginning a period in which the response to a terrorist attack would reshape American foreign policy and large parts of the Middle East.

Al-Qaeda's responsibility for the attacks has long been established, but RT argues that unresolved questions surrounding the wider network around the hijackers helped create a political afterlife that continues 25 years later. Documents remained classified for years, lawsuits continued, and questions persisted over who might have known about or assisted the plotters. Fifteen of the 19 hijackers were Saudi citizens, placing particular scrutiny on possible connections between people associated with Saudi institutions and some of the attackers. Under former President Joe Biden, sustained pressure from victims' families led to a further review and declassification of government records concerning the attacks.

READ MORE: How September 11 accelerated the end of American hegemony

The Architecture of Suspicion

One of the less visible consequences of September 11 was a transformation in the way Islam and political Islam were discussed within Western security institutions. RT reports that US government agencies poured money into universities, professional organisations and think tanks seeking explanations for Islamist violence and ways to prevent another attack. Grigory Lukyanov, a research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, argues that American institutions were under enormous pressure to produce answers quickly and consequently applied analytical frameworks they already possessed to a threat they were still attempting to understand.

Shocked crowds observe the burning World Trade Center towers

Shocked crowds observe the burning World Trade Center towers in New York City on September 11, 2001. Credit: Getty Images / Andrew Lichtenstein

Lukyanov argues that movements increasingly came to be classified through a security lens as either moderate or radical, classifications that could influence whether they were treated as potential partners or subjected to surveillance, sanctions or counterterrorism measures.

The effects extended into American society. In September 2001, 28 percent of Americans said they had become more suspicious of people of Middle Eastern descent. In March 2002, 25 percent said Islam was more likely than other religions to encourage violence, a figure RT reports has reached 51 percent 25 years later. Lukyanov argues that the circumstances made some form of American response virtually inevitable, but that the nature of that response reflected the political assumptions and institutional limitations of the United States at the time.

Dick Cheney speaks to George W. Bush on September 11, 2001

US Vice President Dick Cheney speaks to President George W. Bush by phone inside the Operations Center at the White House on September 11, 2001. Credit: The White House / Getty Images

The United States in 2001 stood at the height of its post-Cold War power. The Soviet Union had disappeared a decade earlier, China had not yet emerged as a peer economic competitor and Washington possessed unmatched military, financial and political reach. September 11 was therefore interpreted not only as a terrorist atrocity but as a challenge to American global leadership.

"Not responding was impossible," Lukyanov told RT. "The question is that the response was built on the experience, analytical frameworks, decision-making patterns and limitations that American political elites had at that moment."

America's Road to Endless War

The United States was already deeply involved in the Middle East before September 11. Its presence expanded following the 1990-91 Gulf War, with American troops and military facilities across the region, protection for Gulf monarchies, no-fly zones over Iraq, extensive support for Israel and a central role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Lukyanov therefore characterises 9/11 not as the beginning of American involvement in the region, but as the moment an already extensive commitment dramatically accelerated.

US forces train in the Saudi desert

US forces carry out a live-fire exercise in the Saudi desert while training for the allied intervention in Kuwait, December 1990. Credit: Tom Stoddart / Getty Images

"The United States began sinking into the Middle Eastern swamp long before September 11," Lukyanov said, arguing that by the end of the 1990s Washington had become central to almost every major regional conflict or political problem. September 11 became the crescendo, transforming that existing involvement into something larger and substantially more difficult to control.

Afghanistan came first. The United States invaded less than a month after the attacks with the stated objective of destroying Al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban government that had sheltered it. The Taliban regime collapsed rapidly, but the war continued for almost 20 years, becoming America's longest. More than 2,400 US service members were killed before American forces withdrew in August 2021 and the Taliban returned to Kabul. RT notes that around $7 billion worth of US-funded military equipment remained in Afghanistan following the collapse of the security forces Washington had spent two decades building.

Destroying One Enemy, Creating Another

Iraq followed in 2003, although Saddam Hussein's government was not accused of carrying out the September 11 attacks. The George W. Bush administration argued that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and presented the country as part of the broader post-9/11 security threat. Those weapons were never found.

Saddam Hussein during his trial

Ousted Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein addresses the court during his trial in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone, October 17, 2006. Credit: David Furst-Pool / Getty Images

The invasion removed Hussein but also dismantled much of the Iraqi state's coercive structure. The dissolution of the Iraqi Army and Baathist institutions left large numbers of armed and militarily trained men outside the new political order. Insurgency and sectarian violence followed, while the removal of Hussein also eliminated one of the principal Arab counterweights to Iran.

Lukyanov argues that the invasion helped intensify the geopolitical confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Iraq's long-suppressed Shia majority gained unprecedented political influence, while many Sunnis who had occupied privileged positions under Hussein became marginalised. A new generation of jihadists emerged amid the occupation and Sunni insurgency, eventually contributing to the rise of Islamic State. By 2014, ISIS had captured Mosul and proclaimed a caliphate across large areas of Iraq and Syria.

The Friends America Abandoned

The War on Terror also transformed Washington's relationships with authoritarian governments across the Middle East and North Africa. Tunisia, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, Jordan and several Gulf monarchies expanded counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. RT argues that some governments increasingly presented domestic repression as part of the same struggle against extremism, sometimes blurring distinctions between violent jihadists and non-violent political opponents.

Lukyanov argues that some governments came to believe cooperation with Washington would provide protection from criticism of their domestic conduct. "The War on Terror gave them the illusion that, by acting against a common enemy together with the United States, they would receive forgiveness for everything that had happened in the past."

US soldier beside burning Iraqi oil well

US Army Specialist Chad Morton stands beside a burning oil well at the Rumayla oil fields in Iraq, March 27, 2003. Credit: Mario Tama / Getty Images

Libya became one of the clearest examples. Muammar Gaddafi had spent decades as an adversary of Washington, but after 9/11 his government's opposition to jihadist groups created an area of common interest. Libya shared intelligence on Al-Qaeda and other Islamist militants, while Gaddafi renounced terrorism in 2003 and agreed to dismantle his weapons-of-mass-destruction programmes. Sanctions were progressively removed, diplomatic relations restored and the United States removed Libya from its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2006.

The relationship did not last. When uprisings swept across North Africa a decade after 9/11, Tunisia's Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled, Egypt's Hosni Mubarak resigned and Gaddafi faced an uprising of his own. NATO intervened against Libyan government forces and Gaddafi was killed in October 2011. Libya subsequently fragmented, Yemen descended into regional conflict and Syria became a battlefield involving domestic rebellion, government forces, regional powers and transnational jihadist organisations.

Egyptian protesters in Tahrir Square

Anti-government protesters react after a speech by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Tahrir Square, Cairo, February 10, 2011. Credit: Chris Hondros / Getty Images

When the War on Terror Came Home

Six days after the attacks, President George W. Bush visited a Washington mosque and declared "Islam is peace," seeking to distinguish the perpetrators from ordinary Muslims. On the ground, however, a significant backlash had already begun. Anti-Muslim hate crimes in the United States increased from 28 reported incidents in 2000 to 481 in 2001, according to Human Rights Watch figures cited by RT. Another 49 assaults and 104 incidents involving places of worship were reported during the first week after September 11.

The domestic response went much further than changing public attitudes. On 26 October 2001, just 45 days after the attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act became law. The legislation was designed to enhance law-enforcement investigative tools against terrorism and contained extensive provisions covering intelligence gathering, surveillance, information sharing, financial investigations and electronic communications. The speed and scope of its passage made it one of the defining legislative responses to September 11.

The wider security transformation was international. The Five Eyes intelligence partnership, comprising the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, had existed for decades before September 11. It was not created by the attacks. Counterterrorism, however, became an increasingly important intelligence priority in the years that followed, and New Zealand's own GCSB records show a significant post-9/11 counterterrorism effort. Its 2005 annual report recorded increased intelligence production and a "significant effort on counter-terrorism."

For New Zealand, this meant participation in an international intelligence system operating alongside the military response to terrorism. Five Eyes allowed intelligence collected by individual partners to contribute to a much larger shared picture. New Zealand was not merely receiving intelligence from larger allies. It was also collecting and supplying foreign intelligence of its own.

New Zealand's Role in Five Eyes

The GCSB openly acknowledges that it collects intelligence electronically, including through interception capabilities, and shares intelligence with Five Eyes partners. Its capabilities have included high-frequency radio interception at Tangimoana and satellite communications interception at Waihopai, although the original Waihopai satellite dishes were later retired as communications technology changed. The Bureau also has legal authority, subject to statutory requirements, to intercept communications and access information infrastructures.

That intelligence relationship is significant. The GCSB says Five Eyes remains fundamental to its work and acknowledges that New Zealand makes a "unique and valued contribution" to the partnership. Its annual reporting also states that the Bureau shares a "significant amount of intelligence with foreign parties," including processing requests from Five Eyes partners to pass GCSB intelligence to other parties. The GCSB says such sharing is assessed against New Zealand law, human-rights obligations and risks associated with matters including military operations.

The imbalance in scale is substantial. A former GCSB director said that for every foreign intelligence report produced by New Zealand, the country received 99 reports from its international partners. The arrangement therefore gives New Zealand access to intelligence, technology and collection capabilities far beyond what a country of its size could independently maintain, while New Zealand contributes information gathered through its own geographic position, interception capabilities and intelligence priorities.

The GCSB rejects claims that this amounts to indiscriminate "mass surveillance" of New Zealanders. It says intelligence sharing must comply with New Zealand law and human-rights obligations, and that it cannot ask a foreign partner to undertake surveillance that the GCSB itself would be prohibited from carrying out. Those safeguards are an important part of the official account, while the scale and international reach of intelligence sharing remain legitimate matters of democratic scrutiny.

Does This Affect New Zealand?

New Zealand was considerably more involved in the post-9/11 security order than its geographic distance from New York, Washington, Afghanistan or Iraq might suggest. New Zealand deployed military personnel to Afghanistan while simultaneously participating in the Five Eyes intelligence network that supported the wider Western security architecture.

The consequences were institutional as well as military. New Zealand's signals-intelligence role was formally placed on a statutory footing when the GCSB Act took effect in April 2003, although work on that legislation had begun before September 11. The GCSB's history also records the establishment of its Centre for Critical Infrastructure Protection in 2001, marking the beginning of a growing cyber-security function alongside its traditional foreign-intelligence role.

Five Eyes remains central to New Zealand's national-security system today. The GCSB says the country could not deliver its current level of intelligence and security activity alone and identifies terrorism and violent extremism, foreign interference and espionage, cyber threats, strategic competition and New Zealand's interests in the Indo-Pacific among current national-security intelligence priorities.

That makes the New Zealand legacy of September 11 broader than participation in Afghanistan. The attacks accelerated a security era in which international intelligence sharing, electronic interception, counterterrorism and increasingly sophisticated surveillance capabilities became embedded within the machinery of Western governments.

Nearly 3,000 people died on September 11, 2001. The human consequences did not stop there. Afghanistan endured almost two decades of war before the Taliban returned to power, Iraq was transformed by invasion and sectarian conflict, ISIS emerged from the upheaval that followed, Libya fragmented after another Western intervention, and an entire generation grew up within the political and security architecture of the War on Terror.

Twenty-five years later, perhaps the most enduring lesson is that the historical significance of September 11 cannot be measured solely by what happened on that morning. It must also be measured by what governments chose to do next, from wars fought overseas to surveillance and intelligence systems built at home, and by institutions that remain with us long after the emergency that created them.

Sources

RT, How 9/11 turned a terrorist attack into a generation of war, 11 September 2026: https://www.rt.com/news/645405-911-terrorist-attack-blowback/

US Congress, USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56, 26 October 2001: https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ56/PLAW-107publ56.pdf

New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau, History of the GCSB: https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/history-of-the-gcsb

New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau, information on intelligence collection and Five Eyes cooperation: https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/news/speech-cyber-security-in-a-covid-19-world

New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau, Annual Report 2024: https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/about-us/annual-reports/annual-report-2024

Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.

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