BRICS: Can a Global Power Bloc Work Without a Leader?

And could New Zealand eventually have a place at the table?


BRICS. Credit: Sputnik / Kristina Solovyova. Source: RT.


BRICS brings together countries with different political systems, competing strategic interests and, in some cases, serious disputes with one another. Yet rather than collapsing under those differences, the grouping continues to expand, raising a bigger question about the emerging world order: can nations cooperate economically and politically without submitting to a dominant power?


INR Report: Based on an analysis by Dmitry Trenin for RT, independently examined against official BRICS documents and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade records.

When BRIC first appeared in international discussion, it was not a political organisation at all.

The acronym was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill to describe four large emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China. The governments themselves subsequently adopted the concept, began meeting formally and admitted South Africa in 2011, turning BRIC into BRICS.

What followed was more consequential.

BRICS now includes Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, alongside a growing group of partner countries.

Yet BRICS still has no constitutive treaty, permanent secretariat or independent budget. Decisions are made by consensus and the presidency rotates among members.

That makes it an unusual geopolitical structure.

It is becoming larger without becoming a conventional alliance.

The Differences May Be the Point

Writing for RT ahead of the 2026 BRICS summit in New Delhi, Russian foreign-policy scholar Dmitry Trenin argues that Western observers have repeatedly misunderstood the organisation.

First, BRICS was dismissed as little more than an economic acronym.

Later, it was portrayed as a developing-country equivalent of the G7.

More recently, particularly amid confrontation between Russia and the West and growing US-China competition, it has increasingly been described as an emerging anti-Western bloc.

Trenin argues that all three interpretations miss something fundamental.

BRICS may be important precisely because its members are not politically aligned.

China and India have strategic differences.

India maintains substantial relationships with the United States and Europe while preserving its longstanding relationship with Russia.

Iran and the United Arab Emirates have frequently approached Middle Eastern security from different directions.

Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia have their own regional priorities.

The governments range across very different political and economic systems.

There is no BRICS equivalent of NATO's Article 5.

There is no supranational BRICS government.

There is no BRICS military command.

There is no single foreign policy.

And there is no formally designated leader.

That apparent weakness may also be what makes the experiment interesting.

China Is the Giant, But Is It the Boss?

Any investigation of BRICS has to confront the enormous imbalance inside the organisation.

China is vastly more economically powerful than most other members and sits at the centre of global manufacturing and international trade.

India is simultaneously becoming another major economic and demographic power.

Russia remains one of the world's principal nuclear powers and a major producer of energy and commodities.

Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America.

The organisation therefore contains significant disparities in population, military power, industrial capacity, resources and economic influence.

That creates an obvious question.

If BRICS is intended to challenge a world system its members regard as excessively dominated by the United States and its allies, does it simply risk replacing American dominance with Chinese dominance?

So far, its institutional structure provides an interesting answer.

China cannot formally dictate BRICS decisions.

Consensus means India, Brazil, Russia, South Africa and the newer members retain political leverage despite China's greater economic weight.

This does not make the countries equal in practical power.

It does mean economic power and institutional authority are not necessarily the same thing.

Sovereignty Is the Organising Principle

Official BRICS documents repeatedly emphasise sovereignty, equality, multilateralism, consensus and reform of global governance.

That helps explain why governments with profoundly different political systems can participate.

BRICS does not require them to become alike.

Nor does membership require countries to surrender substantial national authority to a supranational institution.

This is fundamentally different from the European Union, which has developed common legislation, courts, regulatory institutions, collective borrowing mechanisms and a substantial central administration.

It is also different from NATO, whose members participate in an integrated political and military alliance built around collective defence.

BRICS is much looser.

Its members cooperate where their interests intersect and retain considerable freedom where they do not.

That structure can make agreement slow and difficult.

But it also reduces the political cost of participation.

The Real Test Comes When Members Disagree

A system based upon consensus sounds attractive until important members want different things.

China and India provide perhaps the clearest test.

The two countries have experienced serious border confrontations, compete for regional influence and maintain different relationships with Washington.

Yet both remain inside BRICS.

Russia and India offer another example.

New Delhi has expanded strategic relationships with the United States, Japan and Australia through the Quad while simultaneously maintaining substantial economic and defence relations with Moscow.

Iran and the United Arab Emirates likewise bring different security interests into the same grouping.

BRICS has not eliminated these differences.

That is important because eliminating them was never necessarily the objective.

The real measure of the organisation may instead be whether countries can prevent disagreements in one area from destroying cooperation in another.

If they can, BRICS begins to look less like an alliance and more like a mechanism for managing a multipolar world.

Follow the Money

The geopolitical discussion surrounding BRICS can obscure the more measurable economic question.

The existing international financial system remains heavily centred upon institutions and currencies created or dominated by Western economies.

The US dollar remains the world's principal reserve currency and is central to international trade, commodity pricing and cross-border finance.

The International Monetary Fund and World Bank emerged from the post-war Bretton Woods system.

Western financial infrastructure and sanctions can therefore have consequences extending far beyond Western national borders.

BRICS countries have increasingly discussed greater use of national currencies in bilateral trade, improved cross-border payment systems and alternatives that reduce dependence upon Western-controlled financial channels.

That does not mean BRICS has created a replacement for the dollar.

It has not.

Nor does the existence of more local-currency trade mean the dollar is about to disappear as the world's dominant reserve currency.

The more immediate development is diversification.

Countries want additional mechanisms through which they can trade, borrow, invest and settle transactions without every financial pathway necessarily passing through the same institutions.

The New Development Bank Matters

One of the most tangible BRICS institutions is the New Development Bank.

Created by the original BRICS members in 2015, the bank finances infrastructure and sustainable-development projects in emerging economies.

Its existence provides BRICS with something more concrete than summit declarations.

Capital can be raised.

Projects can be financed.

Infrastructure can be constructed.

Loans can be issued outside the traditional World Bank framework.

But here again the evidence requires caution.

The New Development Bank is not currently a replacement for the World Bank, IMF or global private capital markets.

Its significance lies instead in providing another financing channel.

That distinction reflects the wider BRICS story.

The emerging system does not necessarily have to destroy the existing one to change the balance of power within it.

It merely has to create alternatives.

Is BRICS Anti-Western?

Russia's confrontation with NATO and the United States makes this question unavoidable.

Moscow clearly has strategic reasons to encourage institutions that reduce Western economic and political leverage.

China likewise has reasons to reduce vulnerabilities created by dependence upon US-controlled technologies, finance and markets.

Iran has even stronger reasons because it has experienced extensive Western sanctions.

But it does not follow that every BRICS member shares the same objective.

India maintains extensive relationships with Western countries.

Brazil trades heavily with both China and the United States.

The UAE is deeply integrated into Western financial markets and has longstanding security relationships with Washington.

Indonesia likewise pursues relationships across competing geopolitical camps.

BRICS therefore contains governments seeking alternatives to Western dominance without necessarily seeking confrontation with the West itself.

That distinction is essential.

An institution can seek a more multipolar international system without every member wanting to dismantle relationships with Washington, London, Brussels or other Western capitals.

The Weakness Is Also Obvious

There is a strong counterargument to Trenin's thesis.

Consensus protects sovereignty, but consensus can also produce paralysis.

An alliance can make decisions rapidly because its members have already accepted common obligations.

A supranational institution can implement policy because authority has been delegated to it.

BRICS possesses neither advantage.

When members disagree fundamentally, there is no central government capable of imposing a decision.

There is no military command capable of enforcing a strategic doctrine.

There is no common currency.

There is no common fiscal authority.

There is no BRICS central bank.

And there is no guarantee that members will support one another during a crisis.

The same diversity that makes BRICS attractive to governments seeking independence can therefore limit its ability to act collectively.

That is not a minor weakness.

It is the central experiment.

Can an international system exercise meaningful influence without becoming hierarchical?

Could New Zealand Participate in BRICS?

For New Zealand, this is where the story becomes much more than an argument about Russia, China or the changing Global South.

There is an established mechanism through which New Zealand could seek participation.

BRICS now has two principal formal participation categories: full members and Partner Countries.

Partner status was created at the 2024 Kazan summit as a mechanism allowing countries to participate in BRICS without immediately becoming full members.

The process is surprisingly straightforward on paper.

A country interested in becoming a BRICS partner has its Head of State or Government, or Foreign Minister, formally communicate that interest to the country holding the rotating BRICS presidency.

The presidency then provides the applicant with the principles, standards and criteria governing participation and circulates the expression of interest among BRICS members.

BRICS Sherpas examine the application.

Foreign Ministers consider their recommendations.

The proposed partner can then be referred to BRICS leaders.

The final decision requires consensus among the existing BRICS member countries.

BRICS: Frequently Asked Questions

There is therefore nothing preventing a future New Zealand government from opening a conversation.

Acceptance would be another matter.

New Zealand Would Not Have to Become a Full Member

Partner status could be considerably more relevant to New Zealand than immediate full membership.

BRICS partner countries may be invited to sessions of BRICS summits and meetings of Foreign Ministers.

They can also be invited to other meetings where BRICS members agree and may endorse summit declarations, foreign ministers' declarations and other final documents.

That potentially gives a country access to the BRICS diplomatic network without granting it the same institutional position as a full member.

Current partner countries include states such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

BRICS: About the BRICS

For New Zealand, the question would therefore not necessarily be:

"Should New Zealand join BRICS?"

A more immediate question could be:

Should New Zealand investigate becoming a BRICS Partner Country?

But New Zealand Would Face a Sanctions Problem

This is where the institutional criteria become particularly important.

BRICS says applicants should maintain good diplomatic relations with all full members, support multilateralism and reform of global governance, maintain geographic balance and refrain from imposing unilateral sanctions that have not been authorised by the United Nations Security Council.

That criterion potentially intersects directly with New Zealand foreign policy.

New Zealand implements sanctions mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

But following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Parliament enacted the Russia Sanctions Act 2022, creating a specific domestic mechanism enabling New Zealand to impose sanctions outside the normal UN Security Council process.

MFAT describes those measures as New Zealand's first unilateral sanctions regime and says they have been coordinated with like-minded countries.

MFAT: United Nations sanctions

That creates an obvious obstacle.

Russia is a founding BRICS member.

New Zealand maintains sanctions against Russia that were not authorised by the UN Security Council.

BRICS' published admission criteria say countries seeking participation should refrain from precisely that type of unilateral sanction.

It does not automatically establish what BRICS leaders would decide if New Zealand expressed interest, particularly because the application process is political and consensus-based.

But it is a real policy conflict that would have to be confronted.

New Zealand Already Trades Across the BRICS World

Economically, however, New Zealand is already deeply connected to parts of the BRICS network.

China is one of New Zealand's most important trading relationships.

India is a strategic priority for Wellington and the two governments signed the New Zealand-India Free Trade Agreement on 27 April 2026.

MFAT reports that two-way New Zealand-India trade reached approximately NZ$3.95 billion in the year ended December 2025, with New Zealand exporting around NZ$2.03 billion in goods and services to India.

MFAT: New Zealand-India Economic Relationship

New Zealand also maintains substantial economic relationships across Southeast Asia, the Gulf and other emerging markets represented within BRICS.

Brazil illustrates another largely underdeveloped opportunity.

MFAT's July 2026 assessment describes Brazil as presenting significant opportunities for New Zealand businesses in agribusiness, energy and resources, health technology and other specialised sectors, although it also warns of substantial tariff, tax, regulatory and compliance barriers.

MFAT: Brazil Economic Outlook and Opportunities for New Zealand

The economic question is therefore not whether New Zealand should suddenly begin trading with BRICS.

It already does.

The question is whether participation in the BRICS framework would provide additional commercial or diplomatic opportunities beyond those New Zealand already obtains through bilateral agreements and existing regional institutions.

Would BRICS Conflict With Five Eyes?

This may be the most politically sensitive question.

New Zealand is part of the Five Eyes intelligence relationship alongside Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and United States.

Its defence and security relationships remain closely connected with traditional Western partners.

Would BRICS participation therefore require New Zealand to choose between two geopolitical camps?

The structure of BRICS suggests the answer is not automatically yes.

India itself demonstrates why.

India participates in BRICS alongside Russia, China and Iran while simultaneously participating in the Quad with the United States, Japan and Australia.

The United Arab Emirates has extensive security and commercial relationships with Western countries while participating in BRICS.

BRICS membership therefore does not itself require abandonment of relationships with Western governments.

But New Zealand would still have to determine whether participation was compatible with its existing intelligence, defence and foreign-policy commitments.

That question could not sensibly be answered by BRICS alone.

It would ultimately be a decision for New Zealand.

What Would New Zealand Actually Gain?

This is where advocacy needs to give way to evidence.

BRICS participation would be of limited value if it merely provided New Zealand ministers with another annual summit to attend.

The case would have to rest on measurable benefits.

Could participation improve market access?

Could it accelerate trade with India, Indonesia, Brazil, the Gulf and Africa?

Could New Zealand businesses gain meaningful access to BRICS financing or development projects?

Could New Zealand participate in emerging cross-border payment infrastructure?

Would local-currency settlement reduce transaction costs or financial exposure for exporters?

Could BRICS provide Wellington with greater diplomatic influence among countries representing a growing share of the world's population and economic output?

And would those benefits exceed the diplomatic and strategic costs of changing New Zealand's present alignment?

Those are empirical questions.

They should be investigated before a political conclusion is reached.

There Is Another Question: What Would BRICS Gain?

Membership or partnership is not a one-way transaction.

BRICS members would also ask what New Zealand brings to the table.

New Zealand is a small country by population and economic scale.

But it possesses characteristics that could make it unusual within the BRICS network.

It is a developed Pacific economy.

It is a major agricultural exporter.

It has longstanding commercial relationships across Asia.

It participates in CPTPP and RCEP.

It has established relationships with China, India, Southeast Asia, the United States, Europe and the Pacific.

And it comes from the Western political and institutional tradition.

If BRICS genuinely wants to become a framework for a multipolar rather than simply anti-Western world, a country such as New Zealand could present an interesting test.

Could a Western democracy participate without becoming anti-Western?

Could a Five Eyes country engage with BRICS without surrendering its existing partnerships?

Could New Zealand deal simultaneously with Washington, Beijing, Delhi, Brussels, Moscow and the wider Global South according to its own interests?

If the answer were yes, that would provide evidence for Trenin's central proposition.

If the answer were no, it would expose limits to BRICS' claim to represent sovereign multipolarity.

Does This Affect New Zealand?

Very directly.

For much of the post-war period, New Zealand prospered inside an international system whose financial, security and institutional architecture was dominated by the United States and its allies.

That system is changing.

China is already central to New Zealand's economic prosperity.

India is becoming increasingly important.

Indonesia is a major Indo-Pacific economy.

The Gulf states are becoming larger centres of capital and investment.

BRICS is bringing many of these countries into a single diplomatic framework.

New Zealand does not need to choose BRICS over the West to recognise that transformation.

Nor does recognising the economic rise of BRICS establish that joining it would be in New Zealand's interests.

The more immediate issue is whether Wellington should maintain the widest possible range of relationships as global power becomes more dispersed.

A small trading nation has a particular interest in avoiding a world divided into mutually exclusive economic blocs.

New Zealand's prosperity has historically depended upon being able to sell goods and services across political boundaries.

The emergence of a larger BRICS therefore deserves considerably more attention in Wellington than the simplistic question of whether the organisation is "pro-Western" or "anti-Western."

The Real BRICS Experiment

Dmitry Trenin's argument ultimately reaches beyond BRICS itself.

For centuries, international orders have repeatedly organised themselves around dominant powers, empires, alliances or competing blocs.

BRICS proposes, at least institutionally, something different.

Countries remain sovereign.

They disagree.

They compete.

They maintain relationships outside the group.

And they cooperate where consensus can be found.

Whether that system can function when confronted by severe geopolitical crises remains unresolved.

Whether China can remain the group's largest economic power without becoming its political hegemon remains unresolved.

Whether BRICS can create meaningful financial alternatives without constructing another centralised system remains unresolved.

And whether countries closely associated with the traditional Western system could eventually participate remains unresolved.

New Zealand could one day provide a particularly revealing test.

The formal pathway exists.

New Zealand Government → expression of interest to the BRICS presidency → assessment against BRICS criteria → Sherpa review → Foreign Ministers → consensus among BRICS leaders → Partner Country status → possible later consideration of full membership.

The difficult question is not whether New Zealand can ask to participate.

It can.

The real questions are what New Zealand would gain, what policies it might have to reconsider, what BRICS would expect in return and whether participation could strengthen New Zealand's independence without weakening relationships that already serve its interests.

Those questions deserve examination before the emerging multipolar system makes the choices more difficult.

Sources

Original analysis: Dmitry Trenin for RT, Why the West still misunderstands BRICS

BRICS: Frequently Asked Questions about BRICS

BRICS: About the BRICS

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: United Nations sanctions

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: New Zealand-India Economic Relationship

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Key Facts on New Zealand-India Trade

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Brazil Economic Outlook and Opportunities for New Zealand

Addendum: The New Zealand Question

One point is especially worth retaining: the sanctions issue is probably the biggest concrete obstacle to a New Zealand BRICS application under the currently published criteria.

BRICS explicitly lists "refraining from adopting sanctions without authorization from the UNSC" among its criteria for Partner Countries. New Zealand, meanwhile, has standalone legislation under the Russia Sanctions Act 2022 allowing sanctions to be imposed independently of the United Nations Security Council in response to Russia's military actions. That makes the issue more than a theoretical foreign-policy disagreement.

BRICS: Frequently Asked Questions about BRICS

MFAT: United Nations Sanctions

The economic side is less hypothetical than it might first appear. MFAT describes India as a strategic priority for New Zealand, while India-New Zealand two-way trade now amounts to approximately NZ$3.95 billion annually. New Zealand and India signed their Free Trade Agreement on 27 April 2026, further deepening a relationship with one of BRICS' founding members.

MFAT: New Zealand-India Free Trade Agreement

MFAT has also identified substantial additional opportunities for New Zealand businesses in Brazil, another founding BRICS member, particularly across agribusiness, energy and resources, health technology and specialised sectors.

MFAT: Brazil Economic Outlook and Opportunities for New Zealand

This creates an intriguing strategic tension. New Zealand already conducts substantial trade with BRICS economies and is actively seeking deeper economic relationships with several of them, yet one element of its present foreign policy may complicate formal participation in the organisation itself.

That does not determine whether New Zealand should seek BRICS participation. It does identify a concrete question that any future government considering Partner Country status would have to resolve: could New Zealand retain its existing sanctions policy while satisfying the BRICS requirement for countries seeking participation?

Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.

Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.

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