BRICS nations collectively possess enormous energy resources, but recent supply disruptions have exposed a fundamental weakness: membership does not guarantee access to another member’s oil when a crisis strikes. An emerging proposal would move cooperation beyond declarations by positioning emergency oil stocks closer to importing countries and agreeing access before shortages begin
INR Report: Based on analysis by Manish Vaid for RT HERE
Energy security has moved rapidly from a long-term strategic concern to an immediate problem for many developing economies. Conflict in the Middle East, pressure on shipping routes, damage to energy infrastructure and competition between major buyers have demonstrated how quickly apparently diversified global energy markets can become constrained.
At the September BRICS summit in New Delhi, leaders explicitly recognised that vulnerability. The New Delhi Declaration called for stable energy markets, diversified sources, resilient supply chains, protection of critical infrastructure and uninterrupted energy flows.
The declaration also acknowledged something increasingly significant in the international energy debate: fossil fuels will continue to play an important role for emerging and developing economies even as governments pursue energy transitions.
The problem identified by energy analyst Manish Vaid is that a declaration does not move a barrel of oil.
BRICS Has the Oil, But Who Gets It?
The expanded BRICS grouping contains both major petroleum producers and some of the world's largest energy consumers. Russia, the UAE and Iran possess enormous hydrocarbon resources, while China and India are among the world's biggest oil importers.
That combination appears to provide the foundations of an energy-security bloc. In practice, however, national interests and market forces remain decisive.
India provides the clearest example.
As Middle Eastern supplies became less reliable, Indian refiners dramatically increased purchases from Russia. Reuters reported that Russian crude reached a record 50.83 percent of India's oil imports in July 2026, equivalent to approximately 2.47 million barrels per day.
That demonstrated the value of alternative suppliers. It did not demonstrate guaranteed access.
China was simultaneously increasing demand for Russian oil. As competition intensified and Russian export availability tightened, Indian buyers found themselves competing with another BRICS member for the same barrels.
By late September, Reuters reported that Russian supplies available to India were tightening further, with Indian refiners turning to more expensive alternatives from the UAE, Iraq and Angola.
The lesson is straightforward: having major oil-producing nations inside BRICS is not the same thing as having a BRICS energy-security system.
India and Russia Show How Energy Can Flow Both Ways
The Russia-India relationship also demonstrates something potentially more important than simply buying Russian crude.
When Russia faced domestic fuel shortages after Ukrainian attacks disrupted refinery operations, the direction of trade partially reversed. Russia began importing gasoline from India.
According to the source analysis, a 40,000-tonne gasoline cargo produced by Nayara Energy arrived at Russia's Murmansk port. Nayara itself has a significant Russian connection, with Rosneft controlling a 49 percent interest.
The significance is structural. Russia could provide crude to India when India needed alternative supplies, while Indian refining capacity could provide finished fuel when Russia's domestic processing infrastructure came under pressure.
That is the type of complementary relationship BRICS could potentially formalise.
At present, however, these flows remain largely commercial responses to disruptions after they occur.
Vaid's proposal is essentially to reverse that sequence: establish the mechanisms before the emergency.
Put the Oil Where It May Be Needed
One possible model already exists between India and the United Arab Emirates.
ADNOC and Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited have established a storage relationship at Mangalore. A 2026 agreement explores increasing ADNOC crude stored in India to as much as 30 million barrels, while also examining additional storage at Visakhapatnam and Chandikhol.
The concept is important because the oil can physically exist inside the importing country before a crisis occurs.
But storage alone does not solve the problem.
Ownership, pricing, release conditions, replacement requirements, refinery compatibility, transport arrangements and the importing country's right to draw upon the stock would all have to be established beforehand.
Without those agreements, emergency oil stored nearby may still require commercial negotiation precisely when markets are under the greatest pressure.
Vaid therefore proposes something short of a central BRICS strategic petroleum reserve: voluntary emergency arrangements between interested producers and importing members.
Under such a system, participating countries could establish in advance how much oil is available, where it is stored, what triggers its release, how it is priced and how depleted stocks are replaced.
The Payment System Matters Too
There is another vulnerability.
Even if emergency oil is physically available, the transaction still has to be paid for.
BRICS governments have been discussing cross-border payment mechanisms partly because sanctions and restrictions involving conventional financial channels can complicate trade between members.
Energy resilience therefore requires more than pipelines, tankers and storage tanks. The financial transaction must also work under crisis conditions.
A credible emergency arrangement would consequently need to test both sides simultaneously: can the oil move, and can the money move?
That makes Vaid's proposal less about creating another BRICS institution and more about stress-testing infrastructure that already exists.
The BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform could potentially coordinate pilot exercises involving oil ministries, national petroleum companies and storage operators.
A simulated disruption could then answer a practical question: if a member invokes an agreed right to emergency oil today, how many hours or days pass before that fuel reaches a refinery?
That number may ultimately matter more than another summit declaration.
Energy Security Is Becoming National Security
The wider significance extends beyond BRICS.
Modern economies depend on highly efficient international supply chains built around the assumption that fuel, shipping, insurance, finance and infrastructure remain simultaneously available.
Recent conflicts have demonstrated how quickly those assumptions can fail.
A tanker may be available while a shipping route is unsafe. Oil may be available while insurance becomes prohibitively expensive. A producer may have spare capacity while a pipeline is damaged. A cargo may be ready while financial sanctions interfere with payment.
Energy security therefore increasingly means redundancy.
Countries able to obtain fuel from several suppliers, through several routes, using several payment mechanisms and with meaningful stocks already positioned domestically possess greater resilience than those dependent on a single highly efficient supply chain.
That principle matters well beyond the BRICS economies.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
It does, because New Zealand has moved decisively toward the very model now being stress-tested internationally.
Since the Marsden Point refinery closed in April 2022, New Zealand has imported all of its refined petroleum products, principally from Asian refineries in countries including South Korea, Singapore and Malaysia. Before its closure, Marsden Point produced around 70 percent of New Zealand's fuel requirements from imported crude.
That means New Zealand is no longer principally exposed to the availability of crude oil. It is exposed simultaneously to overseas refinery capacity, refined-fuel availability, international shipping, maritime routes, insurance, functioning ports and domestic distribution infrastructure.
The Government itself recognises the vulnerability. Its Fuel Security Plan describes secure supplies of petrol, diesel and jet fuel as critical to the economy and identifies the refinery closure as having changed the nature of New Zealand's fuel-security risks.
The country has begun rebuilding some physical resilience. MBIE reported that New Zealand's first 93 million-litre strategic diesel reserve was imported during the June 2026 quarter and is being stored in two refurbished tanks at Marsden Point.
That is significant because it follows essentially the same principle being discussed in the BRICS context: critical fuel positioned physically inside the country before an emergency occurs.
There is, however, an important difference.
BRICS producers and consumers are considering whether vertically connected energy relationships could provide additional supply during disruption. New Zealand has no comparable bloc of petroleum-producing partners and no domestic refinery capable of converting crude oil into the petrol, diesel and jet fuel required by the economy.
New Zealand's resilience therefore depends heavily on diversified refined-product suppliers, sufficient domestic stocks, functioning import terminals and shipping routes that remain available during an international crisis.
The BRICS debate consequently raises a useful question for Wellington that has little to do with joining BRICS itself.
Energy security is not simply about knowing that sufficient oil exists somewhere in the world. It is about knowing which fuel is available to New Zealand, where it is located, how quickly it can arrive, how it will be paid for and how long the country can function if that supply chain breaks.
BRICS is beginning to confront the difference between theoretical energy abundance and practical energy security.
New Zealand has reason to understand that difference particularly well.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.
Source
Manish Vaid, RT, 2 October 2026: BRICS talks energy resilience. Time to make it real
Government of India, 12 September 2026: BRICS New Delhi Declaration: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability
New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: Fuel security in New Zealand
New Zealand Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment: June 2026 energy summary
The supplied source establishes the article's central proposal, including the India-Russia trade examples, the proposed voluntary emergency oil arrangements and the argument for testing access, transport and payment systems before the next supply crisis. Pasted markdown