The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu almost two years ago, yet he remains free to travel to countries prepared to receive him. The deeper issue is no longer simply Netanyahu's case, but whether international law can retain credibility when enforcement ultimately depends upon political decisions by individual states.
INR Report: Based on reporting by RT HERE
American criminal-defence and human-rights attorney Stanley L. Cohen has accused governments and the United Nations of weakening the International Criminal Court by failing to enforce its arrest warrant against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
His language is uncompromising.
Cohen told RT that the ICC risks being rendered increasingly powerless unless countries that signed the Rome Statute defend the Court against governments seeking to undermine its work.
The underlying problem he identifies is real.
The ICC issued warrants for Netanyahu and then-Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant on 21 November 2024. The judges said there were reasonable grounds to believe the two men bore criminal responsibility for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity connected with the Gaza conflict.
Netanyahu has not been convicted of those crimes.
Nor, contrary to Cohen's characterisation in the RT interview, is the ICC warrant against Netanyahu a warrant for genocide.
Those distinctions matter.
An arrest warrant means ICC judges concluded there were reasonable grounds to believe there was a case requiring judicial proceedings. It does not establish guilt.
But the warrant remains in force.
And therein lies the institutional problem.
A Court Without Police
The International Criminal Court possesses judges, prosecutors and a legal framework.
What it does not possess is a police force.
The Court was established under the Rome Statute and began operating in 2002. It prosecutes individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression within the limits of its jurisdiction.
But when the Court issues an arrest warrant, it depends upon governments to execute it.
That makes cooperation by states fundamental to the entire system.
If a suspect remains inside a country that rejects ICC jurisdiction, the Court may be unable to arrest that person.
More seriously, if a person subject to an ICC warrant enters the territory of a Rome Statute member and that state refuses to cooperate, the Court's authority can be directly challenged.
That is precisely what happened when Netanyahu travelled to Hungary in April 2025.
Hungary Put the System to the Test
Hungary was then a state party to the Rome Statute.
Netanyahu visited the country from 3 to 6 April 2025 and was not arrested.
The ICC subsequently examined Hungary's conduct and on 24 July formally found that Budapest had failed to comply with the Court's request to cooperate in Netanyahu's arrest and surrender.
The matter was referred to the Assembly of States Parties.
Hungary rejected the legitimacy of the warrant and announced its withdrawal from the ICC system. Its withdrawal took effect on 2 June 2026.
The episode exposed the fundamental limitation confronting the Court.
It can determine that a state has failed to cooperate.
It can refer that failure to the countries participating in the Rome Statute system.
But it cannot send officers into Budapest to make an arrest.
International criminal justice therefore ultimately depends upon political cooperation.
Netanyahu and the United States
Netanyahu's ability to travel to the United States presents a different legal situation.
The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute.
Washington therefore does not have the same treaty obligations as New Zealand or other ICC member states to execute the Court's arrest warrants.
Israel is likewise not a Rome Statute member.
The ICC nevertheless claims jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Palestinian territory because Palestine acceded to the Rome Statute.
Israel rejects that jurisdiction and has vigorously challenged the proceedings.
The United States has gone considerably further.
Rather than merely rejecting the Netanyahu warrant, Washington has imposed sanctions against ICC personnel.
By August 2026, according to the Court, nine of its 18 judges, both Deputy Prosecutors, a former Prosecutor and one staff member had been sanctioned by the United States.
The ICC described the measures as an attack on judicial independence.
Washington's position is that the Court has exceeded its legitimate jurisdiction in pursuing American and Israeli nationals without their countries' consent.
The dispute therefore extends far beyond one Israeli prime minister.
It concerns whether an international court can exercise authority over nationals of states that never accepted its founding treaty when alleged crimes occur within territory over which the Court claims jurisdiction.
The Selective Justice Problem
The ICC has faced another criticism almost since its creation.
Selective justice.
Some of the world's most powerful countries are outside the Court.
The United States is not a member.
Russia is not a member.
China is not a member.
India is not a member.
That creates an unavoidable structural imbalance.
The ICC may have legal jurisdiction in particular circumstances involving nationals of those countries, but enforcing its decisions against powerful states is another matter entirely.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, for example, has also been subject to an ICC arrest warrant since March 2023.
When Putin visited Mongolia, an ICC member, in September 2024, he was not arrested.
The Court subsequently found that Mongolia had failed to cooperate.
The parallel is important.
If international criminal law is to command legitimacy, the same principles must apply regardless of whether the person named in a warrant is Russian, Israeli, African, European or from any other country.
Otherwise the institution risks becoming perceived not as a universal court but as one whose reach is determined by geopolitical power.
Law Versus Power
This is the central problem raised by Cohen's criticism.
International law ultimately operates within a world of sovereign states.
Domestic courts normally possess enforcement machinery.
If a New Zealand court issues an arrest warrant, New Zealand Police can execute it.
The ICC has no equivalent global police force.
It depends upon sovereign governments.
That means international criminal law becomes most vulnerable precisely when it confronts politically powerful defendants.
A government can cooperate.
It can refuse.
It can challenge jurisdiction.
It can leave the treaty.
Or, if powerful enough, it can impose costs on the institution itself.
The legal principle may remain unchanged, but enforcement becomes political.
The Case Against the ICC
There is also a serious counterargument.
Critics of the ICC argue that an international prosecutor and judges should not possess unlimited authority over states that never consented to their jurisdiction.
The United States has long objected to the possibility that American military personnel could face prosecution by an institution outside the US constitutional system.
Israel similarly argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over its nationals.
Other governments have accused the ICC of political bias or selective prosecution.
Those concerns cannot simply be dismissed because the Court performs an important function.
An institution claiming extraordinary authority over individuals, including national leaders, must itself be subject to rigorous legal standards.
But there is an equally serious counterargument to that position.
If national sovereignty always protects leaders from international prosecution, then international criminal law becomes weakest precisely where it was intended to be strongest.
Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are often alleged against people exercising state power.
A system requiring the accused government to consent before prosecution could become effectively meaningless.
That tension has never been fully resolved.
The Dangerous Precedent
There is another reason this matters beyond Israel and Palestine.
Western governments have repeatedly invoked international law when condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
New Zealand has done the same.
The ICC warrant against Vladimir Putin has been cited as evidence that political leaders cannot place themselves above international accountability.
But the principle becomes difficult to sustain if warrants against adversaries are treated as authoritative while warrants against allies are treated as optional or illegitimate.
The reverse is equally true.
Governments that defend international law when it constrains Western countries cannot simply dismiss it when the accused is Russian or belongs to another geopolitical rival.
A rules-based system requires consistency precisely when consistency is politically uncomfortable.
Otherwise the rules risk becoming instruments of power rather than restraints upon it.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Directly.
New Zealand is a state party to the Rome Statute.
It ratified the Statute in 2000, becoming the 17th country to do so, and has consistently described itself as a strong supporter of the International Criminal Court.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has also addressed the Netanyahu warrant specifically.
New Zealand's official position is carefully worded.
The Government says the ICC judges determined there is a case to answer, but Wellington will not comment on the merits while the matter remains before the Court.
More importantly, MFAT states that New Zealand, "like all parties to the Rome Statute, has legal obligations to the Court."
That creates a practical question.
What would happen if Benjamin Netanyahu travelled to New Zealand while the arrest warrant remained valid?
The Government's published position stops short of publicly describing precisely what operational steps would occur.
But New Zealand's treaty obligations would immediately become relevant.
The issue would therefore cease to be an abstract argument about events in The Hague.
It would become a test of New Zealand's own commitment to the international legal system.
Small Countries Have More at Stake
For New Zealand, there is a broader principle involved.
Large powers possess military and economic resources that allow them to protect their interests directly.
Small countries do not.
New Zealand has consequently invested heavily in international rules and institutions.
The UN Charter matters to New Zealand because a world in which powerful states can simply impose their will upon smaller ones is inherently dangerous for a country of five million people.
The same principle underpins Wellington's condemnation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
But support for international law cannot logically depend upon which country is accused of violating it.
If international institutions apply only when powerful governments permit them to apply, smaller states eventually lose the protection those institutions were supposed to provide.
The Real Test of International Law
Cohen describes the present situation as evidence of ICC "impotence".
That language is his assessment.
The Court continues operating, issuing decisions and conducting investigations. It has not ceased to function.
But the enforcement problem he identifies is undeniable.
Benjamin Netanyahu remains subject to an ICC arrest warrant.
So does Vladimir Putin.
Neither has been surrendered to the Court.
Both cases demonstrate the same institutional reality.
The ICC can issue warrants.
It can interpret the Rome Statute.
It can determine that member states have failed to cooperate.
What it cannot do is compel the world's governments to enforce its decisions.
That leaves international criminal justice confronting the oldest question in international relations.
What happens when law collides with power?
For New Zealand, the answer matters.
Because a rules-based international system is valuable to a small country only if the rules constrain friends and adversaries alike.
If they do not, what remains may still be called international law.
But increasingly, it will be power that determines when that law actually applies.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.
Sources
RT, 4 October 2026: ICC weakened by 'impotence' over Netanyahu arrest warrant – attorney
International Criminal Court: Finding on Hungary's non-compliance with the request to arrest Benjamin Netanyahu
International Criminal Court, 19 August 2026: ICC strongly rejects new US sanctions designations
International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties: Non-cooperation
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Israel-Hamas Conflict
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 8 July 2025: Special Session of the Assembly of States Parties