One of Russia’s most prominent foreign-policy strategists says nuclear deterrence has lost credibility and must be restored by convincing European governments that Moscow is genuinely prepared to use its arsenal. His argument exposes a much larger danger: Russia and NATO increasingly appear to be relying on the same proposition, that peace depends upon convincing the other side that nuclear retaliation is credible
INR Report: Based on an article by Professor Sergey Karaganov, originally published by Expert magazine and translated and edited by RT HERE.
Karaganov, honorary chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and academic supervisor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, has issued one of his strongest arguments yet for restoring the credibility of Russian nuclear deterrence.
His central contention is not that Russia should immediately use nuclear weapons. It is that nuclear weapons cease to deter an adversary if that adversary no longer believes there are circumstances in which they will actually be used.
That distinction matters.
Karaganov argues that decades without nuclear warfare, combined with generations of Europeans who have never experienced major interstate war directly, have weakened the psychological force that once made nuclear deterrence effective.
He therefore argues Russia must be prepared, in what he describes as circumstances of "absolute necessity", to use nuclear weapons.
But the implications of his argument extend considerably further.
Karaganov says a nuclear war could be "won" in Europe, argues the United States would not necessarily risk its own territory to defend European allies, and contends that if a non-nuclear European country hostile to Russia acquired nuclear weapons, Moscow should launch a pre-emptive strike.
These are Karaganov’s views. They are not, by themselves, statements of official Russian government policy.
That distinction is essential when assessing what his intervention actually means.
Putin’s Warning Was More Restrained
Karaganov builds his argument partly around recent comments by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Valdai Forum.
According to the account published by RT, Putin invoked the familiar theatrical principle that if a gun is hanging on the wall, eventually it may be fired.
But Putin’s conclusion was that such an outcome should be avoided.
He nevertheless argued that Russia faces an enormous conventional disadvantage in any direct confrontation with NATO because of the alliance’s combined population and economic strength, while Russia possesses strategic weapons capable of compensating for that imbalance.
Karaganov takes that logic considerably further.
His argument is essentially that possession alone is insufficient. An adversary must believe that the weapons could actually be used.
That is the foundation of nuclear deterrence itself.
The Nuclear Paradox
The disturbing element is that Russia is not alone in relying upon this logic.
NATO explicitly describes nuclear weapons as a core component of its deterrence and defence capabilities. In September 2026, the alliance said the fundamental purpose of its nuclear capability was to "preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression".
NATO also states that the circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons are "extremely remote".
Yet deterrence only works if those circumstances are not understood to be impossible.
Three NATO members, the United States, United Kingdom and France, possess nuclear weapons. American nuclear weapons are also forward-deployed in Europe under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements.
At its June 2026 Nuclear Planning Group meeting, NATO members agreed to continue modernising nuclear capabilities and strengthening nuclear planning.
The strategic contradiction is therefore increasingly apparent.
Russia seeks to make its nuclear deterrent more credible because it believes NATO may otherwise underestimate Moscow's willingness to escalate.
NATO seeks to make its own nuclear deterrent more credible because it believes Russia must understand that aggression against the alliance could produce unacceptable consequences.
Both sides describe nuclear weapons as instruments intended to prevent war.
Both sides therefore depend upon the opposing side believing those weapons could ultimately be used.
Where Karaganov’s Argument Becomes Most Dangerous
Karaganov acknowledges one of the strongest arguments against his own proposition.
Once nuclear weapons are actually used, the taboo surrounding them changes.
Even a limited nuclear exchange could establish a precedent for other nuclear-armed states facing regional conflicts. What had been treated for eight decades as an exceptional weapon of last resort could become a usable military instrument.
Karaganov himself recognises this risk and consequently describes nuclear use as a last resort.
There is another problem.
The proposition that a nuclear war could remain geographically confined to Europe depends upon assumptions about how other nuclear powers would respond after the first detonation.
Those assumptions cannot be tested beforehand.
A limited strike intended to restore deterrence could instead be interpreted as the beginning of a larger attack. Political leaders would potentially have minutes to determine whether further weapons were coming and whether retaliation was required.
The very instrument intended to prevent escalation could therefore accelerate it.
Europe Is Rearming
Karaganov portrays Western European governments as increasingly belligerent and argues that political elites are using confrontation with Russia to distract their populations from domestic problems.
That is an interpretation rather than an established fact.
European military spending and NATO preparedness have nevertheless increased substantially since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, while NATO continues strengthening conventional and nuclear deterrence.
NATO describes these measures as defensive and says Russia's war against Ukraine has created the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades.
Moscow sees much of the same military expansion from the opposite direction, as evidence of an increasingly threatening alliance moving closer to Russia.
The security dilemma is therefore self-reinforcing.
One side's deterrence becomes the other side's threat.
That threat produces additional military preparations, which then become evidence justifying further deterrence.
The Arms-Control Barrier Is Weakening
This confrontation is occurring as mechanisms intended to prevent nuclear miscalculation are under increasing strain.
New Zealand told the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference that the long period of stabilising US-Russian bilateral arms-control cooperation appeared to have ended with the demise of New START and the absence of a successor agreement.
Wellington also warned that nuclear-armed states were modernising their arsenals, nuclear threats and belligerent rhetoric were becoming more frequent, and new strategic technologies were complicating escalation and crisis management.
That matters because deterrence does not depend solely upon weapons.
It also depends upon communication.
During the Cold War, arms-control agreements, military hotlines, verification mechanisms and strategic dialogue developed partly because Washington and Moscow understood that misunderstanding could be as dangerous as deliberate aggression.
As those mechanisms weaken, the possibility of misreading an opponent's intentions becomes more consequential.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
For New Zealand, this debate is anything but remote.
New Zealand remains one of the world's most consistently anti-nuclear states. At the United Nations on 29 September 2026, Wellington warned that the threat posed by nuclear weapons was at its highest level in decades and that the world was entering a new era of nuclear competition.
Earlier this year, New Zealand specifically called for nuclear-armed states to tone down belligerent nuclear rhetoric, arguing that threats encourage insecurity and can create incentives for additional countries to seek nuclear weapons.
Karaganov's argument represents almost the exact strategic proposition New Zealand is warning against: that stronger and more believable nuclear threats can restore stability.
NATO, although using considerably more restrained language, continues to rely upon nuclear deterrence as a fundamental component of European security.
New Zealand's position challenges the underlying assumption shared by both.
Wellington argues that increasing reliance upon nuclear weapons ultimately increases rather than eliminates nuclear danger.
For a geographically isolated South Pacific country, the immediate military risk may appear distant. The wider consequences would not be.
A serious European nuclear exchange could disrupt global trade, financial markets, food and energy supply chains, aviation and international security. Any wider escalation involving major nuclear powers could produce consequences extending far beyond the states directly involved.
New Zealand's nuclear-free policy therefore sits inside a much larger strategic question.
Can nuclear weapons continue indefinitely to prevent nuclear war by threatening nuclear war?
For eight decades, deterrence advocates have pointed to the absence of direct great-power conflict as evidence that the system works.
Its critics point to the opposite possibility: that humanity has survived partly because political leaders repeatedly chose not to test whether the system works.
Karaganov's warning brings that contradiction sharply into view.
The nuclear weapon remains simultaneously the ultimate deterrent and the ultimate escalation.
The danger begins when governments become convinced that demonstrating their willingness to cross that threshold is the best way to prevent anyone from crossing it.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.
Sources
- Sergey Karaganov, “Russia must be prepared to use nuclear weapons,” RT, 6 October 2026
- NATO, “NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and forces”
- NATO, “2026 Nuclear Planning Group Statement,” 18 June 2026
- New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: 2026 Review Conference Main Committee 1 Statement,” 1 May 2026
- New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons,” 29 September 2026