The US can no longer run the world, so it’s trying to lock down Europe
By Timofey Bordachev, Program Director of the Valdai Club
US President Donald Trump speaks while (L-R) Italy's Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney listen during a summit of European and Middle Eastern leaders on Gaza, October 13, 2025, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. © Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Whether
we like it or not, Western countries will remain at the center of
Russia’s foreign policy for a very long time. Perhaps indefinitely. The
reason is simple: Historically, the main threats to the Russian state
have come from this direction. One of the basic laws of geopolitics is
that the most important area of a country’s foreign relations is the one
that poses the greatest danger.
Even today, despite Russia’s
successful expansion of cooperation with the East and the South, and the
discovery of new markets and technologies there, relations with the
West remain directly tied to the primary function of the Russian state:
Protecting the lives and freedoms of its people.
None of our other
neighbors present such a threat, either because they lack the physical
capabilities or because they are geographically distant from Russia’s
main administrative and industrial centers. This is one reason Russia
and China can steadily deepen their partnership. Both sides understand
that there is no need for a zero-sum game based on weakening each other
in anticipation of a future conflict.
The situation with the US
and EU is fundamentally different. These powers will remain Russia’s
direct military and political adversaries, or at least competitors, for
the foreseeable future. Monitoring the processes unfolding there is
therefore a key task for Russian diplomacy and analysis. It is hardly
surprising that tensions within the ‘transatlantic family’ have
attracted so much attention over the past year.
The recent forum
in Davos, for all its global pretensions, once again served as a stage
on which observers could watch the West’s internal contradictions. At
the heart of the dispute is Washington’s desire to secure the strongest
possible position in Europe, effectively placing the Western side of it
under complete political and economic control.
The US needs this to address two problems. First, the objective
contraction of the global space it can dominate. Second, the growing
need to redirect resources inward, where domestic tensions are
increasingly visible. For the political group that has ruled the US over
the past year, internal challenges now outweigh external ones.
Europe,
as the closest and most accessible arena, becomes the logical target.
Gaining firm control over it would provide the US with stable resources
and strategic depth. Recognizing that it can no longer manage most of
the world, the US appears to be trying to construct something resembling
Orwell’s ‘Oceania’. That’s a consolidated bloc secured by force.
So
far, however, the results are ambiguous. What Washington has managed to
do is prevent the Europeans from resolving the Ukraine conflict in
their own way. They were absent from the recent talks between Russia,
the US, and representatives of the Kiev regime in the UAE. Nor did they
organize parallel meetings, as they previously attempted to do. Brussels
and London seem to be accepting the role of outside observers.
At
the same time, the US has been less successful in pushing through its
maximalist positions elsewhere. Take Greenland. Even if American
military facilities expand and US companies gain broader access to
mineral resources, this falls far short of genuine control over the
island. The discussion has already shifted from ‘handing Greenland over’
to ‘taking US interests into account’. That’s a very different matter.
This
pattern – loud announcements followed by uncertain outcomes – is
characteristic of current US foreign policy. The same applies to other
supposed ‘victories’. They are tactical successes with unclear long-term
consequences.
Russia and China, America’s main competitors,
appear to understand this well. They observe the oscillations of US
policy calmly, without overreacting to the emotional atmosphere
surrounding each new initiative. The international agenda is
increasingly filled with bold but often unrealistic ideas, while the
practical feasibility of many of them remains questionable.
Consider talk of restoring the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America. This
rhetoric overlooks basic realities. The US now has fewer resources to
offer its neighbors. Latin American states work with China not out of
affinity, but because it is profitable. Pressure from Washington cannot
easily replace tangible economic benefits.
Moreover, there is no
reason why America’s competitors – Russia, China, and perhaps in time
India – would refrain from exploiting the negative consequences of US
pressure in the region. Even in its own hemisphere, the idea of a simple
‘sphere of influence’ looks increasingly outdated.
More broadly,
Washington’s traditional reliance on force has lost much of its
effectiveness in solving major international problems. Force can
sometimes resolve issues at the domestic level. In international
politics, however, there are few examples of long-term problems being
settled that way in recent history.
Europe’s own situation
illustrates this. Its current position is largely the outcome of
internal conflicts in the first half of the 20th century, not the
product of a deliberate American or Soviet ‘conquest’. These Europeans,
through their own struggles, shaped the conditions that later limited
their autonomy.
The Ukrainian question is another example. Even if
the present conflict is frozen or formally settled, genuine
reconciliation and sustainable development between the Russian and
Ukrainian peoples will require long political work. Force may address
immediate issues, but it cannot guarantee lasting peace.
The US
understands this at some level, yet it appears unable to identify
alternative strategic paths. The problems facing America and the broader
Western world have accumulated to such an extent that traditional
solutions are either ineffective or too dangerous. A large-scale war is
not a viable option. As a result, Washington turns to interim, tactical
measures, hoping to manage crises step by step.
This is a fragile
basis for foreign policy. Tactical maneuvers may buy time, but they do
not resolve underlying contradictions. In the end, structural realities –
economic limits, shifting power balances, and the independent interests
of other states – will shape the outcome more than even the boldest
short-term initiatives.