The trend is that Zelensky’s oligarchic faction is declining as the intelligence and military ones respectively represented by Budanov and Zaluzhny rise with all that entails for Ukraine’s future.
Andrew Korybko
Several
factions exist within Ukraine. The main ones are Zelensky’s ruling
clique (who himself represents a collection of oligarchic interests
whose engagement with him used to be managed by Yermak), former Commander-in-Chief-turned-Ambassador-to-the-UK Zaluzhny (and the armed forces in general), and former GUR chief-turned-Chief-of-Staff Budanov
(who still represents the intelligence faction). Their interplay is
becoming more complicated just as Ukraine’s diplomatic and political
dynamics are too.
The Economist
recently reported that “Divisions are emerging within Ukraine’s
delegation. One wing, centred on Mr Budanov, believes Ukraine’s
interests are best served by a swift American-led agreement, and fears
the window for action may soon close. But another wing, apparently still
influenced by the controversial former chief of staff Andriy Yermak,
who departed in a corruption scandal, is much less keen. Mr Zelensky
appears to be balancing between them, while also having his own ideas.”
This was then followed by the New York Times
reporting that “In negotiations over recent weeks, officials have
discussed the idea of forming a demilitarized zone controlled by neither
army…To make it easier for both sides to accept the idea, negotiators
have also discussed forming a free-trade zone in any possible
demilitarized area.” In light of The Economist’s report right
beforehand, this suggests that Budanov’s faction is pushing its agenda
at the expense of the Yermak-aligned one that’s associated with
Zelensky.
Right after, the Associated Press
published an interview with Zaluzhny where he revealed that “dozens of
agents from Ukraine’s domestic intelligence service raided Zaluzhnyi’s
office” sometime in 2022. He also called Yermak at the time and
threatened that “I will fight you and have already called in
reinforcements to the center of Kyiv for support.” Zaluzhny considered
the raid a threat. This revelation at this sensitive moment in the peace
process suggests that he’ll run for the presidency once elections are
finally held.
On that topic, the Financial Times
reported in early February shortly before all the abovementioned
reports that “Zelenskyy planning elections in Ukraine and vote on peace
deal”, but then he himself later said
that he doesn’t think that the public would support any deal that
entails a Ukrainian withdrawal. In any case, all of this is already
enough to grasp a more solid understanding of Ukraine’s diplomatic
dynamics, its political ones, and the evolving interplay between them.
Zelensky’s faction has been weakened by Yermak’s resignation
and replacement with Budanov, which has given the latter more influence
over him. This explains why he’s reportedly more open to a deal and
hasn’t stopped Budanov from negotiating creative solutions to the
Donbass Question. Zaluzhny now senses that the conflict
might soon end, thus contextualizing the timing of his interview and
revelation therein. The trend is that Zelensky’s faction is declining as
the intelligence and military ones rise.
In the
event that a series of compromises soon end the conflict, then elections
will likely be announced shortly after, in which case Zaluzhny is
expected to run and Budanov could leverage the influence he still wields
over the intelligence services to prevent Zelensky from rigging the
vote. Zelensky’s expected loss would then likely lead to Zaluzhny and
Budanov formalizing their alliance, which would facilitate Ukraine’s transformation into the Israeli-like military state that Zelensky and Zaluzhny earlier envisaged.