THE GLOBAL POWER SHIFT: Who Holds the Leverage?

Three Powers. A Changing World.


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The United States, Russia and China have met in an unprecedented summit, while European governments struggle to secure their place in negotiations over Ukraine. Their joint declaration addresses the United Nations, energy security, nuclear weapons and the authority of international courts. Behind these developments lies a far greater question: is the international order that emerged from European imperial power and Western financial dominance being fundamentally reshaped? And if so, who will control the political, military and financial leverage in the world that follows?


INR Report: Based on reporting by Reuters and Associated Press, the 19 November 2026 Shenzhen Declaration, European Union statements, historical financial records and commentary by Clandestine.

The Meeting That Changed the Conversation

On 19 November 2026, Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met in Shenzhen, China, in a diplomatic encounter that placed the leaders of three major military and economic powers at the same negotiating table. The summit took place against a backdrop of continuing conflict in Ukraine, tensions over Iran, disputes involving Taiwan and growing pressure on international institutions. Neither the European Union nor Britain participated in the trilateral meeting. Yet the three leaders emerged with a joint declaration addressing issues that affect governments across the world.

The document committed Washington, Moscow and Beijing to pursuing reform of the United Nations, increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products, respecting state consent and official immunities, and discussing the reduction of nuclear risks. These were not minor subjects. They touched the institutional, financial, energy and military foundations upon which the international order operates.

The declaration did not establish a new global system, produce a Ukraine peace settlement or announce detailed implementation agreements. Indeed, Reuters reported that the summit delivered few concrete outcomes. Nevertheless, its significance may lie in something less immediately visible: the willingness of three powerful governments to discuss the rules of international affairs directly, without the participation of European governments that have historically exercised substantial influence over those arrangements.

The question is whether Shenzhen was simply a diplomatic spectacle or an early indication that the balance of international negotiating power is changing.

Who Gets a Seat at the Table?

The question of participation has become particularly visible in negotiations over Ukraine. During the US-mediated discussions in Abu Dhabi on 10–11 November, American, Russian and Ukrainian representatives conducted the principal trilateral talks. European governments and institutions participated in separate consultations with Ukraine and the United States, but were not included in the main negotiating format with Russia.

This distinction is important. Europe was not absent from the diplomatic process, but its involvement in the decisive negotiating format remained contested. On 16 November, Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov publicly disputed American suggestions that Russia had agreed to include European representatives in the next round. Moscow maintained that the format would remain trilateral unless further arrangements were negotiated.

European leaders responded by seeking a more coordinated position. Their argument was straightforward: a settlement affecting Ukraine's borders, European security guarantees, sanctions and future defence arrangements could not be implemented sustainably without European involvement.

Yet the diplomatic sequence revealed an uncomfortable reality. Governments that have supplied substantial financial and military assistance to Ukraine were being required to negotiate their participation in discussions affecting the security of their own continent.

The issue was not merely protocol. It was leverage.

The Power to Set the Agenda

In his 20 November commentary, Global Leverage, the writer Clandestine argued that the United States, China and Russia possess such overwhelming concentrations of military, nuclear, energy and strategic resources that other powers have limited ability to resist decisions made collectively by the three.

The argument centres on a fundamental distinction between formal authority and practical power. International institutions establish procedures, legal obligations and diplomatic expectations. But the ability to enforce decisions, resist pressure or determine negotiating conditions also depends on military capability, economic resources, control of strategic infrastructure and political alliances.

The United States, Russia and China together possess the overwhelming majority of the world's nuclear warheads. They also exercise enormous influence through conventional military capabilities, energy production, manufacturing, technology, trade and international finance.

But their leverage is not unlimited. Nuclear weapons constrain their possessors as well as their adversaries. Russia's energy exports depend on buyers and infrastructure. China's manufacturing strength depends partly on international markets and supply chains. America's global influence depends on alliances, financial confidence and the continued willingness of other countries to cooperate.

The three governments also have substantial disagreements among themselves. Their combined resources cannot automatically be treated as a unified instrument of power.

The more revealing question is whether they are beginning to coordinate particular areas of strategic influence sufficiently to change the terms on which other governments must negotiate.

The City of London and the Old Financial Order

To understand why such a development matters, it is necessary to examine the historical foundations of Western financial power.

For centuries, the City of London occupied a central position in the financing of international trade, shipping, industrial expansion and the British Empire. Its banking institutions, insurers, capital markets and commercial networks helped connect imperial territories and independent states to a financial system centred on London.

The Bank of England, established in 1694, became a major institution in the development of British public finance. London's financial markets helped governments raise money, businesses obtain capital and international commerce operate across borders. The relationship between state borrowing, financial institutions and overseas political influence became an important feature of British imperial history.

The twentieth century brought major changes. Two world wars weakened Britain's global economic position, while the United States emerged as the dominant Western industrial and financial power. The Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 established a new international monetary framework centred on the US dollar and created institutions that became the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

Yet London did not disappear as a financial centre. It remained influential in foreign-exchange trading, international banking, insurance, legal services and offshore financial activity. The development of the Eurodollar market reinforced its role in international dollar finance, even as American monetary and financial institutions assumed greater global importance.

This history demonstrates substantial financial influence. It does not, by itself, establish that the City of London operates as a single command centre directing Western governments. The institutions involved have different ownership structures, legal responsibilities and commercial interests.

The investigation must therefore go beyond broad claims of centralised control and identify the mechanisms through which financial influence becomes political leverage.

How Financial Leverage Works

Financial power is not exercised only through ownership of money. It also operates through access to credit, reserve currencies, international payment systems, government borrowing, sanctions, investment markets and the legal infrastructure supporting international transactions.

A government may possess constitutional sovereignty while remaining dependent on foreign capital, imported energy, international banking relationships or access to export markets. Those dependencies can influence its policy choices without any formal transfer of political authority.

The international role of the US dollar is particularly important. Dollar-denominated trade, borrowing and reserves create demand for dollar liquidity and connect financial institutions across jurisdictions. American sanctions can affect international transactions because many banks and businesses depend on access to US markets and financial infrastructure.

European financial institutions exercise influence through their own markets, regulatory systems, investment flows and international banking relationships. Britain remains a major financial centre, although it is institutionally separate from the European Union following Brexit.

China and Russia have sought to reduce certain external dependencies by developing alternative payment arrangements, expanding trade in national currencies and strengthening economic relationships outside Western-led institutions. Such developments may alter particular financial relationships, but they have not established a comprehensive replacement for the existing international monetary system.

A genuine shift in financial power would become visible through measurable changes in currency usage, sovereign borrowing, capital flows, sanctions effectiveness, payment infrastructure and the location of major financial decisions.

That is where claims about a changing international order must ultimately be tested.

Sovereignty: The Central Question

The emerging diplomatic debate is frequently framed around national sovereignty.

Russia's transition following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 represented a profound constitutional and economic change. The Russian Federation replaced the Soviet political framework, although aspects of centralised state authority and institutional continuity remained.

China followed a different historical path. Its economic reforms transformed production, trade and investment, but the Chinese Communist Party retained political authority. Under Xi Jinping, the party continues to exercise extensive control over the state. China's growing independence from Western financial and diplomatic influence should therefore not be confused with evidence that the country is abandoning CCP rule.

The United States presents a different question. Its constitutional framework rests on popular sovereignty, representative government and the separation of powers. Yet over the past century, American governments have developed extensive overseas military commitments, intelligence relationships, financial institutions and international obligations.

Those arrangements have given Washington enormous influence abroad while also creating dependencies, costs and constraints on domestic decision-making. Debates over whether particular commitments serve American national interests are therefore legitimate questions of constitutional accountability and public policy.

But national sovereignty and popular sovereignty are not identical.

A government may become less dependent on foreign powers while concentrating greater authority over its own population. Conversely, a government may accept international obligations through democratic procedures while retaining substantial domestic accountability.

The important question is not simply whether states become more independent of established international institutions. It is whether their citizens gain greater control over the decisions made in their name.

The United Nations Under Pressure

The Shenzhen declaration arrived during a period of unusual uncertainty at the United Nations.

Secretary-General António Guterres is due to complete his term on 31 December 2026. According to reporting cited by RT, Security Council members have struggled to agree on a successor, prompting officials to consider contingency arrangements should the appointment process remain unresolved.

The dispute exposes the influence of the five permanent Security Council members: the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France. Each possesses veto powers over substantive council decisions, including the recommendation of a secretary-general.

Shenzhen's three participants called for UN reform, but their declaration did not specify changes to Security Council membership, voting procedures or the distribution of institutional authority.

That omission is significant. Reform designed to give Africa, Asia and Latin America greater representation would differ substantially from changes that increased the discretion of the largest military powers.

The declaration also addressed the immunity of state officials and the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. That commitment raises questions about accountability, particularly when international courts seek to investigate alleged crimes involving senior government officials.

Supporters of stronger state immunities may argue that international judicial mechanisms risk politicisation or interference with sovereign authority. Critics may argue that broad protections for officials could weaken accountability for serious international crimes.

The question is whether the proposed changes would produce a more representative system of international law or one in which powerful governments face fewer institutional constraints.

Energy Is Leverage

One of the most revealing provisions of the Shenzhen declaration concerned refined petroleum products.

The three governments agreed to pursue increased production and supply while emphasising the importance of stable energy flows. That commitment directly connects geopolitical negotiations with the infrastructure supporting transport, industry, agriculture and military operations.

The United States and Russia are major energy producers. China is a major importer, consumer and refiner. Their combined influence over production, demand, processing and trade is substantial.

But influence should not be confused with complete control. International energy markets also depend on other producing countries, commercial companies, shipping networks, refineries, insurance arrangements and strategically located waterways.

The Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca and Panama Canal are especially important to international trade, but they operate under different geographic, legal and political arrangements. No single agreement between Washington, Moscow and Beijing would automatically give those governments unrestricted authority over them.

Nevertheless, coordination among major energy producers and consumers could influence prices, supply security, investment decisions and the negotiating positions of other countries.

Energy dependence creates vulnerability. Countries that rely heavily on imported fuels can experience economic disruption when geopolitical tensions affect production, shipping or financial transactions.

The connection between energy, finance and sovereignty is therefore direct. A country that cannot reliably secure essential supplies may find its political choices constrained by circumstances beyond its borders.

Europe Is Not Powerless

The absence of European leaders from Shenzhen and the dispute over participation in Ukraine negotiations have prompted questions about Europe's influence.

But the European Union remains a major economic and regulatory power. Its markets, trade relationships, financial institutions and industrial capacity provide substantial leverage. European governments also influence sanctions, defence procurement, reconstruction financing and potential security guarantees for Ukraine.

Britain, although outside the EU, retains significant diplomatic, military and financial capabilities. Britain and France possess nuclear weapons and permanent seats on the UN Security Council.

These resources matter because negotiating an agreement and implementing it are different tasks.

A settlement involving sanctions relief, European security guarantees, reconstruction funding or changes to trade arrangements would require cooperation from the governments and institutions responsible for those measures.

There is also evidence that other countries are responding to great-power diplomacy by pursuing their own arrangements. Reuters reported on 20 November that middle powers were advancing separate trade and diplomatic initiatives rather than simply waiting for Washington, Moscow and Beijing to determine the agenda.

Europe's influence may be changing, but the evidence does not establish that it has been eliminated.

The more precise question is whether Europe can continue to shape the agenda or whether it will increasingly be required to respond to arrangements initiated by other powers.

A New Balance or a New Hierarchy?

The historical international order was not created through a single agreement or controlled by one institution. It emerged through imperial expansion, industrial development, wars, monetary arrangements, military alliances, international organisations and successive changes in the distribution of economic power.

British imperial influence, American industrial and financial dominance, Soviet military power, European integration and China's economic expansion all contributed to the system that exists today.

The Shenzhen meeting may represent another stage in that continuing transformation.

But the distinction between a multipolar world and a system dominated by three powers is crucial.

A genuinely multipolar order would involve several centres of political and economic influence, with regional powers and smaller states retaining meaningful independence. A three-power arrangement could instead concentrate decisions among Washington, Moscow and Beijing while leaving other governments to negotiate the consequences.

Neither outcome can be assumed from a single summit.

The declaration establishes an intention to cooperate in selected areas. It does not establish a permanent alliance, a common economic system or agreement over the territorial and political disputes that continue to divide the three countries.

Whether the emerging arrangements become durable will depend on subsequent decisions, implementation mechanisms and the responses of governments outside the trilateral format.

Does This Affect New Zealand?

For New Zealand, the consequences of changing international leverage are not theoretical.

Our economy depends on international trade, imported refined fuels, access to global financial markets and the continued operation of international shipping routes. Changes in energy prices, payment arrangements, sanctions or trade relationships can affect household living costs, business investment and government finances.

New Zealand also occupies a complicated strategic position. China is a major trading partner, while Australia and other Western countries are central to longstanding security and diplomatic relationships. Maintaining independent decision-making requires careful management of those overlapping interests.

A world in which the largest powers negotiate strategic arrangements directly may create opportunities for smaller countries to diversify their relationships. But it may also increase pressure to align with competing blocs or accept decisions made without their participation.

This is why the principle of sovereign equality remains important. International rules do not always protect smaller states effectively, but abandoning common rules in favour of unrestricted great-power bargaining could leave those states more vulnerable.

For New Zealand, the question is whether any emerging system will strengthen the practical independence of smaller nations or simply change which powerful governments exercise the greatest influence over them.

Who Really Holds the Leverage?

The Shenzhen summit did not establish a new world order. Nor did it prove that the United States, Russia and China have agreed to displace European institutions or the City of London's financial influence.

What it demonstrated was a willingness by three major powers to discuss international governance, energy security and strategic stability directly, at a moment when European participation in another major diplomatic process remained contested.

That combination deserves scrutiny.

The historical influence of London, the international role of the US dollar, Europe's economic institutions, Russia's energy resources, China's manufacturing capacity and America's military reach all represent different forms of leverage.

The critical question is how those forms of power interact and whether their relationships are changing.

Wars, financial crises, trade disruptions and political upheavals have repeatedly altered the international balance of power. The institutions that emerge from those events often outlast the leaders who negotiated their creation.

The people affected by those arrangements rarely participate directly in the negotiations that determine them.

If a new international order is taking shape, the decisive question is not simply whether Washington, Moscow and Beijing possess the power to reshape it.

It is who will write the rules, who will control the money and resources, who will enforce the decisions — and whether sovereign nations and their citizens will have any meaningful say in the world being constructed around them.

Sources

  1. The White House — US–Russia–China Heads of State Declaration toward Peace, 19 November 2026.
  2. Reuters — Trump's personalised diplomacy hits its limits with three-way summit, 20 November 2026.
  3. Associated Press — Takeaways from the historic Trump–Xi–Putin summit, 20 November 2026.
  4. European Council — Statement on Abu Dhabi consultations, 10 November 2026.
  5. Reuters — Russia and Ukraine resume US-brokered peace talks, 10 November 2026.
  6. Reuters — Kremlin disputes European participation in next Ukraine talks, 16 November 2026.
  7. Reuters — Middle powers pursue their own diplomacy, 20 November 2026.
  8. RT — UN officials prepare contingency plans amid leadership deadlock, 20 November 2026.
  9. Clandestine — Global Leverage, opinion commentary, 20 November 2026.
  10. Bank for International Settlements — Institutional history.
  11. International Monetary Fund — History.
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