The United Nations faces the unprecedented prospect of entering 2027 without a secretary-general, as the Security Council struggles to agree on a successor to António Guterres. At the same time, the United States, Russia and China have jointly called for institutional reform. The coincidence raises a question extending far beyond the appointment of a new UN chief: are the world's most powerful nations using their political, military and financial leverage to determine the future of an organisation created to represent sovereign states?
INR Report: Based on reporting by Reuters and RT, the November 2026 US–Russia–China declaration, the United Nations Charter and international diplomatic reporting.
A Crisis at the Top
The United Nations is confronting a leadership crisis unlike any in its eight-decade history. Secretary-General António Guterres is scheduled to leave office on 31 December 2026, yet the Security Council has failed to reach agreement on his successor. According to Reuters, repeated rounds of confidential voting have exposed deep divisions among the five permanent members, raising the possibility that the organisation could enter the new year without an appointed leader.
The consequences extend beyond an unfilled position. The secretary-general is the UN's chief administrative officer, responsible for directing its Secretariat, overseeing major operations and exercising diplomatic functions during international crises. Although the General Assembly and Security Council could continue meeting, the absence of a secretary-general could complicate senior appointments, administrative decisions and budget management.
UN officials are reportedly examining contingency arrangements, including temporarily extending Guterres' term or appointing an acting secretary-general. Neither option is expressly prescribed by the Charter for this particular situation, leaving governments to negotiate a solution to a problem the organisation has never previously confronted.
But the deadlock has emerged at a politically significant moment. Washington, Moscow and Beijing have jointly called for changes to the institution itself, introducing a wider question about whether the leadership crisis could become leverage in negotiations over the UN's future.
Three Powers Demand Reform
On 19 November, the United States, Russia and China issued a joint declaration following their trilateral meeting in Shenzhen. Among its commitments was a call to reform the United Nations so that it could respond more effectively to international challenges and fulfil its responsibility for maintaining peace and security.
The declaration did not specify a replacement institutional structure, changes to voting powers or a timetable for reform. Nevertheless, the participation of three permanent Security Council members gave the statement considerable diplomatic significance.
Together, Washington, Moscow and Beijing possess enormous military capabilities, including most of the world's nuclear weapons. They also exercise substantial influence over international trade, energy markets, industrial production and global financial arrangements. Their combined resources give them significant negotiating power, although their interests are not identical and cooperation on one issue does not establish a permanent alliance.
The timing invites scrutiny. The three governments are calling for reform while the UN struggles to select its next leader. Whether the two developments are directly connected has not been established. But both concern the same underlying issue: how much authority should the permanent powers exercise over an institution whose membership extends far beyond them?
The Power to Choose
Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the secretary-general is appointed by the General Assembly following a recommendation from the Security Council. In practice, the five permanent members — the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France — exercise decisive influence because any one can prevent a candidate from receiving the necessary recommendation.
The council's informal selection process involves confidential straw polls intended to identify candidates capable of securing sufficient support. These polls are not themselves final appointments, but they reveal which candidates face potentially decisive opposition.
The ninth round of voting has now failed to resolve the dispute. Reuters reported on 20 November that Costa Rica's Rebeca Grynspan received ten votes in favour and four against, including opposition from two permanent members. Because the identities of those opposing permanent members were not disclosed, their motives cannot be established from the result alone.
The process demonstrates how power operates inside the UN. Although 193 countries belong to the organisation, a candidate cannot become secretary-general without passing through a Security Council structure in which five governments possess special privileges.
That arrangement was established in the aftermath of the Second World War, when the victorious major powers negotiated the foundations of the postwar international system. More than eighty years later, the distribution of permanent seats remains unchanged.
Leverage Beyond the Ballot
The ability to block a secretary-general is only one form of influence.
The United States remains an important source of UN funding, and its decisions concerning financial contributions and participation in particular agencies can affect institutional operations. In January 2026, the Trump administration directed the withdrawal of American participation or funding from numerous UN entities where legally permitted, citing concerns about expenditure and policy priorities.
Russia possesses Security Council veto power and substantial military and energy resources. China combines its permanent council position with extensive trade relationships, manufacturing capacity and growing financial influence.
These different forms of leverage can influence negotiations even without an explicit threat. Governments deciding whether to support a candidate or reform proposal must consider how their decisions may affect diplomatic relationships, financial support and cooperation on unrelated international issues.
But leverage is not the same as unrestricted authority. The United States, Russia and China cannot simply impose a new UN Charter by agreement among themselves. Britain and France retain their own veto rights, while the General Assembly has substantial legal responsibilities in any formal reform process.
The critical distinction is between the ability to set negotiating terms and the legal authority to implement institutional change.
Who Controls the Rules?
Article 108 of the UN Charter establishes demanding requirements for constitutional reform. Amendments must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of UN members, including all five permanent Security Council members.
That provision gives every permanent member an effective veto over changes to the Charter, even when an overwhelming majority of other countries supports reform.
It also means that Washington, Moscow and Beijing cannot independently dictate a new constitutional structure. They can propose changes, coordinate their positions, withhold consent and use diplomatic influence to seek support. But the formal process requires broader agreement.
The distinction is fundamental to understanding the current moment. A group of powerful states may possess sufficient leverage to make certain proposals unavoidable in diplomatic discussions without possessing the legal authority to enact those proposals alone.
That is why the selection of the next secretary-general matters. The successful candidate will inherit an organisation facing financial pressure, political divisions and demands for institutional change. Their ability to manage those pressures will depend partly on the willingness of the permanent powers to cooperate.
The leadership contest may therefore influence the direction of reform even if no formal connection between the succession dispute and the Shenzhen declaration is demonstrated.
Europe and the Established Order
The current debate also raises questions about the position of Britain, France and the wider European political establishment.
Britain and France retain permanent Security Council seats, reflecting the settlement negotiated after the Second World War. The European Union itself does not possess a permanent seat, although its member states participate individually in the UN and coordinate positions on many international questions.
Russia has repeatedly argued that the Security Council should provide greater representation for Asia, Africa and Latin America. China has similarly called for developing countries, particularly African nations, to receive a stronger voice in international decision-making.
These demands challenge the geographical distribution of permanent representation. Africa has no permanent Security Council member, despite the continent's population, number of sovereign states and extensive involvement in UN peacekeeping and conflict-resolution activities.
Yet expanding representation would raise difficult questions. Would new permanent members receive veto powers? Would existing veto privileges be restricted? Would regional organisations gain representation, or would additional seats be allocated to individual countries?
The Shenzhen declaration does not answer those questions.
Reform could produce a more representative institution. It could also preserve existing concentrations of authority while changing which governments exercise the greatest influence.
Sovereignty or Great-Power Control?
The United Nations was founded on the principle of sovereign equality among its members. In practice, however, its constitutional structure grants special authority to five permanent Security Council members.
This tension has existed since 1945.
The veto was intended to secure the participation of major powers whose cooperation was considered essential to preventing another world war. Yet it also allows those governments to block collective action, including in situations involving their own conduct or the interests of close allies.
The result is an institution that combines universal membership with unequal decision-making authority.
Calls for reform therefore raise two competing possibilities. One is that the UN could become more representative, with greater influence for countries historically excluded from permanent Security Council membership. The other is that the strongest states could negotiate new arrangements that preserve or increase their own discretion while presenting the outcome as institutional modernisation.
The difference would be visible in the details: representation, veto powers, accountability mechanisms, financial independence and the rights of smaller states.
Without specific proposals, it is premature to conclude which direction the three governments intend to pursue.
The Price of Independence
The UN's financial arrangements are another source of potential leverage.
Member states contribute to the organisation through assessed budgets, while numerous programmes and agencies also depend on voluntary funding. Large contributors can exercise influence through funding decisions, although financial contributions do not automatically confer additional votes in the General Assembly.
The organisation's dependence on member governments creates a structural difficulty. It is expected to act independently in pursuit of international peace and security, yet its operations depend on the political and financial support of states whose interests may conflict.
Article 100 of the Charter requires the secretary-general and UN staff to remain independent of instructions from individual governments. That principle is central to the organisation's credibility.
But independence is difficult to sustain when major contributors reduce funding, powerful states threaten vetoes or diplomatic disputes prevent essential appointments.
The current leadership crisis exposes those vulnerabilities.
The question is whether future reform will reduce institutional dependence on powerful governments or simply redistribute that dependence among a different group of states.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
For New Zealand, the future of the United Nations is directly connected to the country's ability to exercise independent foreign policy.
Smaller countries have limited capacity to influence major military confrontations through force. International institutions provide diplomatic forums, legal frameworks and collective mechanisms through which their interests can be represented.
New Zealand has historically supported multilateral diplomacy, international law and the principle that disputes between states should be resolved peacefully. Those principles do not eliminate power imbalances, but they offer alternatives to a system in which the strongest governments determine outcomes solely through their military and economic capabilities.
Changes to UN decision-making could affect sanctions, peacekeeping, international development, humanitarian assistance and the legal rules governing relations between states.
For New Zealand, the central concern should be whether reform strengthens the representation and independence of smaller sovereign nations or concentrates authority further among major powers.
The distinction is particularly important as international relationships become more contested and countries face pressure to align with competing economic and security arrangements.
Who Holds the Leverage?
The United Nations' leadership crisis has exposed a longstanding contradiction at the centre of the organisation.
It represents 193 sovereign states, yet the selection of its most senior official depends on the consent of five governments possessing permanent veto powers.
Now three of those governments — the United States, Russia and China — are jointly calling for reform while the institution struggles to resolve its succession.
There is no publicly established evidence that the leadership deadlock has been deliberately engineered to force constitutional change. Nor has the Shenzhen declaration set out a detailed plan to replace the UN's existing structures.
But the convergence is significant.
Washington, Moscow and Beijing possess considerable leverage through military capabilities, economic relationships, energy resources, financial influence and their positions within the Security Council.
Their cooperation could make certain reforms more politically achievable. Their disagreements, or opposition from Britain, France and the wider UN membership, could prevent those reforms from proceeding.
The real test will be whether the proposed changes redistribute authority more fairly or simply reinforce the privileges of the powerful.
The United Nations was created to prevent the world from being governed solely by force. Eighty-one years later, its future may depend on negotiations among governments possessing much of the world's military and economic power.
The question is whether those governments intend to reform the rules for everyone — or use their leverage to determine who gets to write them.
Sources
- Reuters — UN could soon be leaderless as race to succeed Guterres stalls, 19 November 2026.
- Reuters — Two veto-wielding powers reject Grynspan in UN leadership poll, 20 November 2026.
- RT — UN officials draw up plans for possible leadership vacuum, 20 November 2026.
- United Nations — Charter, full text, particularly Articles 97, 100 and 108.
- United Nations — Charter amendments, Articles 108–109.
- US Congressional Research Service — Appointing the UN Secretary-General, September 2026.
- The White House — US–Russia–China Heads of State Declaration toward Peace, 19 November 2026.