This is the grand strategic context within which Russia’s talks with the US and Ukraine are taking place.
Andrew Korybko
Casual
observers are convinced that Trump is a madman with no method behind
his madness, but the reality is that he and his team – collectively
known as Trump 2.0 – are slowly but surely implementing their grand
strategy against China. Every one of their moves abroad should be seen
as a means to this end. They want to comprehensively contain China and
then coerce it into a lopsided trade deal that “rebalance[s] China’s
economy toward household consumption” per the National Security Strategy.
Trump 2.0 doesn’t want to go to war over this, however, which is why they’re careful to avoid replicating the Imperial Japanese precedent.
Piling too much economic-structural pressure on China at once could
spook it into lashing out in desperation before the window of
opportunity closes. They therefore decided to gradually deprive China of access to markets and resources,
ideally through a series of trade deals, in order to imbue the US with
the indirect leverage required to peacefully derail China’s superpower
rise.
The US’ trade deals with the EU and India
could ultimately result in them curtailing China’s access to their
markets under pain of punitive tariffs if they refuse. In parallel, the
US’ special operation in Venezuela, pressure against Iran, and simultaneous attempts to subordinate Nigeria and other leading energy producers could curtail China’s access
to the resources required for fueling its superpower rise. The combined
effect thus far is already placing immense pressure upon China to cut a
deal with the US.
This is the grand strategic context within which Russia’s talks with the US and Ukraine
are taking place. It too is coming under immense pressure after Trump
2.0 unexpectedly (from their view) perpetuated the proxy war in Ukraine,
pioneered a breakthrough to Central Asia through last August’s “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” across the South Caucasus, and got India to curtail its oil imports. Russia must now decide whether to cut its own deal with the US or become more dependent on China.
The
first scenario could include a resource-centric strategic partnership
with the US in exchange for compromising on its maximalist goals in
Ukraine, which could deprive China of access to the deposits that the US
invests in as explained here. As for the second scenario, Russia could continue its special operation
indefinitely with growing Chinese support in exchange for China
receiving unrestricted access to its resources at bargain-basement
prices, thus greatly helping China prepare for war with the US.
Framed
in this way, reaching a deal with Russia could facilitate China’s
strategic surrender to the US without spiking the risk of war, while
failing to do so could spike the risk of war if Russia turns itself into
China’s raw materials reserve for the aforesaid reason and with the
same outcome vis-à-vis the US. This imbues Putin with leverage vis-à-vis
Trump 2.0, but they’re also not desperate to reach a deal with Putin at
any cost, ergo why they haven’t coerced Zelensky into his demanded concessions and might never.
If Trump 2.0 can’t cut a deal with Putin, then they’ll prepare for war with China, which their National Defense Strategy
envisages given its explicitly declared World War-like military
build-up. Be that as it may, replicating the Imperial Japanese precedent
in that case dangerously risks a 21^st^-century Pearl Harbor, thus imperiling their planned restoration of unipolarity.
It’s therefore better for Trump 2.0 to coerce Zelensky into giving
Putin what he wants in order to continue peacefully containing China
instead.