Eliminating Supreme Leader doesn’t end the conflict. It transforms it into a matter of principle and raises the odds of a wider Middle East war
https://www.rt.com/op-ed/authors/farhad-ibragimov/By Farhad Ibragimov – lecturer at the Faculty of Economics at RUDN University, visiting lecturer at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
https://www.rt.com/op-ed/authors/farhad-ibragimov/
https://www.rt.com/op-ed/authors/farhad-ibragimov/@farhadibragim
© Majid Saeedi/Getty Images
[RT] Overnight,
Tehran confirmed the death of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic
Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, following US and Israeli strikes on
his residence early on February 28. In strategic terms, this marks a
watershed moment in the architecture of the Middle East conflict. This
was not a tactical raid or a calibrated show of force, but a
decapitation strike at the very apex of Iran’s state system.
The
confrontation between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel
on the other has now entered a qualitatively new phase. The elimination
of a state’s highest political and religious authority during an ongoing
military operation is, from Tehran’s perspective, a textbook casus
belli. This is no longer a limited exchange of blows. It is a shift
toward a far broader and potentially systemic confrontation.
From 'decapitation strike' to regional firestorm
Throughout
February 28, reports poured in of strikes and heightened military
activity across the Persian Gulf – from the UAE to Qatar, Bahrain, and
Saudi Arabia. Even isolated incidents in neighboring airspace
underscored a hard truth: the conflict is no longer geographically
contained. The regional security order is under acute strain. An already
volatile Middle East is now teetering on the brink of a full-scale war.
Politically,
the move looks like an all-in bet by the administration of President
Donald Trump – a calculated attempt to deliver a strategic knockout by
targeting Iran’s decision-making core. But such a step dramatically
raises the stakes and all but eliminates the room for diplomatic
maneuver. Removing the leader does not freeze the conflict; it
accelerates escalation. It sets in motion a retaliatory spiral.
For Iran, this means navigating an extraordinarily delicate
leadership transition under conditions of direct military threat. The
security services will consolidate power. The influence of the military
and clerical establishment will expand. The probability of a forceful
response increases. For the region, the risks multiply: expansion of the
battlespace, threats to maritime routes and energy infrastructure, and
renewed shocks to global stability.
Tehran’s calculus is
straightforward. With Khamenei’s killing, the stakes have been raised so
dramatically – and the conflict pushed into such an unprecedentedly 'hot'
phase – that prior constraints no longer apply. Iran’s response will
almost inevitably focus on American military infrastructure in the
region, because that is the one domain where Tehran can inflict tangible
costs on the United States.
This logic lies at the heart of both
Iran’s position and the dilemma facing the Gulf Arab states. Yes, Gulf
countries and other Arab partners may view Iranian retaliation as a
direct threat to their own security and as being dragged into someone
else’s war. But they also understand the operational reality: Iranian
missiles cannot reach the continental United States. They can, however,
reach US bases, logistics hubs, command centers, and air defense
installations across the region. If Iran strikes back at Washington, it
will do so through the regional theater – even if that imposes severe
political costs on its relations with its neighbors.
No collapse is coming: Why Iran’s system is built to endure
At
the same time, Washington and West Jerusalem’s apparent assumption that
killing Khamenei would paralyze Iran’s state machinery is fundamentally
flawed. In Iran’s political system, the Supreme Leader is a figure of
extraordinary authority, but the system itself was designed to be
resilient to personal loss. Decision-making authority is distributed
across the security apparatus, religious institutions, and formal state
structures. Within the Iranian establishment, it has long been
understood that the Supreme Leader operates under permanent high-risk
conditions; succession is not a theoretical contingency but a practical
one.
The critical question, therefore, is not whether Iran remains
governable, but what form that governability now takes. Here lies the
region’s most acute risk: a shift toward a more rigid, mobilizational
model of rule. If Khamenei – for all his hardline credentials – was seen
as someone capable of balancing factions and calibrating escalation,
his death increases the odds that figures will rise to the top for whom
war and security are not temporary crises but defining life missions. In
that framework, 'compromise' is easily branded as weakness and
'restraint' as defeat.
There is also the mechanism of interim governance to consider.
Formally, Iran has procedures to absorb such a shock. Leadership
functions can be redistributed among key institutions pending the
selection of a new Supreme Leader. An immediate collapse scenario is
therefore unlikely. The baseline risk is different: acceleration of the
force spiral, in which Iranian strikes on US assets trigger further
rounds of retaliation, widening the conflict’s geographic scope.
The central takeaway regarding President Donald Trump is this: if Washington assumes that removing Khamenei "solves the problem"
or breaks Iran’s political will, that is a profound strategic
miscalculation – one that could carry enormous costs. In Tehran’s logic,
eliminating the Supreme Leader transforms the conflict into a matter of
principle. The political price of not responding becomes unacceptable
within the system. The result is not de-escalation but a heightened
probability of a major war – strikes on bases, infrastructure, and
shipping lanes, with cascading effects across the Middle East’s security
architecture.
Trump’s claim that targeting “decision-making centers” and eliminating the Supreme Leader would automatically “liberate the Iranian people”
borders on the absurd. The history of the Middle East shows that
external coercive pressure rarely liberalizes mobilizational systems.
Far more often, it produces the opposite effect: social consolidation
around a symbolic figure and empowerment of the most radical factions.
Events
inside Iran today reflect precisely that pattern. Despite ongoing
Israeli and American airstrikes, mass rallies have taken place in Tehran
and other cities, with participants demanding a harsh response to
Khamenei’s killing. For a substantial segment of Iranian society, he was
not merely a political leader but a symbol of statehood, religious
legitimacy, and resistance to external pressure. Under such conditions,
an external attack does not dismantle the ideological framework; it
hardens and cements it.
Moreover, one cannot ignore the presence
in Iran – and across the broader Muslim world – of hundreds of thousands
of committed hard-liners for whom Khamenei’s ideas are not abstract
rhetoric but an element of identity. These constituencies have
institutional backing within the security services, religious
seminaries, and political organizations. Many are fervently devoted to
his legacy and openly prepared to shed blood in his name. Calls for
jihad have already surfaced. The most unsettling prospect is not
necessarily immediate retaliation, but delayed retribution – one, two,
even three years down the line. Insurgency and guerrilla violence can
emerge like a bolt from the blue.
Iran’s transition points toward escalation, not restraint
By
March 1, only hours after confirmation of Khamenei’s death, Ayatollah
Alireza Arafi was named acting Supreme Leader. He does not possess
Khamenei’s political stature or authority, but he is regarded as a close
associate and an ideologically aligned figure. His core asset is trust
– Khamenei’s trust – and deep institutional roots in the clerical
system. Born in 1959 into a clerical family in the city of Meybod, in
Iran’s central Yazd province, Arafi’s father, Ayatollah (Sheikh Haji)
Mohammad Ebrahim Arafi, was close to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the
founder of the Islamic Republic. Alireza Arafi currently heads the
Al-Mustafa International University in Qom, an institution formally
established in 2009 and closely associated with Khamenei. Fluent in
Arabic and English, he has authored 24 books and articles. Since 2019,
he has served as a member of the powerful 12-member Guardian Council,
which wields veto authority over government policy and electoral
candidates.
The biography of even an interim Supreme Leader
suggests that the transition at the top of Iran’s power structure will
be managed and orderly rather than chaotic. At the same time, the
absence of Khamenei’s personal political weight may incentivize a
tougher line, as a way to signal resolve and maintain systemic control.
Additional
concern stems from the rhetoric of religious and security elites.
Ayatollah Shirazi has reportedly declared jihad against the United
States and Israel, giving the conflict not only a geopolitical but an
explicitly religious-ideological dimension. Earlier, Iran’s National
Security Council secretary warned of strikes delivered with “unprecedented force.”
Such language signals a shift into a phase where demonstrative scale
and severity of response become integral to deterrence strategy.
In
short, instead of resolving the crisis, the region faces accelerated
escalation, religious mobilization, and the real prospect of direct
attacks on US military infrastructure across the Middle East. A conflict
launched under the banner of liberation risks evolving into a long-term
confrontation with far higher stakes – and the political cost for
Washington may ultimately prove far greater than anticipated. The death
of Ali Khamenei is not a tactical episode. It is a point of no return
for the entire Middle Eastern security order.