Trump intimated that he might cut off arms sales to them for transfer to Ukraine if they reject his demand, thus likely handing Russia the victory that they’ve sought to avert for four years already, but they also don’t want to risk military losses to Iran either that could doom their politicians’ careers.
Andrew Korybko
Trump warned in an interview with the Financial Times
that “If there’s no response or if it’s a negative response (to his
proposed Hormuz naval coalition), I think it will be very bad for the
future of Nato…We have a thing called Nato. We’ve been very sweet. We
didn’t have to help them with Ukraine. Ukraine is thousands of miles
away from us…But we helped them. Now we’ll see if they help us. Because
I’ve long said that we’ll be there for them but they won’t be there for
us. And I’m not sure that they’d be there.”
The
ominous innuendo is that Trump could potentially stop “helping [NATO]
with Ukraine”, which could take the form of no longer selling them arms
for transfer to that country, if they don’t participate in his proposed
Hormuz naval coalition and “knock out some bad actors that are along the
[Iranian] shore.” This throws NATO into a dilemma since its goal is to
perpetuate the Ukrainian Conflict till a new anti-Russian administration comes to power in the US, but they also don’t want to risk military losses to Iran.
The
conflict can’t continue if the US drops out, but the killing of troops
in a distant warzone – especially a mass-casualty event like Iran
sinking one of their ships – could provoke unrest and doom the careers
of those who approved it during the next elections. There’s another
layer to this dilemma and it’s that not helping the US reopen the strait
keeps oil prices higher for longer, thus upsetting more voters, but it
might also lead to the US extending its temporary sanctions waiver on Russian oil that the EU is against.
NATO
therefore has to choose between helping the US secure the strait at the
risk of military losses to Iran, possible unrest, and dooming the
careers of those who approved it or refusing, risking the US cutting off
their arms supply to Ukraine, and the US possibly extending its Russian
oil sanctions waiver. The first choice entails military and political
costs while the second entails economic (higher oil prices for longer)
and reputational ones (worsening ties with the US and a possible Russian
victory in Ukraine).
Objectively speaking, the US isn’t expected
to entirely withdraw its military forces from Europe if NATO doesn’t
join Trump’s proposed Hormuz naval coalition, so that dimension of the
second scenario’s costs is manageable. The economic ones are too, but
only if they muster the political will to discredit their own
anti-Russian energy rhetoric by scaling up purchases of its oil and
possibly requesting the reopening of its pipelines. The only significant
cost is therefore a possible Russian victory in Ukraine.
About
that, while it was earlier thought that Trump wouldn’t want to hand
Putin such a victory for reasons of ego and legacy, he might do so if
Putin helps him achieve some of his goals in Iran via diplomacy as was
explained here, here, and here and to punish NATO for not joining his coalition. Putin could raise the odds by sweetening the terms of his proposed resource-centric strategic partnership between Russia and the US after the Ukrainian Conflict ends. This scenario therefore can’t be ruled out.
NATO should thus brace for that possibility if it rejects joining Trump’s coalition, but even if it gets involved in the Third Gulf War,
then Russia could still exploit the expected redirection of Western
arms to there from Ukraine to more effectively coerce Zelensky into
complying with his demands. Unlike before the Third Gulf War when it looked like
Putin would have to compromise on some of his demands, he now has a
greater chance of achieving more of them whether by force or with
Trump’s indirect support.