The US will have lost the Third Gulf War if China can still rely on Iran as a reliable low-cost energy supplier while turning the yuan into a global reserve currency that challenges the petrodollar.
Andrew Korybko
Trump announced
on Monday that he extended to Friday his deadline for Iran to reopen
the Strait of Hormuz under pain of destroying its energy infrastructure,
which was supposed to expire that same day, due to supposedly fruitful
talks with unnamed members of its leadership. He also declared
that the Strait would be jointly controlled by him and the Ayatollah
when the conflict ends as part of a deal. Iran denied that any talks
took place, even indirectly via mediation, so it’s unclear whether this
even happened.
The day before his announcement, The Economist assessed that “Donald Trump has four bad options for the war in Iran”: talk, leave, continue, or escalate. However, it was argued here
that “the relatively least bad from the perspective of Trump 2.0’s
interests are talking and escalating, the first if its interests are
taken at face value and the second if ulterior ones are at play.” The
difference is between retaining the world order or radically
transforming it through the likely destruction of all Gulf energy
infrastructure.
Trump 2.0 might opt for the first due
to fear of the blowback that could follow the second, even if it takes
time to materialize, but there are two goals that it must achieve in
either case otherwise it would be almost impossible to convincingly
present them as a victory. These are obtaining proxy control over Iran’s energy exports, so as to either cut China off from the 13.4% of its oil imports by sea per last year’s statistics or weaponize this as leverage, and thwarting the petroyuan proposal that Iran recently floated.
Iran
might freeze and later cap its missile program upon replenishing some
of its stockpile as well as give all of its highly enriched uranium to
Russia, but if China can still rely on Iran as a reliable low-cost
energy supplier while turning the yuan into a global reserve currency,
then the US would have lost. If Iran still won’t agree to the US’
aforementioned demands, basically replicating the Venezuelan “regime tweaking” model (possibly with the parliament speaker), then the US might try to capture Kharg Island.
The New York Times
recently reported on how this could unfold, namely through the Army’s
82nd Airborne Division and/or the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, but
this would be the ultimate gamble if Trump 2.0 decides to do so due to
the enormous stakes and potentially disastrous costs involved. On the
one hand, if the US captures and retains control over Kharg without Iran
destroying the site from where the overwhelming majority of its oil is
exported, then the US could use it as leverage in negotiations.
For
instance, Kharg could be jointly managed or returned to Iran (even if
later) in exchange for it giving Russia all of its highly enriched
uranium, agreeing not to sell any more energy to China, and dropping its
petroyuan proposal. Sanctions relief could follow as a form of
reparations, even if only phased at first, as well as sharing taxes on
transit across the jointly US-Iranian controlled strait. If Iran
vengefully destroys Kharg, then the US will destroy the rest of its
energy infrastructure, and Iran will destroy the Gulf’s.
The
US could insulate itself from the global chaos by retreating back to
the Western Hemisphere that it now mostly dominates after the success of
its “Fortress America” strategy over the last 15 months while
its Chinese systemic rival and everyone else in the Eastern Hemisphere
apart from Russia suffers. The most immediate cost would be its
soldiers’ lives, but the world would be radically changed forever, with
this sequence possibly being set into motion by the US’ Kharg Island
gamble and Iran’s response thereto.