If NATO as a whole remains more or less intact upon the US’ hypothetical exit, and the US then reaches bilateral security deals with Poland, the Baltic States, and Turkiye, then not much would change from Russia’s perspective.
Andrew Korybko
Trump’s latest talk about the US leaving NATO is being taken seriously by many Europeans owing to his rage over their refusal to help him reopen the Strait of Hormuz, not to mention them denying the US access to its own bases on their territory and even their airspace for use in the Third Gulf War. It’s possible that this is just a bluff, however, to usher in the radical reforms that he envisages and which were described here in connection with a prior report about his supposed “pay to play” plans.
Nevertheless,
it’s also possible that he’s indeed serious and that the US will
ultimately end up leaving NATO, in which case it’s useful to analyze the
future of transatlantic security. For starters, the headquarters of
both EUCOM and AFRICOM are in Germany, and it would be very difficult
and inconvenient to relocate them. Therefore, the US might reach a
bilateral security deal with Germany in this scenario, which could set
the basis for other such deals with other NATO members.
Such
arrangements would likely include terms that are advantageous to the US
such as its allies committing 5% of their GDP to defense like has
already been demanded of them as well as giving a preference to American
companies for military-technical procurement. The US might also demand
that its troops be granted immunity for any crimes that they might
commit while based in their allied nation. Trump could seek to enshrine
trade privileges for the US into any security deal too knowing him.
The
only countries that would likely agree to such terms are those whose
leaders either sincerely fear Russia or manipulate the public on this
pretext, thus Poland and the Baltic States for sure, but Finland and
Romania can’t be ruled out either. They and the other NATO members would
still enjoy Article 5 assurances amongst themselves, but it’s also
possible that larger members like France, Germany, Italy, and/or the UK
might follow the US’ lead in making demands of the smaller ones for
ensuring this.
In that event, the European security system could
fundamentally change, but concerns about Russia exploiting the optics of
infighting (even if only for soft power purposes and not by initiating
hostilities against post-US NATO) could deter the aforementioned larger
members from doing this. If NATO as a whole remains more or less intact
upon the US’ hypothetical exit, and the US then reaches bilateral
security deals with Poland and the Baltic States, then not much would
change from Russia’s perspective.
The same goes for if the
US reaches such a deal with Turkiye, which enjoys pragmatic ties with
Russia unlike Poland and the Baltic States but is poised to take the
lead in expanding Western influence along its southern periphery through
the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity”.
If the US remains committed to Turkiye’s defense, any potential clash
with Russia could risk World War III. If no such deal is reached,
however, then Russia might be more proactive in pushing back against
Turkish influence there.
All in all, transatlantic security
isn’t expected to change much if the US leaves NATO so long as it
retains Article 5-like obligations to several of the bloc’s key members,
namely Poland, the Baltic States, and Turkiye. If it doesn’t, then
Russia might consider preventive military action against post-US NATO to
eliminate security threats emanating from it, but it could be deterred
by nuclear-armed France and/or the UK reaffirming their Article 5
obligations to the bloc’s members. Nothing would really change then.