Russia’s loss in this new competition could lead to the removal of its air and naval bases.
Andrew Korybko
Zelensky’s
West Asian tour, which saw him clinch security deals with the Gulf
Kingdoms that are worth paying attention to for the reasons that were
explained here, culminated in a surprise visit to Syria. After meeting with his counterpart Ahmed Sharaa, he announced
that “There is strong interest in exchanging military and security
experience.” It’s unclear what form this could take, such as if Ukraine
will provide drone warfare training to Syria (perhaps for free to spite
Russia?), but Sharaa’s calculations are obvious.
“Russia’s Interests In Syria Go Far Beyond Retaining Its Air & Naval Bases”
as was explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis after Sharaa’s
latest meeting with Putin at the Kremlin in February. These are mutually
beneficial business opportunities and “nation-building”, the second of
which relates to the “New Syria” that Sharaa envisages, and Russia hopes
that the demonstration effect of succeeding with this in Syria will
lead to other countries requesting its support. African ones are its
most likely prospects.
Ukraine has no military bases in
Syria, their business ties are mostly Ukrainian agricultural exports to
Syria, and it has no experience in helping others “nation-build”.
Nevertheless, by exploring closer security cooperation with Ukraine,
Syria wants to make Russia jealous so that it offers better terms on
their deals in furtherance of its aforesaid interests if it fears that
Syria might fall too far under Ukraine’s influence and consider closing
Russia’s bases. More drone cooperation could exacerbate these fears.
Not
only might this reduce the appeal of Russia as one of Syria’s top
security partners with time, which it relies upon to preemptively avert
disproportionate dependence on Turkiye (but this role could
hypothetically be replaced by more Turkish-friendly Ukraine), but it
also poses a latent threat. The post-Assad Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is now
comprised of many “former” terrorist-designated individuals who could
put their Ukrainian drone training to use in attacking their erstwhile
enemy’s bases in Syria.
It’s also possible that Sharaa could
weaponize this by feigning “plausible deniability” if he decides to
turn a blind eye to such preparations in the event of future disputes
with Russia over business terms or whatever else. To be sure, Russia and
Syria benefit from maintaining their Assad-era strategic ties, but more
Ukrainian influence over Syria could distort the perceptions of Sharaa
and his team. Therefore, it can’t be ruled out that this won’t end in another setback for Russia, which Russia might thus try to avoid.
In
pursuit of that, expanding cooperation with Syria on the
earlier-mentioned issues and offering better terms too could be the
means that Russia employs, quite wisely too since Ukraine’s interest in
the Arab Republic strongly suggests an intent to spoil its adversary’s
ties with it. In fact, this should be a priority so that Russia
maintains the strategic initiative vis-à-vis Ukraine and doesn’t cede it
by procrastinating due to the false belief that Zelensky’s visit poses
no threat, which would be an epic miscalculation.
The precedent established by Ukraine’s drone warfare training to Mali’s terrorist-designated Tuareg rebels, which led to them devastatingly ambushing
Wagner in summer 2024, hints at the fate that could befall Russian
troops in Syria if ties deteriorate over whatever issue it may be. This
dark scenario could be averted if Russia replaces Ukraine’s likely drone
warfare training role in the SAA, limits it to vetted non-radical
members, and offers better partnership terms to win the new competition
for Syria’s loyalty.