More European countries are quietly stepping back from the anti-Russian front
By Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
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The
latest election in Bulgaria has delivered a striking result. Former
President Rumen Radev’s party, Progressive Bulgaria, secured a
commanding 44.5% of the vote, far ahead of its rivals. The once-dominant
GERB–SDS alliance trailed in second place with 13.3%, followed by the
We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria coalition on 12.6%. While
coalition talks are still required, the outcome leaves little doubt
about the direction of Bulgarian politics.
Radev’s decision to
resign from the largely ceremonial presidency in January in order to
contest the parliamentary election, the eighth in five years, has paid
off. His victory reflects not only personal popularity but also a
broader shift in public sentiment. In a country exhausted by political
instability, voters have rallied behind a figure who presents himself as
pragmatic and focused on national interests.
Predictably, much of the Western European commentary has framed Radev as “pro-Russian.”
In today’s political climate, that label is applied with remarkable
ease. Any hesitation about Brussels’ strategy of complete rupture with
Russia, or any attempt to introduce nuance into the debate over Ukraine,
is often enough to invite suspicion. Yet this characterization says
more about the narrowing of acceptable discourse inside the EU than it
does about Radev himself.
Radev isn’t a champion of Moscow. He
does not express overt sympathy for Russia, nor does he challenge
Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union or NATO. Rather, he
represents something increasingly rare in contemporary Western European
politics: a leader willing to question whether every directive from
Brussels necessarily serves his country’s interests. That alone is
enough to mark him out as a dissenter, albeit one operating within
carefully defined limits. As the experiences of Hungary and Slovakia
demonstrate, those limits can be stretched, but only by the most
determined political actors.
To understand the significance of developments in Bulgaria, and more
broadly across Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, two factors must be
taken into account.
First, changes in this region, however
notable, do not fundamentally alter the strategic direction of the EU or
NATO. The core of decision-making remains concentrated in a handful of
major capitals and central institutions. This was the design of European
integration from the outset. Smaller and newer member states,
particularly those that joined in the 21st century, remain too dependent
on the Union to pursue genuinely independent policies.
Hungary’s
Viktor Orban has often been presented as a disruptive force, but even
his resistance has had limited practical impact. Apart from occasional
disputes, such as Hungary’s recent exclusion from Russian oil supplies
delivered via Ukraine, Budapest hasn’t created insurmountable obstacles
for Brussels. Elsewhere, dissent has tended to be rhetorical rather than
substantive. Leaders in Croatia or Romania have voiced objections
without translating them into concrete policy shifts. Even Slovakia’s
Robert Fico, perhaps the closest counterpart to Orban, operates within
the constraints of a relatively small state.
Poland is something
of an exception. It’s a large, ambitious country with a coherent
economic strategy and growing political weight. Yet even in Warsaw’s
case, the emphasis remains on defending national interests within the
existing framework rather than reshaping the EU project itself.
For
now, Western Europe’s overarching course, strongly pro-Ukrainian and
firmly anti-Russian, continues to serve as a unifying principle.
Abandoning this stance would pose greater risks for the cohesion of the
EU than maintaining it. As a result, meaningful change is unlikely to
originate from the periphery.
The second factor, however, is more
subtle and potentially more consequential over time. Across Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe, a gradual shift in attitude is becoming visible.
This should not be interpreted through the simplistic binary of “pro-EU” versus “pro-Russian.” Such framing is reductive and, in many cases, deliberately misleading.
What’s emerging instead is a pragmatic instinct for
self-preservation. As the Ukraine conflict drags on and global
instability intensifies, countries in the region are increasingly aware
of the risks they face. While Western Europe remains committed to a
principled confrontation with Russia, it’s also clear that the costs of
this strategy are unevenly distributed. Larger and wealthier states have
both the capacity and the inclination to shift the burden onto their
eastern neighbors.
Faced with this reality, governments across the
region are seeking to limit their exposure. Poland, despite its hawkish
rhetoric, is acutely conscious of the risks on its doorstep. Hungary
continues to pursue a cautious, interest-driven approach. The Czech
Republic navigates a contradictory path, balancing alliance commitments
with domestic considerations. Romania remains relatively passive,
avoiding bold moves in either direction.
In this sense, a loose “coalition of the unwilling”
is taking shape, a group of countries that aren’t prepared to openly
challenge Brussels, but are equally reluctant to bear the full costs of
its policies. Their aim is to avoid being drawn too deeply into a
confrontation whose consequences they would feel most directly, rather
than realign with Russia.
The Bulgarian election result fits
neatly into this pattern. Radev’s success doesn’t signal a geopolitical
pivot. Rather, it reflects a growing desire for a more measured,
interest-based approach, one that acknowledges the realities of
geography and security.
Whether this trend will eventually
translate into a broader shift in EU policy remains uncertain. Most
likely, it won’t, at least not in the near term. The structural dynamics
of the EU favor continuity over change, and the current strategic
consensus is deeply entrenched.
Nevertheless, the signs are worth
noting. As the EU confronts a more complex and unstable global
environment, the question of adaptation will become unavoidable. If the
bloc moves away from its current model of universalism toward a more
fragmented system of overlapping interests and alliances, the choices
facing individual countries will become more pronounced.
In that
scenario, the instinct for self-preservation now visible in Eastern and
South-Eastern Europe may prove to be an early indicator of a broader
transformation. History, after all, rarely repeats itself in identical
form, but it often echoes. And in this case, the echo is unmistakable: a
region navigating between larger powers, seeking to protect its own
interests in an increasingly uncertain world.