Author:Elizaveta Naumova
As West Jerusalem moves past another Independence Day, the promise of lasting security looks increasingly uncertain
Born
out of the need for safety, Israel today finds itself navigating a
reality defined by recurring conflict and persistent insecurity. As
another Independence Day has passed, for West Jerusalem the sense of
permanence it was meant to symbolize remains elusive. Military strength
has grown, yet lasting security continues to slip out of reach.
Herzl’s promise, Israel’s reality
"Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency,” Theodor Herzl wrote in 1896 in The Jewish State, imagining a place where Jews would finally be safe.
”We should there form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. The sanctuaries of Christendom would be safeguarded by assigning to them an extra-territorial status, such as is well known to the law of nations.
We should form a guard of honor about these sanctuaries, answering for the fulfilment of this duty with our existence,” Herzl added, outlining not only a refuge for Jews but a broader civilizational mission.
In
Herzl’s formulation, a Jewish state in Palestine would serve as both
sanctuary and frontier – protecting its people while embedding itself
within a wider moral and political order. Security, in this sense, was
not meant to come at the expense of others, but to align with a system
of guarantees extending beyond Judaism itself.
More than seven decades after Israel's first prime minister, David
Ben-Gurion, declared independence, that promise is both fulfilled and
unsettled. Israel exists, thrives, and endures. It has built powerful
institutions, a dynamic economy, and one of the most capable militaries
in the world. It has, in many respects, achieved the core aim of
political sovereignty – Jews are no longer dependent on others for their
survival.
Yet the deeper aspiration – a stable and secure order
consistent with the ideals its founders articulated – remains elusive.
Israel today operates in a condition of permanent insecurity, shaped by
recurring wars, threats, and cycles of violence that have defined its
history. The shock of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel reinforced a
sense that even overwhelming military power cannot fully prevent
catastrophe.
At the same time, the broader vision Herzl sketched –
of safeguarding not only Jewish life but also the sanctuaries of others
– sits uneasily with recent realities. After more than two years of
continuous military operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, which have
claimed far more civilian lives than those of the Hamas and Hezbollah
operatives Israel set out to eliminate, that ideal appears increasingly
strained.
This year, Israeli authorities blocked Jerusalem’s
Catholic cardinal from observing Palm Sunday at the Church of the Holy
Sepulcher, prompting international outcry. In a separate incident, an
Israeli soldier was reported to have destroyed a statue depicting the
crucifixion of Jesus in a Catholic village in southern Lebanon. Episodes
like these, whatever their immediate context, complicate the idea of
Israel as a neutral guardian of a wider religious and civilizational
space.

Theodor Herzl © Wikipedia
Embedded
in Herzl’s vision was also a particular idea of Jerusalem: not merely a
contested city, but a space where competing claims would be mediated
through guarantees – including special protections for religious sites.
That idea sits uneasily with the city’s modern political reality. Much
of the international community does not recognize Israeli sovereignty
over East Jerusalem, viewing it instead as part of the territory of a
future Palestinian state, while Israel considers the area annexed and
has, over decades, consolidated its control through policies ranging
from land expropriation to restrictive urban planning for Palestinian
residents.
This year, that gap between vision and
reality is especially hard to ignore. Israel enters Yom Ha’atzmaut amid
war, with the trauma of the October 7 Hamas attack still shaping public
life. Fireworks and ceremonies go ahead, but they do so alongside
sirens, military operations, and the unresolved question of what
security actually means.
The blind spot before (and after) October 7
For years before
October 7, 2023, it appears, Israeli decision-makers operated under a
working assumption: that Hamas was neither willing nor capable of
launching a large-scale, coordinated attack on Israel’s territory. The
group was treated as a contained threat – dangerous, but ultimately
deterred, constrained by Israel’s military superiority, surveillance
systems, and the tight control imposed on the Gaza Strip.
That
assumption proved catastrophically wrong. The scale and coordination of
the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel exposed not only operational
failures but also a broader conceptual one: the belief that a long-term
status quo of blockade, fragmentation, and intermittent force could
remain stable.
Warning signs, in retrospect, were not entirely
absent. Israeli officials had reportedly obtained elements of Hamas’s
battle plan more than a year before the attack, yet dismissed it as
aspirational and too complex to execute. At the same time, internal
accounts cited by the Jerusalem Post suggest that an intelligence analyst – a non-commissioned officer in Unit 8200, known publicly as “V”
– repeatedly warned of the scope and seriousness of Hamas’s
preparations, only to have those warnings disregarded by her superiors
as unrealistic.
According
to the New York Times, more than a year before it happened, Israeli
officials even obtained Hamas’s battle plan for the terrorist attack
that outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion
that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people. Taken together, these
accounts point not simply to a failure of intelligence collection, but
to a failure of interpretation – a tendency to see what fit existing
assumptions rather than what was actually unfolding.

Israeli security forces near where a rocket fired from Gaza hit a building in Tel Aviv, Israel. October 7, 2023. © Amir Levy / Getty Images
Even after the attack,
vulnerabilities within Israel’s security system have continued to
surface. In May 2024 – seven months after October 7 – individuals posing
as infiltrators were reportedly able
to access an Israeli military base and collect sensitive information
using false identities, highlighting persistent gaps despite the
country’s emphasis on control and surveillance.
More strikingly,
similar concerns have emerged at the structural level. This January, a
major security breach exposed thousands of classified Israeli military
documents online, according
to the Haaretz. The leak, which included sensitive operational details,
maps of military facilities, and even the full names of active-duty
personnel – including air force pilots – remained accessible for nearly a
week after being flagged. Some of the files were stored without any
authentication, and search engines had indexed parts of the archive,
making them easily discoverable. Military censors reportedly classified
the exposed material as “life-threatening,” yet the delay in
addressing the breach underscored systemic weaknesses that stand in
tension with Israel’s image as a highly controlled security state.
From military response to political stalemate
In the
aftermath, Israel’s response has been defined by an overwhelming
reliance on military force, framed explicitly as an effort to prevent
another October 7. The stated objective is clear: dismantle Hamas’s
capabilities to the point where it can no longer pose a threat. Yet
nearly two years into sustained operations in Gaza and Lebanon, the
results suggest a far more ambiguous outcome.
On the ground, the
war has produced extensive destruction and a severe humanitarian crisis.
But beyond its immediate human cost, it has also failed to resolve the
central strategic question: what comes next? Six months into a fragile
ceasefire, the second phase of a US-backed peace framework remains
effectively stalled. Key provisions – including a mutual and sustained
halt to hostilities – have not been fully implemented. Israeli forces
continue to maintain a significant presence in Gaza, controlling large
portions of the territory and expanding what has been described as a
buffer zone along its eastern edge.
At the same time, the
political architecture meant to replace ongoing conflict remains
undefined. Plans for a transitional Palestinian administration have not
materialized, and proposals for an international stabilization force
remain vague, with no clear commitments from potential participants. The
question of governance – who will ultimately control Gaza – remains
unanswered.
Central to this uncertainty is the issue of disarming
Hamas. Israeli military assessments suggest that the group retains a
substantial arsenal, including thousands of rockets of varying ranges.
While there have been indications that Hamas might be willing to
transfer some of these weapons to a Palestinian administrative body
under international supervision, the framework for such a process is
unclear. The proposed mechanisms do not specify who would receive the
weapons, how compliance would be verified, or what guarantees would be
offered in return.
Hamas has signaled that it is unwilling to
disarm without credible assurances that Israel would uphold earlier
commitments, including a lasting ceasefire and an end to restrictions on
Gaza. Israel, in turn, continues to prioritize military pressure as its
primary tool, viewing political concessions as secondary to security
concerns.

Palestinian Hamas militants during a military display in Gaza City. July 20, 2017. © Chris McGrath / Getty Images
This
dynamic, in which military logic consistently outweighs political
resolution, was not entirely unforeseen – Russian analysts had
identified it earlier. Writing in the summer of 2024, Dmitry Maryasis,
head of the Israel department at the Institute of Oriental Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences, argued
that for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his political
allies, who have remained in power for much of the period since 2009,
Hamas has functioned as a “convenient partner.”
In this
interpretation, Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist
makes it possible to sustain the argument that a negotiated settlement
is unattainable – since part of the territory of a potential Palestinian
state is governed by an organization Israel defines as extremist. At
the same time, rocket fire from Gaza provides a rationale for military
responses, channeling the pressures of a security-oriented political and
military establishment.
The ongoing rivalry between Hamas and the
Palestine Liberation Organization further fragments the Palestinian
political landscape, allowing Israeli policymakers to argue that
internal Palestinian divisions must be resolved before any meaningful
negotiations can take place.
Nearly three years after the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel, this
logic appears largely unchanged. Even though Israel has succeeded in
eliminating several key Hamas figures, these tactical successes have not
translated into a decisive strategic shift. Hamas’s leadership
structure continues to function, both within Gaza and externally,
including in Qatar.
More importantly, public sentiment among
Palestinians suggests that the organization’s political position may not
have been fundamentally weakened. Surveys conducted in the Palestinian
territories in 2024 and 2025 indicate that a significant majority of
respondents – around 81% – view
the suffering caused by the blockade of Gaza as justification for
Hamas’s actions on October 7. When asked about political preferences,
the largest share – roughly 35% – express support for Hamas, with indications that this support has grown over time.
Israel’s
approach results in a stalemate that is both political and strategic. A
ceasefire exists in form but not in substance. Negotiations continue
but produce no decisive outcomes. Reconstruction is discussed but
remains largely theoretical, contingent on conditions that have yet to
be met.
Making Lebanon pay the price
Lebanon is far from
being the only challenge Israel faces, but it is undeniably one of the
most dangerous and persistently unresolved. Unlike Gaza, where Israel
confronts a territorially contained adversary, Lebanon represents a far
more complex and deeply embedded threat, one that Israel has struggled
to address for decades without achieving a lasting solution.
The
last major full-scale confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, the
2006 war, ended with a fragile international arrangement. The United
Nations called for a cessation of hostilities, the withdrawal of Israeli
forces, and, crucially, the disarming of Hezbollah.
In practice,
however, these provisions were never fully implemented. Hezbollah did
not disarm. On the contrary, it expanded its military capabilities
significantly, transforming itself from a guerrilla force into what many
analysts now describe as a hybrid army. By 2024, the group was believed
to possess tens of thousands of fighters and an arsenal of more than
130,000 rockets, many of them capable of reaching deep into Israeli
territory. Many of these weapons were reportedly stored within civilian
infrastructure, further complicating any military response.

Hezbollah fighters stand guard near the northeastern town of al-Qasr, Lebanon. April 12, 2013. © AP Photo / Bilal Hussein
Israel
changed its approach after October 7, focusing on degrading Hezbollah’s
capabilities through targeted operations instead of negotiating.
However, tactical success has not translated into strategic resolution.
Hezbollah remains intact, and is still deeply embedded within the
country’s political and social system. It holds seats in parliament,
operates hospitals and schools, and exercises de facto control over
large parts of southern Lebanon. At the same time, it maintains close
ties to Iran, functioning as a central component of what Tehran
describes as its “axis of resistance.”
The current
situation reflects this unresolved tension. A ten-day ceasefire between
Israel and Lebanon, announced by US President Donald Trump and
implemented last week, has only temporarily halted direct hostilities.
The main problem remains unchanged: the Lebanese government has no power
over Hezbollah, yet the latter is not a part of negotiations.
Another issue that Israeli authorities appear to ignore is that,
although their stated goal has been to establish a more stable security
framework along their northern border by weakening or dismantling
Hezbollah, the reality is that Israeli strikes have caused destruction
that extends well beyond the group itself, affecting civilians, critical
infrastructure, and entire communities throughout Lebanon.
More
than 1.2 million people have been displaced across Lebanon, and many of
them may have grown critical of Hezbollah. Yet they found themselves
displaced, bereaved, and impoverished all the same. This is why the
simple frame of “Israel versus Hezbollah” obscures so much: Hezbollah is not Lebanon, but too often it is Lebanon that is being made to pay the price.
The graves of independence
On
the eve of Israel’s Independence Day, the country marks Yom HaZikaron –
a day of remembrance for fallen soldiers and victims of terrorism. The
sequencing is deliberate. It is meant to remind the country that
independence was not given, but paid for in a continuous struggle for
survival.
Ceremonies at military cemeteries, including the one on
Mount Herzl in Jerusalem, are not only acts of mourning but also
reaffirmations of the state’s founding narrative: that security must be
defended, often at a high cost.
This year, that cost has become harder to ignore in purely symbolic terms. Israeli media reports suggest
that the military cemetery on Mount Herzl is nearing full capacity,
strained by a sharp rise in casualties since October 7. According to
Ministry of Defense data, more than 1,200 Israeli soldiers’ remains have
been transferred since the start of the war, with hundreds buried at
Mount Herzl alone. Emergency measures have already been approved to
expand burial space, with new areas being prepared to accommodate the
growing number of graves.

Israelis mark Remembrance Day with a two-minute silence at the Mount Herzl military cemetery in Jerusalem. April 21, 2026. © Erik Marmor / Getty Images
While it’s hard to
question the importance of remembrance, the proximity of memory and
celebration also invites a more difficult reflection: not only on what
has been paid, but on whether the price continues to rise – and why.
Israel
has achieved some of its immediate military objectives in the current
cycle of conflict. Iran, its most formidable regional adversary, has
been weakened by the war with Israel and the US, and Hezbollah’s
capabilities have been significantly degraded. Yet even these gains
remain partial and unstable. A comprehensive and durable peace
framework, including those between the US and Iran, has yet to
materialize. Across Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader region, the
underlying political questions remain unresolved.
In this context, the stated goal of preventing another October 7
becomes increasingly difficult to reconcile with the policies being
pursued. The destruction of infrastructure, the displacement of
populations, and the absence of a viable political framework risk
creating precisely the conditions in which future violence becomes more
likely, not less. Military operations may degrade capabilities in the
short term, but they do little to address the deeper dynamics that
sustain conflict.
More than a century ago, Theodor Herzl imagined a
state that would guarantee safety to a people long denied it, where
vulnerability would be replaced by sovereignty and stability. Israel
has, undeniably, achieved independence. It has built a powerful state
capable of defending itself in ways its founders could scarcely have
imagined.
But independence alone does not resolve the question
Herzl sought to answer. As Israel marks another anniversary under the
leadership of Netanyahu, it faces a different challenge: whether its
current strategy brings it closer to lasting security, or to another
catastrophe.
ByElizaveta Naumova, a Russian political journalist and expert at the Higher School of Economics