Germany’s political landscape is being reshaped as the Alternative for Germany challenges the established parties and the political barriers constructed around it. Russian analyst Fyodor Lukyanov argues the upheaval reflects something much larger: a growing European struggle over sovereignty, globalisation and whether electoral victories still translate into political power.
INR Report: Based on analysis by Fyodor Lukyanov for RT HERE
Germany's political establishment is confronting a problem that may prove increasingly difficult to contain: substantial numbers of voters are moving towards parties that the traditional political system has spent years attempting to isolate.
That is the central argument advanced by Fyodor Lukyanov, editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, in an analysis published by RT following the Alternative for Germany's strong performance in Saxony-Anhalt.
Lukyanov argues that the significance extends well beyond one German state election. In his assessment, Germany may be demonstrating an emerging European political pattern in which established parties remain institutionally powerful but increasingly struggle to reconcile their policies with the demands of significant sections of their electorates.
The question now is not simply how well the AfD performs at the ballot box. It is what happens when a party deliberately excluded from mainstream political cooperation wins enough votes to potentially govern.
The AfD Problem Becomes a Democratic Problem
According to Lukyanov, the scale of the AfD's advance in Saxony-Anhalt sends an unmistakable warning to Germany's political establishment.
The mainstream response to the AfD has traditionally centred on the Brandmauer — or firewall — under which established parties refuse political cooperation with it. Critics of the AfD argue this is necessary because of extremist elements within the party and concerns about its positions on immigration, Germany's political system and Russia.
But the strategy becomes increasingly complicated as the AfD's electoral support grows.
Lukyanov argues that attempts during the campaign to portray the party as extremist or aligned with Moscow failed to halt its momentum. In his interpretation, such attacks may even have reinforced support among voters already distrustful of established political institutions.
That creates a fundamental political dilemma.
If voters deliver the AfD enough seats to govern but the remaining parties combine primarily to prevent it from taking office, the arrangement can remain constitutionally legitimate. Yet repeatedly producing governments whose principal common purpose is excluding the largest electoral force carries political consequences of its own.
Voters, Lukyanov argues, eventually notice when winning elections does not necessarily result in political power.
What Happens If the AfD Governs?
An AfD-led state government would create another difficult choice.
Germany's federal system depends heavily on cooperation between the Länder and the federal government, including in sensitive areas such as policing, intelligence and security.
Lukyanov points to discussion about restricting cooperation with AfD-controlled authorities and argues that deliberately obstructing a legitimately constituted state government could ultimately damage Germany's federal system in an attempt to contain a single political party.
The alternative would be to allow the AfD to govern where it wins.
Lukyanov argues this could potentially achieve what years of political isolation have failed to accomplish. Governing forces insurgent political movements to confront budgets, administration, compromise and accountability. Contradictions that can remain hidden in opposition become much harder to conceal when a party assumes responsibility for delivering results.
Political exclusion, by contrast, can allow anti-establishment parties to continue portraying themselves as outsiders fighting an entrenched system.
Merz Faces His Own Political Test
The problem also reaches Chancellor Friedrich Merz and the governing Christian Democratic Union.
Lukyanov argues that Merz's political interventions increasingly risk producing the opposite response from the one intended, particularly among voters already suspicious of Germany's political establishment.
Further electoral setbacks in forthcoming contests could therefore increase pressure on the federal government and potentially weaken Merz's authority.
But Lukyanov sees the German situation as a symptom rather than the underlying disease.
His larger argument concerns the transformation of Western European politics.
The Globalisation Bargain Is Weakening
For several decades, European integration transferred increasing amounts of political and economic decision-making beyond national governments.
That development was not necessarily imposed against the interests of voters. Highly interconnected economies created problems that genuinely required international coordination, while globalisation and European integration were accompanied by periods of rising prosperity.
The implicit political bargain was relatively straightforward.
Citizens might surrender some national political control, but the economic system would compensate them through higher living standards, greater opportunity and increased prosperity.
Lukyanov argues that bargain has weakened.
Europe remains economically interconnected enough that governments cannot simply restore the national economic structures of previous generations. Yet globalisation no longer appears capable of producing the economic dynamism and political confidence that once legitimised greater supranational control.
Established political institutions therefore find themselves caught between two forces: structures created during the high period of globalisation and electorates increasingly demanding greater national sovereignty.
Europe’s Protest Parties Are Not One Movement
The result has been the growth of nationalist, populist and anti-establishment political movements across Europe.
They frequently share concerns about sovereignty, immigration, national identity and supranational institutions. But Lukyanov cautions against treating them as a unified political bloc.
German, French, British and other nationalist movements emerge from different histories and pursue different national interests. Opposition to Brussels does not automatically make them political allies.
That distinction is important because Europe's political transformation does not necessarily point towards a single ideological destination.
Instead, it may represent the fragmentation of a political consensus that dominated Europe during the decades following the Cold War.
Can the Political Firewall Hold?
Germany's established institutions remain powerful.
Coalition agreements, parliamentary structures and political conventions provide numerous mechanisms through which mainstream parties can prevent insurgent parties from exercising power even when those parties achieve substantial electoral support.
The question is how sustainable that approach becomes if the electoral trend continues.
A firewall constructed around a party receiving relatively modest support is one thing. Maintaining it when that party becomes one of the largest — or potentially the largest — political forces in a region is something else entirely.
At that point, the debate inevitably shifts from whether the AfD should be politically isolated to whether the mechanisms being used to isolate it are themselves affecting public confidence in representative democracy.
That is the deeper issue raised by Germany's evolving political landscape.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
The German experience has relevance far beyond Europe because the tension Lukyanov identifies — between established institutions and voters demanding greater national control — is not uniquely European.
New Zealand has also transferred significant areas of practical decision-making into international agreements, regulatory frameworks and multinational institutions while simultaneously confronting public debates about sovereignty, immigration, trade, economic security and democratic accountability.
The comparison should not be overstated. New Zealand's electoral system, political history and constitutional arrangements differ substantially from Germany's.
But the underlying democratic question travels easily across borders.
What happens when voters increasingly reject the direction of established institutions, yet those institutions retain mechanisms capable of limiting the political consequences of those electoral choices?
Political systems depend not only upon elections being conducted legitimately, but upon citizens believing that voting can meaningfully change the direction of government.
Germany's developing confrontation with the AfD therefore offers a broader democratic case study.
Attempts to isolate insurgent political movements may contain them for a period. But if the underlying grievances producing their support remain unresolved, institutional barriers can eventually strengthen the very anti-establishment narrative they were intended to defeat.
Europe's post-Cold War political settlement is not necessarily disappearing. But the assumptions that sustained it — continuing economic integration, growing prosperity and broad public acceptance of increasingly supranational decision-making — are being tested.
Germany may simply be one of the places where that test has become impossible to ignore.
Source: Fyodor Lukyanov, RT, 7 September 2026 — Germany shows where Europe is heading
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.