Australia’s military integration with the United States is reaching far beyond AUKUS submarines, according to reporting cited by RT. The expansion raises questions about how independently Canberra could act if a US-China confrontation erupted in the Indo-Pacific — and what that would mean for New Zealand
INR Report: Based on reporting by RT, drawing on reporting by The Guardian and research from the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.
RT reports that the United States now controls, uses or has a military or corporate presence at a substantial majority of surveyed Australian defence facilities, as Washington expands the infrastructure required to conduct military operations across the Indo-Pacific.
According to the report, data compiled by the Nautilus Institute identified some form of US military or defence-contractor presence at 110 of 168 Australian facilities surveyed.
The US military reportedly directly controls 17 facilities, while having access to dozens more. American defence contractors including Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman also operate at Australian installations.
The significance is not simply the number of facilities involved. It is what some of them are designed to do.
Pine Gap at the Centre of US Operations
Among the most strategically important facilities is the Pine Gap intelligence complex in central Australia.
The report says Pine Gap tracks missile launches, intercepts communications and supplies targeting information used by US forces.
Other facilities include a naval communications installation in Western Australia used to communicate with submerged US submarines and RAAF Base Tindal in Australia's Northern Territory.
Tindal is being expanded to accommodate US B-52 Stratofortress bombers, aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
The Guardian, as quoted by RT, highlighted a longstanding feature of Australia's nuclear arrangements with Washington: the United States does not disclose whether individual aircraft are carrying nuclear weapons, while Australia does not ask.
That policy creates an obvious tension with Australia's own nuclear non-proliferation commitments and with the wider South Pacific's nuclear-free tradition.
Preparing for High-Tempo Operations
The expansion is not confined to existing installations.
RT says AFP previously reported that the United States was preparing a permanent Australian stockpile of weapons, ammunition and equipment for the US Marine Corps, expected to reach full capacity in 2028.
Richard Tanter, whose Nautilus Institute database underpins the figures cited in the reporting, described the strategic objective in unusually direct language.
He argued that Washington has spent more than a decade developing Australia's capacity to serve as a springboard for what he called "high-tempo warfighting operations with China."
That interpretation goes considerably further than describing Australia as simply hosting an allied military presence.
Tanter's contention is that Australia's territory and defence infrastructure are becoming integrated components of the American military system.
From Beijing's perspective, he argued, Australia could increasingly be viewed not as a country containing American bases but effectively as a US military base in its own right.
Canberra Says the Presence Strengthens Security
The Australian Government presents the relationship very differently.
Defence Minister Richard Marles has argued that the expanding American presence strengthens Australian military capability and national security.
Canberra also sees deeper US integration as part of its response to China's rapidly expanding military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.
That distinction matters.
The facilities and US presence are real; the conclusion that Australia has effectively surrendered its strategic independence is an interpretation advanced by critics of the arrangements, rather than an established fact.
Supporters of the alliance would argue almost the opposite: Australia's geography makes it strategically important, while integration with the world's largest military substantially strengthens Australia's deterrence against potential adversaries.
The disagreement therefore comes down to a fundamental strategic question:
Does deeper military integration increase Australia's sovereignty by making the country safer — or reduce it by making Australian territory indispensable to another country's war plans?
AUKUS Is Bigger Than Submarines
The developments also place the AUKUS agreement in a broader context.
Public debate around AUKUS has frequently concentrated on Australia's planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.
But former Australian Defence Minister Christopher Pyne has described the arrangement in much wider strategic terms.
According to the report, Pyne said AUKUS effectively establishes a new US submarine base in the Indian Ocean, providing Washington with a major strategic advantage.
That suggests the transformation underway is not principally about Australia acquiring a new class of submarine.
It is about reshaping Australia's military geography as part of a much larger US-led Indo-Pacific defence architecture.
Australia on the Front Line
Geography explains much of Washington's interest.
Australia offers political stability, enormous territory, established military infrastructure and relative geographic security compared with US facilities closer to China.
It also provides access to the Indian and Pacific oceans.
In a major confrontation with China, those characteristics could make Australia an essential logistics, intelligence, communications, submarine, bomber and weapons-support hub.
But strategic value brings strategic exposure.
The more indispensable Australian facilities become to US military operations, the more likely those facilities would be regarded as legitimate military targets during a major conflict.
That is the uncomfortable trade-off sitting beneath the debate over Australia's deepening alliance with Washington.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
Very directly.
Australia is New Zealand's closest defence partner and our only formal ally under the ANZUS framework still operating as such. Our economies, intelligence relationships and defence establishments are deeply connected.
New Zealand is also a member of Five Eyes and has been discussing greater interoperability with Australia and other Western partners as strategic competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific.
If Australia becomes increasingly integrated into US military planning for a potential conflict with China, New Zealand could face difficult decisions long before any shooting started.
Would New Zealand provide intelligence?
Would American or Australian aircraft and ships receive logistical support here?
Would New Zealand Defence Force personnel participate?
Could New Zealand ports or airfields become part of allied supply networks?
And how would those decisions sit alongside New Zealand's nuclear-free legislation and its enormous economic relationship with China?
These are not arguments for or against the US alliance.
They are questions about sovereignty and democratic consent.
The Australian experience demonstrates how military integration can accumulate gradually — through intelligence facilities, rotational deployments, communications systems, logistics agreements, weapons storage, interoperability and infrastructure investment — without a single moment when the public is asked to decide whether the country's strategic position has fundamentally changed.
For New Zealand, that may be the most important lesson.
The question is not simply whether Wellington supports Washington, Canberra or Beijing.
It is whether New Zealanders understand what commitments are being made in their name, what those commitments could require during a crisis, and ultimately who decides whether New Zealand becomes involved in somebody else's war.
Source: RT, US turning Australia into military base – Guardian, 9 September 2026; citing The Guardian and Nautilus Institute research.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.