The State of the EU: Power, Debt and Rearmament

What von der Leyen's address reveals about Europe's changing Union


European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Brussels, September 9, 2026. Credit: Getty Images / Dursun Aydemir. Source: RT


Ursula von der Leyen approaches her 2026 State of the Union address with the European Commission exercising an expanding role in defence, migration, borrowing, digital regulation and support for Ukraine. Behind the institutional language lies a larger question: how much power and financial responsibility is moving towards Brussels, and how effectively are those decisions being scrutinised?


INR Report: Based on reporting by the RT newsroom in The State of the EU: What von der Leyen won’t say in her speech, independently examined against European Commission, Council of the European Union and European Parliament records.

When European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen addresses the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 16 September, the official theme is increasingly clear: European independence.

The Commission's own presentation ahead of the address describes an EU attempting to reduce strategic dependencies, strengthen defence, support Ukraine, expand international partnerships and protect what it calls European democracy. It presents these developments as evidence that Europe can act more effectively when its members work together. European Commission: State of the Union 2026

RT presents almost the inverse interpretation. Its analysis portrays the European Union as an increasingly centralised and militarised political structure, accumulating authority while borrowing heavily, financing Ukraine, expanding defence expenditure and developing regulatory mechanisms capable of influencing political debate inside member states.

Neither framing should simply be inherited.

The more important question is what has actually changed.

The Commission Is Becoming More Consequential

The European Commission has always occupied an unusual position. It proposes EU legislation, enforces European law, administers programmes and budgets, negotiates in several policy areas and represents common European interests within the institutional structure created by the treaties.

What has changed is the range and political significance of the problems now being addressed at European level.

Defence, migration, energy security, industrial policy, digital platforms, Ukraine, borrowing and economic resilience have increasingly become questions involving EU-wide programmes or regulation.

That does not mean national governments have surrendered control of those areas. The Council, representing member states, and the directly elected European Parliament remain central to EU lawmaking, while major decisions can require qualified-majority or unanimous agreement depending on the legal basis.

But the institutional direction is nevertheless significant.

More decisions with substantial national consequences are now being coordinated, financed or regulated through Brussels.

Migration Shows How the Balance Is Changing

RT describes the Migration and Asylum Pact as giving the Commission the ability to order member states either to accept migrants arriving elsewhere in the Union or pay a financial penalty.

The actual mechanism is more complicated.

Under the solidarity arrangements agreed for 2026, the EU established a reference pool equivalent to 21,000 relocations or other solidarity efforts, or €420 million in financial contributions.

Member states can choose among three forms of contribution: accepting relocations, making financial contributions, or providing alternative solidarity measures. Countries can also combine those options. Council of the European Union: Migration and asylum solidarity pool

So the RT description overstates the Commission's direct power to allocate migrants to individual countries.

But the underlying institutional development is real.

Migration pressure that once fell predominantly within national political systems is increasingly governed through an EU-wide burden-sharing structure.

The argument is therefore not simply whether Brussels can "force" a country to accept migrants.

The deeper constitutional question is how far responsibility for migration should be shared across the Union, and how much discretion individual governments should retain when national electorates disagree with collective European policy.

Ukraine Has Become a Major European Financial Commitment

The scale of Europe's financial commitment to Ukraine is much easier to quantify.

In April 2026 the Council finalised a €90 billion EU loan to Ukraine covering 2026 and 2027.

The money is being raised through EU borrowing on capital markets and backed by the EU budget.

Of the total, approximately €30 billion is intended for economic support and €60 billion for military assistance and defence-industrial capacity. Council of the European Union: EU financial support for Ukraine

That distinction matters.

This is not simply €90 billion transferred from an existing European cash reserve. The EU is using its collective borrowing capacity to raise money for Ukraine.

Nor is the funding entirely unconditional. The Council says disbursement is linked to requirements including adherence to the rule of law and measures against corruption. Council of the European Union: €90 billion support loan to Ukraine

The mechanism nevertheless represents an important evolution in European financial power.

The Union borrows.

Its budget supports the borrowing.

Ukraine receives the financing.

European taxpayers ultimately stand behind the institutional structure supporting that debt.

Europe Is Borrowing to Rearm

Ukraine is only part of the financial transformation.

Europe is simultaneously embarking upon one of the largest increases in defence investment since the Cold War.

The Commission's ReArm Europe Plan, now presented under Readiness 2030, is intended to facilitate approximately €800 billion in additional defence investment.

The largest component does not consist of €800 billion being directly spent by Brussels.

Instead, the Commission estimates that allowing member states additional fiscal flexibility equivalent to 1.5 percent of GDP for defence could create close to €650 billion of fiscal space over four years.

Alongside that sits SAFE, Security Action for Europe, a €150 billion EU loan instrument for defence investment. The Commission raises the money on capital markets and lends it to participating member states for approved defence programmes. European Commission: Future of European defence

The Commission reports that 18 national SAFE plans have been approved and more than €12 billion has already been disbursed. It says procurement rules generally require at least 65 percent of component costs to originate within the EU, European Economic Area or Ukraine. European Commission: Protecting what matters

That creates another important economic mechanism.

European governments borrow or allocate additional money.

Defence budgets rise.

Governments procure weapons, ammunition, drones, air-defence systems, communications networks and other military capabilities.

Defence manufacturers receive the contracts.

Industrial capacity expands.

Europe's geopolitical transformation therefore also becomes an industrial transformation.

Is This Militarisation or Deterrence?

This is where interpretation becomes unavoidable, but the underlying facts need not be disputed.

The Commission describes the programme as necessary deterrence.

Its case is straightforward. Russia's invasion of Ukraine fundamentally changed Europe's security environment, exposed shortcomings in European military capacity and demonstrated the risks of relying heavily upon the United States for continental defence.

According to Commission figures, defence spending by EU countries has already increased by almost 80 percent since 2020. The Commission cites 2026 Eurobarometer surveys showing substantial public support for greater defence cooperation and investment. European Commission: Protecting what matters

Critics see the same development differently.

They argue that an institution created principally around economic integration is progressively developing characteristics associated with strategic and military power, while increased borrowing risks creating permanent financial commitments around rearmament.

Both descriptions concern the same institutional change.

Europe is spending substantially more on defence, coordinating more of that activity through European institutions and creating financial mechanisms designed to sustain the expansion.

Whether that represents overdue strategic independence or excessive militarisation is a political judgement.

Then Comes the Older Debt

The EU's new borrowing commitments do not begin with Ukraine or defence.

During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Union established NextGenerationEU, financed through large-scale borrowing by the European Commission.

Those obligations now overlap with the next European budget.

The Commission's proposed 2028 to 2034 Multiannual Financial Framework totals approximately €1.76 trillion in 2025 prices.

Within that proposal sits €149.3 billion for repayment of debt created through NextGenerationEU grants. European Parliament: 2028-2034 EU long-term budget

The European Parliament has argued that those repayment costs should sit outside the normal budget ceilings rather than consuming money otherwise available for EU programmes. In April 2026, Parliament adopted that negotiating position by 370 votes to 201, with 84 abstentions. European Parliament: Long-term EU budget negotiating position

The important issue is not simply whether borrowing was justified during the pandemic.

It is that EU-level debt has consequences extending decades beyond the political crisis during which it was created.

NextGenerationEU repayment is expected to continue until 2058. European Parliament: NextGenerationEU debt

Europe is therefore simultaneously servicing previous collective borrowing, financing Ukraine, expanding defence capacity and negotiating a much larger long-term budget.

That is a substantially different European financial architecture from the one that existed before 2020.

The Budget Is Changing With the Politics

There is another revealing change buried inside the numbers.

The Commission's proposed 2028 to 2034 budget shifts emphasis away from some traditional areas of European expenditure and towards competitiveness, security and defence. European Parliament: 2028-2034 EU long-term budget

That tells us something important about Europe's priorities.

For decades, the European project was associated most visibly with agricultural policy, regional development, common markets, free movement and economic integration.

Increasingly, its institutional vocabulary includes strategic autonomy, defence readiness, military mobility, industrial resilience, cyber security, border management and technological sovereignty.

The European project is changing because the environment surrounding it has changed.

The question is how far that transformation should go.

The Digital Power Question

RT also argues that the EU has constructed what it calls a "repression machine" through its regulation of online platforms and election-related information.

That description is an interpretation, not an established fact.

But the broader issue deserves examination.

European institutions have developed increasingly powerful mechanisms for regulating large digital platforms through the Digital Services Act and associated programmes intended to address illegal content, platform risks, foreign information manipulation and threats to election integrity.

Supporters regard those measures as necessary protection against manipulation, algorithmic amplification and foreign interference.

Critics argue that regulatory pressure on platforms can blur the boundary between combating genuinely unlawful material and influencing lawful political speech.

That distinction matters enormously.

A democratic institution can legitimately seek to protect elections from covert foreign operations while still requiring strong safeguards against political censorship.

The proper question is therefore not whether all EU content regulation constitutes censorship, or whether all concerns about censorship constitute disinformation.

It is who defines the prohibited or harmful material, what legal standard is applied, how transparent the process is, what appeal mechanisms exist and whether the rules operate consistently across political viewpoints.

Political Resistance Is Part of the Story

RT places considerable emphasis on growing political opposition to Brussels within member states, particularly in Germany and France.

Those political movements differ substantially from one another and should not be treated as a single European bloc.

But the structural tension they expose is real.

European integration transfers some decisions from national political arenas into shared European institutions.

That can increase collective bargaining power and allow countries to address problems that cross national borders.

It can also create distance between voters and decision-makers.

When national electorates strongly disagree with European policy on migration, Ukraine, climate regulation, trade or fiscal policy, the question becomes more than whether a particular policy is sensible.

It becomes a question of democratic authority.

Who ultimately decides?

Von der Leyen's Stronger Europe Comes With a Price

The Commission's case ahead of the 2026 State of the Union is that Europe needs greater capacity to act independently.

Its published priorities include strengthening defence, reducing strategic dependencies, increasing competitiveness, supporting Ukraine, developing energy infrastructure and protecting European democracy. European Commission: State of the Union 2026

Those objectives are not costless.

Greater military capability requires money.

Greater European industrial independence requires investment.

Supporting Ukraine requires financing.

Energy transformation requires infrastructure.

Collective borrowing requires future repayment.

And transferring additional responsibilities to European institutions necessarily raises questions about democratic oversight and national sovereignty.

This is where RT's critique intersects with the Commission's own evidence.

The EU does not need to be described as an authoritarian superstate for the underlying concentration of financial and regulatory capacity to deserve scrutiny.

The numbers themselves are consequential enough.

Does This Affect New Zealand?

For New Zealand, Europe can seem geographically distant while remaining economically and politically important.

The EU is a major trading partner and an important diplomatic relationship for Wellington. European regulatory standards can influence international commerce far beyond Europe because companies seeking access to the enormous European market frequently adapt their products and practices to EU rules.

The defence transformation also matters.

New Zealand is simultaneously reconsidering its own defence capabilities as strategic competition intensifies across the Indo-Pacific. Europe's experience demonstrates how quickly security shocks can transform political attitudes towards military expenditure.

There is also a fiscal lesson.

Emergency borrowing can solve immediate problems while transferring costs far into the future. NextGenerationEU debt created during the pandemic will remain part of Europe's financial architecture for decades, while new commitments involving Ukraine and defence are being layered onto that structure. European Parliament: NextGenerationEU debt

For a small democracy such as New Zealand, the European experience raises a broader question about sovereignty.

International cooperation can provide economic and strategic advantages that individual states cannot easily reproduce alone.

But every transfer of decision-making authority upwards should be accompanied by an equally serious examination of accountability downwards.

The State of the Union Beneath the Speech

Von der Leyen's State of the Union address will inevitably emphasise achievements and future ambitions. That is the function of such a speech.

RT's article approaches the same landscape from the opposite direction, concentrating on debt, centralisation, political resistance and militarisation.

The documentary record produces a more complicated picture.

Europe really is borrowing collectively.

It really is financing Ukraine on an enormous scale.

It really is constructing mechanisms capable of facilitating hundreds of billions of euros in additional defence expenditure.

It really is carrying substantial pandemic-era debt into its next long-term budget.

And European institutions really are becoming increasingly involved in policy areas that touch directly upon national sovereignty.

But those developments have not occurred in a vacuum. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, energy insecurity, migration pressure, technological competition and doubts about Europe's reliance on the United States have generated genuine strategic pressures upon European governments.

That leaves a question considerably more important than what Ursula von der Leyen chooses to include in a single speech.

Europe is acquiring more collective financial, regulatory and strategic power. What democratic mechanisms will ensure that power remains accountable to the people of its member states?

Sources

Original report: RT, The State of the EU: What von der Leyen won’t say in her speech

European Commission: State of the Union 2026

European Commission: Future of European Defence, Readiness 2030 and SAFE

European Commission: Protecting What Matters

Council of the European Union: EU Financial Support for Ukraine

Council of the European Union: €90 Billion Support Loan to Ukraine

Council of the European Union: 2026 Migration Solidarity Pool

European Parliament: 2028-2034 EU Long-Term Budget

European Parliament: Long-Term EU Budget Negotiating Position

European Parliament: NextGenerationEU Debt

Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.

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