Britain’s calls for greater national war readiness have prompted a dispute over the difference between credible defence planning and public alarm. As European intelligence officials debate the immediacy of Russian threats, the controversy raises questions about how New Zealand assesses international risks and determines its own defence commitments
INR Report: Based on commentary by Tarik Cyril Amar for RT HERE, published 24 September 2026. Additional context from official British and New Zealand defence documents and contemporary reporting.
What Britain Is Asking Its Public to Prepare For
In a sharply critical opinion article, historian Tarik Cyril Amar argues that British political, military and media figures are encouraging the public to anticipate a future war with Russia. He points to comments by former Conservative minister Jacob Rees-Mogg, an interview with Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, and Sky's televised hypothetical conflict scenario, The Wargame.
Amar interprets these developments as attempts to normalise the prospect of war and discourage dissent. That is his interpretation, rather than an established finding about the intentions of British officials or the programme's producers. The underlying policy is nevertheless documented: Britain's 2025 Strategic Defence Review calls for a whole-of-society approach to resilience, greater military readiness and a public conversation about defence.
The review states that Russia's invasion of Ukraine and other security developments have changed Britain's strategic environment. It argues that credible preparation can help deter an attack rather than make war inevitable. Those stated objectives are important when assessing Amar's contention that the public is being conditioned for conflict.
Public Statements and Media Scenarios
Amar cites Jacob Rees-Mogg's remarks about circumstances in which people might have to die and Chief of the Defence Staff Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton's discussion of public understanding of security threats. These examples raise legitimate questions about how leaders communicate military risk and the obligations they ask citizens to accept.
However, an individual politician's rhetoric does not establish a government decision to enter a war. Likewise, a hypothetical television scenario is not evidence that an attack is scheduled or expected. It can influence perceptions, but its effect on audiences would require separate evidence.
The British review provides a clearer test of official intentions than television commentary: it proposes resilience planning, protection of essential infrastructure, industrial mobilisation capacity and closer cooperation with NATO allies. Whether individual measures are proportionate is a separate question from whether they exist.
How Immediate Is the Russian Threat?
The dispute is complicated by differing assessments of Russia's capabilities and intentions. European intelligence officials have warned about possible sabotage, drone incidents and other actions intended to test NATO responses. Other Baltic officials have cautioned against presenting a direct Russian military attack on NATO as imminent.
These positions are not necessarily contradictory. A country can assess a risk of hybrid operations while judging a large-scale conventional invasion unlikely in the immediate term. Russia's denials of plans to attack NATO are relevant diplomatic statements, but do not independently settle questions of capability or future intent.
Public debate benefits from distinguishing an immediate warning supported by specific intelligence, a longer-term defence-planning scenario and a fictional media exercise. Conflating them risks either overstating a danger or overlooking risks that do exist.
Preparedness, Consent and Accountability
National resilience includes measures that may be useful in emergencies other than war, such as reliable communications, energy security, medical capacity and protection of transport systems. A government can make a practical case for those investments without claiming that war is inevitable.
The more difficult questions concern cost, military obligations and public consent. Citizens need to understand what threat assessment supports a policy, what alternatives were considered and how decisions about deployment would be authorised. The existence of a serious security risk does not remove the need for parliamentary scrutiny or transparent spending decisions.
Amar's article foregrounds the danger of political messaging built around fear. Britain's official position instead presents preparedness as a means of deterrence. Both propositions can be tested against concrete policies, documented threat assessments and the public accountability mechanisms surrounding them, rather than assuming either explanation establishes the motives of every participant.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
New Zealand is geographically distant from the European theatre, but it has security partnerships and economic interests affected by international instability. Its 2025 Defence Capability Plan proposes rebuilding military capability, increasing interoperability with Australia and other partners, and developing maritime, technological and surveillance capacity. The Government announced a plan containing $12 billion over four years, including $9 billion in new spending, with an ambition to lift defence spending above 2% of GDP within eight years.
Those commitments do not automatically imply that New Zealand would participate in a European war. They do raise questions about the circumstances in which New Zealand might support overseas operations, how decisions would be made and whether spending is directed towards clearly defined national and regional priorities.
For New Zealand, the immediate relevance of Britain's debate is therefore institutional rather than rhetorical. Defence cooperation can improve readiness and access to technology, while deeper integration can create expectations among partners. The public interest lies in clear statements of purpose, transparent costs, parliamentary scrutiny and an explicit distinction between protecting New Zealand's own security and supporting operations elsewhere.
The wider lesson is that preparation and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive. Governments can strengthen resilience while explaining their assessments, preserving space for disagreement and maintaining diplomatic channels intended to reduce the risk of conflict.
Sources
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.