Former CIA analyst Larry Johnson says direct conflict between Russia and European NATO states is becoming increasingly likely, drawing on recent meetings and observations in Moscow. His warning is striking, but several of his military and economic claims are predictions or disputed assessments rather than established facts
INR Report: Based on an interview with Larry Johnson by Lena Petrova for World Affairs In Context
Former CIA analyst and US State Department counterterrorism official Larry Johnson has returned from Russia warning that the danger of the Ukraine war expanding into a direct Russia-Europe confrontation is now extremely high.
Johnson told Lena Petrova that he had recently visited Moscow and St Petersburg, participated in academic meetings and met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov. He said his conversations left him convinced that Russian officials increasingly regard a wider confrontation with Europe as a realistic possibility.
Johnson put his own assessment at a “90% certainty” of war between Russia and Europe. He attributed part of that conclusion to a conversation with Russian General Apti Alaudinov, whom Johnson said regarded eventual conflict with Europe as likely because European states are supplying weapons used against Russia, increasing military production and discussing mobilisation.
That is Johnson’s assessment, not an independently established probability of war.
NATO Gives a Very Different Assessment
The most important counterpoint comes from NATO itself.
Speaking on 24 September, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte cited a Danish intelligence assessment that a full-scale Russian invasion of NATO territory was “highly unlikely”. Rutte nevertheless warned that Russia is rapidly expanding military production and said NATO must continue strengthening its own industrial and military capacity.
NATO describes itself as a defensive alliance and says it does not seek confrontation with Russia. At the same time, it identifies Russia as the most significant direct threat to Allied security and has strengthened forces, air defence and military readiness along its eastern flank.
The distinction matters. Johnson is warning that escalation dynamics could produce war even without Russia seeking territorial conquest in Europe. NATO’s public assessment is that a deliberate Russian full-scale attack remains unlikely, while deterrence and military preparation are necessary precisely to keep it that way.
What Johnson Says He Saw in Moscow
Johnson also challenged claims that Russia’s economy is close to collapse.
He described Moscow and St Petersburg as clean, modern and economically active, saying he saw no visible evidence of widespread economic desperation. He also said that a large Ukrainian drone attack during his stay caused little visible disruption in central Moscow.
Personal observation can establish what Johnson saw in particular parts of two major Russian cities. It cannot by itself measure the condition of an economy spanning eleven time zones.
The International Monetary Fund’s July 2026 outlook does not describe economic collapse, but neither does it indicate robust wartime growth. It projects Russian real GDP growth of about 1.1 percent in 2026 and consumer-price inflation of 5.6 percent.
Russia therefore appears to remain economically functional despite sanctions and the costs of war, but Johnson’s observations of Moscow should not be treated as a substitute for national economic data.
The Industrial War
Johnson’s strongest strategic argument concerns military production.
He contends that Europe has underestimated Russia’s ability to sustain an industrial war, particularly in artillery ammunition, drones, missiles and energy-intensive manufacturing. He argues that Russia’s domestic access to oil, gas, coal and other resources gives it an advantage in prolonged high-intensity conflict.
Russia has unquestionably expanded defence production substantially since 2022. NATO itself acknowledges the scale of the Russian mobilisation.
But Johnson’s comparison of Russian and Western artillery production understates how quickly NATO production is now expanding. At NATO’s July 2026 Defence Industry Forum, Rutte said the Alliance expects to have annual capacity to manufacture around four million artillery shells by 2027, nearly twice its capacity a year earlier.
That does not resolve questions about existing stockpiles, delivery schedules, ammunition types, cost or battlefield consumption. It does demonstrate that the Western industrial position is not static.
Drones and the Changing Battlefield
Johnson argues that Russia has adapted rapidly to battlefield conditions, particularly the extraordinary expansion of drone warfare.
That assessment is less controversial. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have transformed their tactics around inexpensive unmanned systems, electronic warfare, dispersed formations and precision strike capabilities.
Johnson says this experience has exposed weaknesses in NATO doctrine and procurement. NATO’s own industrial programme suggests the Alliance also recognises the transformation. In July, NATO members announced new multinational projects involving 155mm ammunition and ground-based precision strike systems, alongside continuing investment in drones, counter-drone systems and air defence.
Ukraine has therefore become not only a battlefield but a laboratory for technologies and tactics likely to shape future conventional warfare.
Johnson Predicts a Ukrainian Military Collapse
Johnson makes an even more dramatic prediction about Ukraine itself.
He argues that Russian pressure across multiple sectors of the front, combined with Ukraine’s manpower and matériel problems, could produce a relatively sudden collapse. He predicts that Russia could threaten Kyiv and Odessa in early 2027 and even claims Russia could control Kyiv by June.
Those statements are forecasts, not facts.
Battlefield outcomes depend on variables that cannot be reliably reduced to ammunition production or manpower alone: defensive terrain, fortifications, logistics, intelligence, foreign assistance, political decisions, mobilisation, operational mistakes and changes in military technology all matter.
Johnson’s prediction should therefore be understood as his interpretation of the trajectory of the war rather than a demonstrated outcome.
Moscow’s View of Washington
Johnson also says Russian officials have lost confidence in the Trump administration’s ability or willingness to deliver a negotiated settlement.
He contrasts the present environment with the Cold War, when Washington and Moscow maintained arms-control negotiations and regular strategic communication despite proxy conflicts and intense geopolitical competition.
His larger argument is that deteriorating communication increases the danger of miscalculation.
That concern extends beyond Johnson’s political interpretation. When nuclear-armed states increasingly prepare for confrontation while simultaneously losing confidence in diplomatic channels, the consequences of misunderstanding become more serious even if neither side initially intends a direct war.
Does This Affect New Zealand?
For New Zealand, the significance is not whether Johnson’s 90 percent estimate proves correct. There is no reliable basis for assigning that probability to a Russia-NATO war, and NATO’s current public assessment points in the opposite direction.
The significance is the escalation pathway itself.
New Zealand is already materially involved in supporting Ukraine. On 8 September, the Government extended Operation Tīeke until 30 June 2028, authorising up to 70 NZDF personnel in Europe. Most are training Ukrainian forces in Poland, with New Zealand also providing intelligence, liaison and logistics support.
The Government says Ukraine’s defence has implications for both European and Indo-Pacific security and continues to support sanctions against Russia.
A direct confrontation between Russia and NATO would therefore alter the strategic environment in which New Zealand is already operating. It could increase pressure on Wellington for additional military, intelligence or logistical support, place greater strain on allied defence supply chains, and intensify debate over how New Zealand balances European commitments against security requirements in the Indo-Pacific.
The economic effects could also reach New Zealand rapidly through energy markets, shipping, commodity prices, financial volatility and European demand.
Most importantly, Russia and several NATO members possess nuclear weapons. The relevant question for New Zealand is therefore not whether one commentator can accurately predict war. It is whether current escalation, military rearmament and weakened diplomatic communication are increasing the consequences of miscalculation.
Johnson’s warning deserves examination because he has recently spoken with Russian officials and observers. But his conclusions remain his own. NATO’s current assessment that a Russian full-scale attack is highly unlikely is equally important evidence.
For New Zealand, understanding both assessments is more useful than assuming either side can know with certainty where the present trajectory ends.
Independent reporting. Original context. Credited sources.
Sources
Source Transcript
The supplied transcript of the Larry Johnson interview was used as the primary interview record for this report.