The German chancellor, French president and Italian prime minister appear to have seen reason in making up with Moscow. But is it genuine?
ByTarik Cyril Amar, a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory
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RT: German Chancellor Friedrich Merz © Getty Images / Maja Hitij / Getty Images
Sometimes
a surprising statement made almost in passing on a minor occasion can
pack a lot of political oomph. And sometimes, it’s just a slip and won’t
tell you much about either the present or the future. But how do you
know?
That is the challenge posed by German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s recent – and very unusual – talk about a “compromise” (“Ausgleich” in German) with Russia, which, he also stressed, is “a European country,” indeed “our greatest European neighbor.”
Outside
the context of current Western and, in particular, German and EU
politics, such a statement may seem almost commonplace. Obviously,
it would make sense for Berlin – and Brussels, too – to work toward a
peaceful, productive, mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow.
Equally obviously, this is not merely an option but, in reality, a vital
necessity (as Merz may have been hinting at when emphasizing that
Russia is Germany’s greatest European neighbor: Greatest as in
indispensable?).
Yet once you add the actual context of escalating
German and EU policies toward Russia since 2014 at the very latest,
Merz’s sudden insight into the obvious appears almost sensational. For
over a decade, German and EU policy toward Moscow has been based on
three simple – and self-damagingly insane – ideas: First, Russia is our
enemy by default and “forever” (see the refreshingly frank admission
by German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul). Second, using Ukraine (and
a lot of Ukrainians), we can defeat that enemy with a combination of
economic and diplomatic warfare and a very bloody proxy war on the
ground. Finally, there is no alternative: it is VERBOTEN to even think
about genuine give-and-take negotiations and any compromise that would
also be good enough for Moscow.
Merz, moreover, has no record as a
doubter of these moronic dogmas. On the contrary, he has been a
consistent uber-hawk, combining the requisite constant Russophobic
undertone with a long series of hardline initiatives and positions. Just
a few months ago, for instance, Merz fought tooth and nail
for confiscating Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU. That he
lost that fight was due to resistance from Belgium – which would have
been exposed to absurdly irrational risks by permitting that robbery –
and France and Italy, whose leaders tripped up their hapless German “ally” at the last minute.
In a similar combination of public belligerence and final futility,
Merz had long been a proponent of delivering advanced German Taurus cruise missiles – particularly well-suited for destroying things such as Russia’s Kerch Bridge
– to Ukraine, before abandoning that awful idea. Ultimately and wisely,
he shied away from involving Germany even more deeply in the proxy
fight against Russia, most likely under the impression of very firm
warnings from Moscow.
Just this month, the German chancellor declared he is ready to send German soldiers to secure a “ceasefire”
in Ukraine. Yes, that would be that ceasefire that Moscow has ruled out
as a dishonest half-measure. It is true that Merz hedged this
announcement with conditions that make it irrelevant. But, nonetheless,
it was not a contribution to de-escalation with Russia.
Yet here
we are. Speaking not in Berlin, but the provincial metropolis of Halle
in Eastern Germany, Merz used the occasion of a fairly humdrum meeting
under the auspices of a regional IHK (Industrie und Handelskammer)
meeting to speak about Germany’s relationship with Russia.
The IHK
is a chamber of industry and commerce, an economic association of some
weight. But it is not the parliament in Berlin or, for instance, even a
foreign-policy information war outfit/think tank. Most of Merz’s remarks,
unsurprisingly, concerned the German economy, which, he had to admit,
is not in a good state, but, he promised, will be better soon. He also
gave his word to fight and reduce bureaucracy, not only in Germany but the EU as well. That sort of stuff, nothing special, political potboiler.
But then, in the middle of the absolutely predictable and rather
boring meeting, the chancellor suddenly extended a hand to Moscow. Or
did he? Merz himself knows that his having anything to say about Russia
that comes without foam at the mouth is extraordinary: he took care to
assure his listeners that it was not the location “in the East” (that is, the former East Germany) that made him strike such a new tone regarding Russia.
His
audience may or may not have been convinced by that all-too-quick
denial. Halle is not only a major city in Germany’s East, but also, more
specifically, the second-largest conurbation in the Land of
Saxony-Anhalt. That is where, polls suggest, the new-right Alternative
for Germany (AfD) party may well win a crucial election in September, particularly by outdistancing Merz’s own mainstream conservatives (CDU). A similar scenario is possible in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, also in Germany’s East.
In
both places, even a relative (not absolute) AfD majority, which seems
certain at this point, would expose the traditional parties and
especially the CDU to one of their worst nightmares: the end of the
so-called “firewall,” that is, the harebrained and undemocratic
policy of simply freezing the AfD out of the building of ruling
coalitions. Merz personally has been an iron proponent of the “firewall.” Razing it, even regionally, will cost him his political career or force him into a brutal, humiliating 180-degree turn.
One
important reason voters in Germany’s East are unhappy with the
traditional parties is their policy of relentless, self-damaging
confrontation toward Russia and equally relentless, really masochistic
support for Zelensky’s regime in Ukraine. Just now, one of Germany’s
highest courts has finally, in essence, recognized the fact that Ukraine
was deeply involved in the worst vital-infrastructure attack in postwar
German history, the destruction of most of the Nord Stream pipelines. Many Germans have had enough, not only but especially in Germany’s East.
That is why Merz knows that any apparent concessions to Moscow will
meet healthy skepticism there. He also has a solid and well-deserved
reputation for breaking his promises. His listeners in Halle may well
have dismissed the new Merz sound as nothing but cheap pre-electoral
manipulation.
And perhaps that is all it was. But there are good
reasons to keep an open mind. For one thing, Merz has not been the only
EU leader striking a more conciliatory note recently. As the Russian government has noted,
similar statements have been made in France and Italy. The leaders of
both countries, Emmanuel Macron and Georgia Meloni, have been no less
bold than Merz in stating the obvious, namely – to summarize – that not
even talking to Moscow is a daft policy.
It is not hard to see why
EU politicians may be prepared to pursue diplomacy again. Their
imperial overlord in Washington has made it clear that the Ukraine war
will be their problem and theirs alone, while also displaying a
brutality towards the world, including the clients/vassals in Europe,
that is unusually open even by American standards.
After the
tariff wars, the new US National Security Strategy, Venezuela, and the
threats against Denmark over Greenland, could it be that, at very long
last, some in Europe are slowly waking up to the fact that the worst
threat to the sorry remains of their sovereignty, their economies, and
also their traditional political elites is Washington, not Moscow? It
would be very rash to assume so. But we can hope.