The “golden age” of US-Pakistani ties that began with Trump’s return is now over after the US reached its interim trade deal with India.
Andrew Korybko
Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard told
Congress last week that “Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Pakistan
have been researching and developing an array of novel, advanced, or
traditional missile delivery systems with nuclear and conventional
payloads that put our Homeland within range…Pakistan’s long-range
ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with the
range capable of striking the Homeland.” This shocked Pakistan after its
rapid rapprochement with the US.
Pakistan’s de facto military dictatorship that came to power after April 2022’s post-modern coup against former Prime Minister Imran Khan has behaved very obsequiously
towards Trump, in response to which he showered them with compliments
that naturally upset their Indian nemesis. Pakistan has even reportedly
considered offering the US a commercial port. While ties officially remain strong, the Indo-US trade deal caught Pakistan off guard, thus prompting concern that India regained the US’ regional favor.
Such
views are now circulating even more widely after Gabbard’s remarks,
which reaffirmed what the Biden Administration claimed in December 2024
when it imposed sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. It
was argued here
that perhaps Pakistan plans to sell its ICBM research and future
technology, while former senior officials from the Department of War and
National Security Council speculated last summer that Pakistan actually wants to deter a US decapitation strike or intervention on India’s side.
Dr. Rabia Akhtar, who’s a prominent Pakistani nuclear security scholar and a leading figure at the University of Lahore, published a detailed rebuttal to the two aforesaid former officials’ article from Foreign Affairs that can be read here
and is worth at least skimming for those interested in this subject.
Her argument boils down to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program
expanding in response to India expanding its military footprint so as to
cover all of its nemesis’ strategic sites in the event of a crisis.
She
also argues that “[Pakistan’s] strategy to handle those contingencies
(of a US decapitation strike or attempted seizure of its nukes) has
emphasised operational secrecy and redundancy of its nuclear arsenal,
not threatening America with attack.” That’s reasonable, but from the
US’ strategic security perspective – which she describes in this context
as “alarmist” and “worst-case” thinking – its expanding capabilities
could facilitate a future intent to threaten or target the homeland,
which is also reasonable.
Dr. Akhtar’s rebuttal doesn’t
touch upon the scenario of Pakistan selling its reported ICBM research
and future technology, however, which might have influenced Israel’s
decision to recognize Somaliland last December as argued here
so as to keep an eye on possible Turkish testing sites in neighboring
Somalia. This is also a plausible scenario as is the one about deterring
the US. What’s most important is that the US is once again drawing
attention to Pakistan’s ballistic missile program after a 15-month
hiatus.
That in turn suggests that the “golden age” of
US-Pakistani ties which began with Trump’s return is now over after the
US reached its interim trade deal with India. It can even be argued in
hindsight that the US used Trump’s purposely provocative praise of
Pakistan over the past year to “bait” India into zeroing out tariffs on
most US goods and services in exchange for restoring India’s role as the
US’ regional favorite. If that’s correct, then the US might take a
harder line towards Pakistan, thus reversing the past year’s gains.