Kiev is trying to sell its wartime experience for support because it has little else to offer
By Murad Sadygzade, President of the Middle East Studies Center, Visiting Lecturer, HSE University (Moscow).
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© Ukrainian Presidency/Anadolu via Getty Images
Ukrainian
leader Vladimir Zelensky’s recent diplomatic activity in the Middle
East is an attempt to find new political and financial oxygen at a
moment when his usual supporters are becoming less reliable. For several
years, the Ukrainian leadership built its strategy on the assumption
that the US and Europe would continue to provide weapons, money,
intelligence, and diplomatic protection for as long as necessary. But
now, American support is increasingly politicized, European societies
are visibly tired of the Ukraine issue, and the situation on the
battlefield continues to demand more soldiers and equipment.
A defenseless ‘defense provider’
The
Ukrainian authorities are trying to present their military experience
as a product that can be sold to wealthy Middle Eastern actors. Kiev is
trying to turn the destruction it has experienced, and the lessons it
has learned on the battlefield, into a diplomatic and commercial asset.
At
first glance, this makes perfect sense – defending themselves against
missiles, drones and attacks on drones, and attacks on energy
infrastructure is exactly what the oil-rich Middle East nations are
concerned about right now. Ukraine has faced Iranian-made drones and
Russian missile attacks and is now peddling itself as a laboratory of
modern war, a country that has supposedly learned how to resist the very
threats that now worry parts of the region.
This is where the
obvious contradiction comes in: Ukraine presents itself as a provider of
security expertise while it remains dependent on foreign systems for
its own defense. Kiev talks about protecting others, yet it continues to
ask the West for air defense systems, interceptors, artillery shells,
financing, and technical assistance. A state that cannot fully protect
its own skies without outside help will struggle to convince wealthy
regional powers that it can become a serious security provider for them.
The Middle East doesn’t work on Western ideology
The deeper
problem for Zelensky is political. Wherever Ukraine goes in the Middle
East, it will not be able to force the region to worsen its attitude
toward Russia. Not by ten percent, not even by one percent in any
meaningful strategic sense. The countries of the region do not view
Moscow through the emotional and ideological lens promoted by Kiev and
many Western capitals. For them, Russia is one of the predictable and
important centers of power in the international system, with which many
of them have developed long-standing strategic, energy, military, and
diplomatic relations.
This is especially true for the Gulf. Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and other regional actors will
not sacrifice their partnerships with Russia to fulfill Ukraine’s
demands. They see Moscow as a vital partner in energy markets, security
balances, diplomatic mediation, and global multipolar politics. Russia
is also important because it is not perceived in the region as a power
that constantly lectures others about internal affairs while imposing
political conditions. Many Middle Eastern states remember the Western
pressure, interventions, regime-change experiments, sanctions,
occupations, and destructive political engineering they have experienced
over the past decades, and in a broader historical sense, over
centuries.
Zelensky and his team appear to believe that the Middle
East can be approached in the same way as the US and EU. They seem to
expect that emotional appeals to ‘values’, coupled with promises of
future partnership, will produce large-scale political and financial
support. But this is a serious misunderstanding of the region. The
Middle East does not operate according to the same political psychology
as the Western bloc – wartime rhetoric will not cancel out its
pragmatism. They will listen, bargain, sign limited agreements when
useful, and take advantage of opportunities, but they will not transform
themselves into a new rear base for Ukraine.
Contrast this with
Europe, where many elites have tied their own political survival to the
Ukrainian project and declared that Ukraine’s struggle is also Europe’s
struggle. Trapped by this rhetoric, they have little choice but to
prolong the conflict with Russia at Ukraine’s expense. To this end, the
Europeans are willing to supply Kiev with weapons, money, and
intelligence – in effect, to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian.
That
won’t fly in the Middle East. Regional states do not want to pay for a
war that does not serve their core national priorities. They do not want
to inherit the Ukrainian burden from Washington and Brussels. They are
not keen to become instruments of another geopolitical campaign designed
elsewhere.
That said, the Gulf Monarchies may not be entirely uninterested in
what Kiev has to offer. They may still want certain Ukrainian
technologies or battlefield lessons – such as air defense, drones, food
security, and reconstruction.
Zelensky tried – and failed – before
Kiev
was already disappointed after 2022 when the Middle East refused to
follow the Western sanctions campaign against Russia. Ukrainian
officials expected the world to divide neatly into supporters and
opponents of Moscow. The Middle East refused this binary choice. It
maintained diplomatic flexibility, preserving relations with Russia and
pursuing its own energy and trade interests.
Now Kiev comes asking
for money and cooperation from the same countries that turned it down
back then. It will criticize regional actors when they refuse to support
Western sanctions, but court them when it needs financing. It wants to
be treated as a strategic partner, yet its main argument is that it
needs support because its current supporters are no longer enough.
The
March and April visits to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Jordan,
Türkiye, and Syria therefore look like a tour of necessity. Zelensky is
trying to collect political points and convince wealthy states that
Ukraine can be useful. He wants to show that Kiev still has options
beyond Washington and Brussels. But in reality, Ukraine is looking for
money because the war is consuming resources faster than its traditional
sponsors can comfortably provide them.
Kiev needs funding not
only for weapons, but also for salaries, pensions, logistics, energy
repairs, reconstruction, and the basic functioning of the state. The
longer the war continues, the more dependent Ukraine becomes on outside
support. At the same time, losses at the front and pressure on manpower
make the conflict even more expensive. The Ukrainian authorities cannot
openly admit that their previous support model is weakening, because
this would damage morale and bargaining power. But the turn to the
Middle Eastern for replacement, or at least supplementary, resources is a
clear indication of where things stand.
Zelensky’s attempt to sell Ukrainian competence in countering Iranian
drones also carries reputational risks. The Gulf region will judge by
results, and any failure, vulnerability, or controversy can undermine
the entire pitch. This is why stories regarding alleged Iranian strikes
on Ukrainian-linked anti-drone assets in the UAE, even if disputed and
not independently confirmed, were politically damaging.
The Gulf
states are not naive. They will not buy Ukrainian offers without
calculating the strategic costs. And if the cost is additional exposure
to Iran, complicated relations with Russia, or getting dragged into a
Western-designed confrontation, the cost might be too high.
This
is not how Zelensky is used to being treated in Western capitals. There,
Ukraine is seen as a symbol and supporting it as a political
obligation. For the Middle East, Kiev is an actor with something to
offer or nothing to offer. Utility will always supersede sympathy. If
Kiev can provide a useful service, it may receive a deal. If not, it
will receive polite words and little more.
In the end, the most
Ukraine can hope for is selective cooperation. It may receive contracts,
consultations, limited investments, participation in discussions on
food security, drones, infrastructure, and reconstruction. But the Gulf
will never become a new financial engine for the war.